Will Rabuka destroy Fiji’s future with his latest transaction?>

13 Wednesday May 2026

Posted by fijipensioners in Articles & Reports

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environment, fiji, news, politics, travel

FIJI IS OUR BRAND, WHAT DO WE LOSE IF WE TRADE IT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DECISIONS OUR CHILDREN AND LANDOWNERS WILL HAVE TO LIVE WITH?

Dobs Tukana

Will we protect what makes Fiji special before we accidentally or deliberately trade it away?

What I’m sharing will affect all of us even before the first concrete is poured.

It all starts with one decision.

One moment that can shape Fiji for the next 30 to 50 years.

We have every chance to build something truly global from what we already have.

But we also risk slowly “shooting ourselves in the foot” if we get this wrong….

And it all begins with Vuda……..

Please like read & share Post 3B……

POST 3B INTRODUCTION

This post will reveal something much bigger than a single infrastructure project.

Because what is now unfolding is no longer just an engineering discussion.

It is becoming a national question about legacy, accountability, economic survival, and the long-term direction of Fiji itself.

And the reality is this:

All of this may begin with one decision (WtE Vuda)

One approval.

One signature.

One Environmental Impact Assessment process.

One moment where Fiji decides what kind of future it is willing to lock itself into.

And in infrastructure systems thinking, this is exactly how national trajectories begin to change.

Because long after governments, consultants, developers, and decision-makers move on…

it is ordinary Fijians, landowners, future generations, local businesses, and the national economy that will ultimately live with the consequences of these decisions.

And this is where the conversation becomes uncomfortable.

But something about this issue has continued sitting heavily in my heart…

And honestly, I believe God is speaking to me very clearly about it.

Not to attack development.

Not to attack government.

Not to attack investors.

But to shed light on the long-term consequences that can happen when development decisions are made without fully understanding what may unfold 20,30, or even 50 years later.

Most people may not have seen this angle before….

This is the lens of someone who has lived inside both worlds, Fiji’s lived reality and global Tier 1 development systems.

You only truly understand this when you sit inside environments where infrastructure is not just engineering, but national economic strategy.

Because Fiji has already experienced moments like this before…

The Monasavu land issue is one example that stayed with me deeply growing up.

My own family (maternal link) comes from the Monasavu landowning units (Yavusa o Nubu) connected to the Hydro Scheme.

Back in the 1970s, many of our elders, uncles, cousins and grandfathers did not have the technical exposure, legal understanding, or global development experience to fully understand the long-term implications of those negotiations and agreements.

They trusted the process.

They trusted leadership.

They trusted development.

But decades later, compensation issues still affected families.

I still remember the emotional moment in our home when payments were finally resolved properly around 2005.

The happiness in the room.

The relief.

The emotion.

That moment stayed with me for life.

Because I realised something very important:

Development decisions do not end when construction finishes.

Sometimes the real consequences only appear decades later.

And by then, the original decision-makers are often gone.

The people left carrying the burden are usually:

• the landowners

• the younger generations

• the ordinary families

• and the communities connected to the land itself

MY LIVED EXPERIENCE, WHY THIS LENS EXISTS

That young boy growing up in Lautoka in the 1980s is no longer the same person today.

Before I ever entered global environments, development was already part of my life.

My father worked in the Monasavu Hydro Scheme in the 70’s and later joined what became the Fiji Electricity Authority and now EFL.

My uncles & cousins were carpenters and foremen.

One of my Tatalevu was the General foreman during the Lautoka Hospital construction back in the days.

Construction, infrastructure, and development were not concepts to me they were family life conversations.

That is how I grew up understanding Fiji.

Later in life, I joined the British Army-Royal Engineers.

Even there, instructors would often say something I never forgot (& my fellow serving and veterans will attest to this):

“Why would you leave Fiji when people from all over the world pay to experience where you already come from?”

At that time, I did not fully understand what they meant.

Years later, I understood.

God later blessed me with opportunities to work inside some of the world’s most advanced development environments:

• Riyadh

• Dubai

• Abu Dhabi

• London

And what many people may not realise is this:

You only begin seeing development differently once you are actually sitting inside Tier 1 systems helping shape economic growth every single day.

