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We all, each and every one of us, should be aware that since 1987, we have been governed by an assortment of the Almost Good, the Very Bad and the Disgustingly Ugly, plus corrupt, incompetent, greedy, and idiotic.

The time has come when we must for the future of the children and our Nation ensure that we vote and that we vote for a party that we truly believe is capable of working in the best interest of Fiji, its aged, its young, its poor, its future generations, which frankly rules out most government members we have had for the past 40 years.

This is a pragmatic assessment grounded in Fiji’s structural realities as a small, open, climate-vulnerable Pacific island economy with a history of political instability, ethnic diversity, high public debt, tourism dependence, and exposure to external shocks. These considerations could guide ANY FUTURE PARTY seeking durable national outcomes rather than short-term electoral advantage.

Political foundations

Long-term viability depends more on institutional quality than on any particular ideology:

  • Prioritise political stability and the rule of law. Fiji’s repeated coups and periods of tension have raised the cost of capital, deterred investment, and fragmented policy continuity. Strengthening independent institutions (judiciary, electoral bodies, anti-corruption mechanisms) and predictable constitutional rules reduces the risk of abrupt reversals that destroy credibility.
  • Build inclusive, multi-ethnic governance. Policies that systematically advantage or disadvantage one community over another recreate the zero-sum dynamics that have repeatedly destabilised the country. Broad-based legitimacy is more resilient than majoritarian or identity-based mobilisation.
  • Focus on competence and continuity over personality or patronage. High debt levels, climate risks, and the need for sustained investment reward parties that can maintain coherent multi-year strategies in infrastructure, education, and fiscal management rather than cyclical spending spikes before elections.
  • Maintain civilian supremacy and clear civil-military boundaries. Recurring military involvement in politics has been a source of uncertainty; durable democracy requires both professional security forces and civilian accountability.

These are enabling conditions. Without them, even well-designed economic policies tend to under-deliver.

Trade and economic orientation

Fiji’s size, remoteness, and vulnerability to cyclones and global commodity swings favour openness combined with deliberate capacity-building:

  • Deepen and diversify trade rather than retreat into protectionism. Tourism remains the dominant foreign-exchange earner, but concentration creates fragility. Expanding higher-value agriculture (including branded products), fisheries, niche manufacturing, and services while improving logistics, biosecurity, and quality standards increases resilience. Preferential access to Australia, New Zealand, and other markets is valuable only if domestic producers can meet standards and compete.
  • Engage regional and bilateral arrangements selectively and with clear safeguards. Agreements such as PACER Plus or others with major partners should be judged by whether they expand realistic market access, support infant-industry development where feasible, and avoid locking in rules that permanently constrain policy space. Fiji has historically approached some of these deals cautiously for exactly these reasons.
  • Balance major partners without exclusive alignment. Australia and New Zealand remain critical for tourism, labour mobility, and security; China, India, the United States, and others offer investment, infrastructure, and market opportunities. A non-aligned, interest-based approach that maximises options while preserving sovereignty is more sustainable than ideological dependence on any single external power.
  • Integrate climate resilience into trade and investment policy. Physical risks (cyclones, sea-level rise, droughts) already impose large costs. Policies that encourage climate-smart agriculture, resilient infrastructure, and insurance mechanisms protect both export capacity and fiscal sustainability. International climate finance can complement, but not replace, domestic reform.
  • Improve the investment climate through governance rather than solely through incentives. Rule of law, contract enforcement, transparent regulation, and reduced bureaucratic friction matter more for sustained foreign direct investment than temporary tax holidays. High public debt constrains fiscal giveaways; credibility is the scarcer resource.

Trade-offs and realism

Openness can expose domestic producers to competition and widen trade deficits if competitiveness does not improve. Protection can shelter jobs short-term but often raises costs for consumers and input-using industries. Fiscal expansion may be politically attractive yet risks debt sustainability given already elevated ratios. Climate adaptation requires upfront spending that competes with other priorities.

A future party’s most constructive contribution would be to treat these trade-offs explicitly, ground policy in evidence about what actually raises productivity and resilience in a small island setting, and build cross-community coalitions around shared material interests (jobs, security from disasters, rising living standards) rather than identity cleavage. Success will be measured less by ideological purity than by whether living standards, institutional trust, and shock-absorbing capacity rise over successive electoral cycles.