Not just watching projects from the outside.

Actually, sitting at the table.

Watching how governments and developers decide:

• where infrastructure should go

• what economic value it unlocks

• what risks it creates

• how tourism is protected

• how investor confidence is maintained

• and how national branding is strategically defended

From:

• data centres generating hundreds of millions every month

• railway systems unlocking regional productivity

• casino developments tied to tourism diversification

• aviation expansion

• bridges connecting economic corridors

• waterfront masterplans

• logistics hubs

• and entire future cities

One thing became very clear to me:

Infrastructure and economic growth coexist together.

One feeds the other.

One protects the other.

And one can also destroy the other if planning is done poorly.

That is why this issue matters so deeply.

Because what is now unfolding in Fiji is no longer simply:

• an engineering discussion

• a waste discussion

• or an energy discussion

This is becoming a national conversation about:

• legacy

• identity

• landowner protection

• Brand Equity

• tourism survival

• climate credibility

• and the inheritance future generations of Fijians will one day carry

And perhaps this is where many people still have not fully seen the angle I am speaking from.

Project Managers may look at:

• megawatts

• construction timelines

• engineering outputs

• and financial return models

But the lens I am looking through now is much wider.

I now see:

• tourism sensitivity

• Brand Equity exposure

• investor psychology

• environmental positioning

• landowner implications

• international perception risk

• and intergenerational consequences

That is not theory.

That is experience.

And perhaps this is why I cannot stay silent.

THE FIJI BRAND IS NOT MARKETING.

IT IS ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE.

One of the biggest misunderstandings in developing countries is this:

People think branding is just marketing.

But for countries like Fiji, branding is not marketing.

It is economic infrastructure.

Fiji does not compete globally through:

• oil and gas

• heavy industry

• manufacturing dominance

• or industrial exports

Fiji competes through perception.

And over generations, Fiji built one of the most emotionally powerful national brands in the Pacific.

The FIJI Brand represents:

• purity

• happiness

• untouched beauty

• environmental trust

• clean oceans

• cultural authenticity

• peace

• safety

• and escape from industrialised environments

That emotional connection is not symbolic.

It drives:

• tourism

• aviation demand

• exports

• foreign exchange

• hospitality employment

• investor confidence

• and international trust

The world does not pay premium prices for Fiji accidentally.

People pay because they emotionally trust what Fiji represents.

When somebody buys a bottle of FIJI Water in Dubai for USD$10…

they are not buying water.

They are buying:

• trust

• purity

• emotional connection

• environmental identity

• and Brand Equity

I still remember in Saudi Arabia around three years ago when one of my colleagues bought a bottle of FIJI Water.

She looked at me and said:

“Your country must be pure and beautiful if the water tastes this good.”

That moment stayed with me.

Because I realised something very important:

The FIJI name already carries global emotional value.

Countries spend billions trying to build that kind of perception artificially.

Fiji already has it naturally.

And perhaps this is where Fiji must wake up strategically.

Because unlike Dubai or Abu Dhabi, where billions are spent building:

• artificial islands

• engineered coastlines

• manufactured waterfronts

• and tourism branding from scratch

Fiji already possesses naturally what other countries are desperately trying to create artificially.

We already have:

• natural islands

• natural beauty

• real oceans

• authentic culture

• emotional tourism appeal

• and globally admired landscapes

A gift from God Himself.

So, the national question becomes:

Why are we risking trading one of the world’s most naturally valuable tourism identities…

for infrastructure decisions that may slowly weaken the very perception supporting the economy itself?

That is not anti-development.

That is strategic concern.

Because perception shifts faster than construction.

And once perception changes:

• tourism behaviour changes

• investor behaviour changes

• international narratives change

• premium positioning weakens

• and Brand Equity slowly begins eroding underneath the surface

That is the compound effect many people are still not seeing.

A 5% tourism perception shift today may look small.

But compounded across:

• airline demand

• hotel occupancy

• foreign exchange

• employment

• investor confidence

• tourism expansion

• and premium branding

…the downstream economic impact becomes enormous over time.

Tourism earnings already exceed billions annually.

Even modest long-term perception shifts could quietly remove hundreds of millions from the economy over future decades.

That is why this discussion matters.

And perhaps this is the deeper emotional concern many ordinary Fijians and landowners are now feeling.

Not fear of development.

But fear that Fiji may accidentally compromise something generations before us worked incredibly hard to build.

LET US REMEMBER THOSE WHO BUILT FIJI BEFORE US

Before any final decisions are made, we must remember those who built Fiji before us.

The forefathers.

The landowners.

The village elders.

The Girmitiyas who came and toiled the land.

The sugarcane farmers.

The workers.

The teachers.

The civil servants.

The nation builders.

They did not build Fiji overnight.

They built trust over generations.

That trust became:

• the Fiji Rugby identity

• the Fiji Airways identity

• the FIJI Water identity

• the tourism identity

• and the peaceful image the world emotionally connects with today

Fiji Rugby took more than 113 years to rise into Tier 1 global respect.

That did not happen overnight.

It took sacrifice.

Discipline.

Pride.

Identity.

The same applies to the FIJI Brand itself.

And perhaps this is what many people are emotionally protecting now.

Not just land.

Not just coastlines.

But the inheritance left behind by previous generations.

A place the world often describes as:

“The Way the World Should Be.”

That legacy is not ours alone to redesign without consequence.

It is ours to protect.

MY POSITION IS NOT ANTI-DEVELOPMENT, IT IS PRO-FIJI

To foreign investors reading this:

Please understand something very clearly.

Most ordinary Fijians are not anti-investment.

They are not anti-growth.

They are not anti-development.

Fijians welcome progress.

But the land is emotional to our people.

The ocean is emotional to our people.

And the FIJI name is emotional to our people.

In Tier 1 development environments, landowners are respected.

Communities are consulted.

National branding is protected strategically.

That same respect must exist here too.

Because development done properly can absolutely coexist with:

• tourism

• sustainability

• climate leadership

• investor confidence

• and long-term national prosperity

FINAL REFLECTION

This is not just about one project.

This is about what Fiji becomes.

We already have something the world cannot easily replicate.

Natural Brand Equity.

We are not short of opportunity.

We are at risk of misalignment.

And that is the difference.

Post 4 will focus on… The way forward for Fiji….

Because it is not too late for Fiji.

Fiji can still move forward strategically.

We can still modernise properly.

We can still create energy security.

We can still attract investment.

We can still protect tourism.

We can still protect landowners.

We can still strengthen the economy.

But only if development remains aligned with what gives Fiji value in the first place.

And perhaps that is the biggest point of all.

The world already sees Fiji as special.

The real question now is:

Will we protect what makes Fiji special before we accidentally or deliberately trade it away?

THE TIME TO BE CONCERNED IS NOW!

11 Monday May 2026

Posted by fijipensioners in Articles & Reports

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climate-change, energy, environment, technology

Intro

Rick Rickman

prnteSsodo5i2cc294f9f9f172ug7m3000g6h871cf4fl345m0467l4936tc ·

Shared with Public

This is a detailed analysis of the current Waste for Energy proposal that the PM and his overpaid ministers are proposing.

Every one of them including the PM should read this and then write a logical response if they are capable.

Failing that the proposal should be squashed.

Dobs Tukana is in Fiji.

prnteSsodo5MM3y284f9f9ft0 ug4m3000 6h8P1af4fl345 : 67l4a361c ·

This is a long post

But if you want to truly understand the engineering, economics, logistics, infrastructure strain, and what this system could mean for Fiji over the next 30 years…Please Find time to read it

“This analysis is written from a Civil Engineering and Global infrastructure Development perspective, based on academic and practical Mega & Giga Project Delivery Experience.”

I have broken this into two posts so it is easier to follow.

Post 3A focuses on the system reveal, what the engineering, economics, and logistics are actually showing.

Post 3B will follow later this weekend and goes deeper into what these systems connect to and what it means long-term.

Apart from the wider news, this is important because it affects all of us and it highlights how deeply connected national systems really are.

POST 3A: THE HIDDEN TRUTH BEHIND FIJI’S WASTE-TO-ENERGY DEBATE, WHAT THE NUMBERS ARE REALLY REVEALING

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few weeks, Fiji has been debating the proposed Vuda Waste-to-Energy project from every possible angle.

Landowners.

Environment.

Development.

Investment.

Energy.

Waste.

Everyone is arguing from different positions.

But what if the real issue is that most people still have not seen what the system itself is actually designed around?

Because once you strip away the presentations, the (cleaning Fiji) marketing language, and the political noise, infrastructure projects eventually face one unavoidable test:

Do the numbers actually balance?

That is where this conversation starts to change.

In real infrastructure engineering, projects of this scale are not supposed to move forward based on excitement or broad promises alone.

They go through Project Appraisal.

A structured process used to test whether a project still works once real-world engineering, logistics, transport systems, long-term costs, and operational realities are applied to it.

And in many developed countries, especially for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (NSIPs), there are institutional “Gatekeepers” that test projects before the public ever reaches this level of confusion and division.

Technical gates.

Financial gates.

Logistics gates.

Risk gates.

Which raises a serious question:

If Fiji had a proper national Gatekeeper system for projects of this scale… would we even be debating this proposal in its current form today?

Because if the engineering fundamentals were stress-tested properly from the beginning, many of the questions now dividing the country may already have been answered.

And this is where the discussion becomes uncomfortable.

Most people understandably assume this project is simply about cleaning up Fiji’s waste problem.

But engineering systems do not run on assumptions.

They run on:

throughput, feedstock, calorific value, logistics, daily operational demand, and long-term system stability.

That is where the numbers begin telling a very different story.

Current estimates suggest Fiji generates approximately 200,000 tonnes of municipal waste per year.

Yet an 80MW scale Waste-to-Energy system typically requires close to 900,000 tonnes annually to maintain continuous operational throughput.

That is not a small gap.

That is a structural dependency.

And once that reality appears, the entire national conversation changes.

Because the question is no longer:

“Can Fiji build a Waste-to-Energy plant?”

The real question becomes:

What is the system actually designed to depend on for the next 25 to 30 years in order to keep operating continuously?

And if Fiji alone cannot physically sustain the required waste volumes…

then what fills the gap?

We must now ask the uncomfortable questions:

• Who pays to transport waste from across Fiji to Vuda continuously?

• What happens when transport and fuel costs rise? (which we are currently facing now)

• What happens if throughput drops below operational requirement?

• What happens if Fiji’s local waste supply is never enough to sustain the system?

• And is the system ultimately being engineered around Fiji’s waste reality… or around something much larger?

This is where thermodynamics, transport engineering, logistics modelling, and Cost-Benefit Analysis begin revealing things the public debate has not fully confronted yet.

Because Waste-to-Energy systems are governed by physics, not slogans.

Low calorific waste.

High moisture content.

Transport distance.

Fuel costs.

Throughput instability.

Supply chain interruptions.

All of these affect whether the system remains economically and operationally viable over time.

And once you begin calculating:

• waste availability

• transport requirements

• logistics costs

• road network stress

• daily throughput demand

• and long-term operational dependence

you begin to realise this is no longer just a waste discussion.

It becomes a permanent national logistics and infrastructure system that Fiji could be locked into for decades.

So, before people argue about outcomes, promises, or headlines…

the first responsibility is to test whether the engineering system itself genuinely balances under real-world conditions.

Because if the numbers do not balance…

what exactly are we really being asked to commit to?

And in Post 3B, another hidden layer will be revealed.

One that sits beyond the engineering, beyond the calculations, and beyond the Waste-to-Energy plant itself.

Because sometimes the biggest long-term consequences of a national project are not the ones people see at the beginning.

They are the ones that emerge quietly after the country has already committed.

This post is written in simple english with basic engineering calculations, specifically so that landowners, students, and young people who will become future leaders can understand how major national infrastructure projects should be properly checked before a country commits to them.

SECTION A. BASIC PROJECT APPRAISAL, WHAT THE NUMBERS ACTUALLY SHOW

Before any nationally significant infrastructure project is approved in countries with mature planning systems, it must first pass through a formal Project Appraisal process.

This is standard international practice.

It is used across major infrastructure systems in the UK, Europe, Australia, Asia, and by institutions connected to long-term development financing.

One of the most widely recognised methodologies is Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA).

In simple terms, CBA asks one fundamental question:

Do the long-term benefits to the country genuinely outweigh the long-term costs, risks, dependencies, and national obligations created by the project?

Not just financially.

But socially.

Logistically.

Environmentally.

Operationally.

And across the full lifecycle of the system.

This means analysing:

• construction costs

• maintenance costs

• transport systems

• logistics requirements

• fuel dependency

• operational resilience

• environmental burden

• infrastructure stress

• public cost exposure

• and long-term national sustainability

Importantly:

these assessments are not done using slogans, marketing, or political excitement.

They are done using engineering.

Physics.

Thermodynamics.

Transport modelling.

And real-world operational calculations.

Because Waste-to-Energy systems are governed by physics, not narratives.

Low calorific waste.

High moisture content.

Transport distance.

Fuel cost escalation.

Throughput instability.

Supply chain interruptions.

All of these determine whether the system remains viable over 25 to 30 years.

And this is where the public discussion begins changing completely.

Because once you begin calculating:

• waste availability

• transport requirements

• logistics costs

• road network stress

• daily throughput demand

• calorific efficiency

• and long-term operational dependence

you begin to realise this is no longer just a “clean-up Fiji” discussion.

It becomes a permanent national logistics and infrastructure system that Fiji could be locked into for decades.

And this is exactly why proper Gatekeeper systems exist internationally for major infrastructure proposals.

Because if a project fails the appraisal gate:

• it is redesigned

• reduced in scale

• tested through proof-of-concept

• or stopped entirely before national commitment occurs

That is how serious infrastructure systems protect taxpayers, landowners, future generations, and the national interest.

So we must now ask the uncomfortable questions:

• If this project was truly designed around Fiji’s waste reality… where is the national transport and logistics plan?

• Who pays to move waste from across Fiji to Vuda continuously for 25 to 30 years?

• Who pays for inter-island barge systems that must comply with MSAF requirements?

• Who absorbs rising diesel and shipping costs over time?

• What happens if daily waste throughput drops below operational requirement?

• What happens if Fiji’s local waste is never enough to sustain the required energy output?

• And if the economics only improve when foreign waste enters the system… what does that reveal about the real operating model?

Because once the numbers are tested properly…

something very important begins to emerge.

The system does not appear to be optimised around Fiji’s domestic waste reality.

The system appears to perform more efficiently at large-scale imported throughput.

And that changes the entire conversation.

Especially for:

• landowners

• students

• young people

• and future leaders

because these are the generations who will ultimately inherit the long-term consequences of infrastructure decisions made today.

STEP 1: WASTE BALANCE CHECK (CORE ENGINEERING TEST)

An 80MW Waste-to-Energy plant typically requires:

• approximately 900,000 tonnes of waste per year

Fiji’s estimated municipal waste generation:

• approximately 200,000 tonnes per year

Simple balance calculation:

Required:

900,000 tonnes/year

Available locally:

200,000 tonnes/year

Shortfall:

700,000 tonnes/year

Engineering interpretation:

Fiji can only supply:

200,000 ÷ 900,000 × 100

= 22%

Meaning:

• 78% of required feedstock does not exist locally

This is the first major reveal.

Because thermodynamics does not care about public messaging.

The plant still requires continuous heat energy input every single day.

And heat energy depends on:

• waste quantity

• waste consistency

• and calorific value

If throughput drops:

• combustion efficiency drops

• steam generation drops

• turbine efficiency drops

• energy output drops

• and financial performance drops

Which means the system cannot operate efficiently on unstable or insufficient waste streams.

Key technical question:

Where does the missing 700,000 tonnes per year come from consistently over 25-30 years?

Because if that answer is not clear at appraisal stage:

the system is not technically self-sustaining.

STEP 2: DAILY THROUGHPUT REALITY CHECK

Convert annual demand into daily operations:

900,000 ÷ 365

= 2,466 tonnes/day required

Fiji local supply:

200,000 ÷ 365

= 548 tonnes/day available

Daily shortfall:

2,466 − 548

= 1,918 tonnes/day missing

This means the plant requires nearly:

2,000 tonnes of additional waste every single day.

Not occasionally.

Every day.

Continuously.

For decades.

This is where the “clean-up Fiji” narrative begins colliding with engineering reality.

Because Fiji’s waste system is geographically fragmented across:

• islands

• rural settlements

• municipal areas

• and low-density communities

That creates a transport engineering problem.

Not just a waste problem.

STEP 3: TRANSPORT ENGINEERING & LOGISTICS REALITY

Assume one heavy truck carries:

• 10 tonnes per load

To move 1,918 tonnes/day:

1,918 ÷ 10

= approximately 192 truck movements per day

That is continuous industrial logistics.

Now include:

• return trips

• fuel

• road wear

• handling delays

• transfer stations

• labour

• breakdowns

• and inter-island waste transfer

For outer islands and Vanua Levu:

domestic waste movement would require barge systems operating under MSAF compliance standards.

That means:

• vessel certification

• marine safety compliance

• loading infrastructure

• transfer operations

• environmental handling controls

• and ongoing maritime operational cost

Now compare that against international shipping.

Imported waste arrives:

• compacted

• containerised

• bulk-loaded

• internationally certified

• and already integrated into global shipping systems

Which means:

the overseas logistics chain is already built.

And this is where the reveal becomes difficult to ignore.

If the project was truly designed primarily to clean up Fiji’s local waste…

why does the infrastructure logic align more efficiently with imported bulk waste systems?

Especially when the only clearly defined logistics

infrastructure repeatedly discussed is:

the proposed private deep-water port at Vuda.

STEP 4: THERMODYNAMICS ,THE HIDDEN ENGINEERING TRUTH

This is the layer many people have not yet seen.

Waste-to-Energy systems do not simply need “waste.”

They need:

• consistent waste

• dry enough waste

• combustible waste

• and stable calorific value

Many tropical waste streams contain:

• high moisture

• food waste

• green waste

• and organic material

High moisture content lowers combustion efficiency because a significant portion of the thermal energy is first consumed in evaporating moisture before usable heat energy can be converted into steam and electricity.

This reduces thermal efficiency.

Simple engineering example:

If waste calorific value falls:

• furnace temperature falls

• steam pressure falls

• turbine performance falls

• electrical generation falls

Meaning:

the same quantity of low-quality waste produces less usable energy.

This is why many high-output WtE systems internationally rely on:

• processed waste

• pre-sorted waste

• refuse-derived fuel (RDF)

• or high-volume industrial feedstock

Now compare this to dispersed municipal waste collected across Fiji.

Engineering implication:

local waste alone may not consistently deliver:

• required quantity

• required calorific stability

• or required throughput reliability

And once again:

the economics begin favouring imported processed waste streams.

STEP 5: THE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (CBA) REVEAL

Now apply simplified Cost-Benefit Analysis logic.

Local Fiji waste:

200,000 tonnes/year

Assume blended logistics cost:

$60 per tonne

Transport cost calculation:

200,000 × $60

= $12 million/year

Over 30 years:

$12 million × 30

= $360 million

And that is before:

• fuel escalation

• road rehabilitation

• marine operations

• infrastructure upgrades

• labour increases

• or system expansion

Now ask:

Who carries this cost?

The answer is simple.

You the Taxpayers.

Municipalities.

Government.

Ratepayers.

Now compare imported waste.

Imported waste:

700,000 tonnes/year

Assume gate fee:

$80 per tonne

Revenue calculation:

700,000 × $80

= $56 million/year

Over 30 years:

$56 million × 30

= $1.68 billion

This is the reveal.

One system costs Fiji money to sustain.

The other generates revenue the moment waste arrives.

So from pure engineering and financial optimisation:

which waste stream does the system naturally favour?

STEP 6: THE LANDFILL REALITY CHECK, VUNATO & SYSTEM SCALE

Another major public narrative is now emerging:

that communities near landfill sites should support the project because it solves local waste problems.

But once again:

thermodynamics changes the discussion.

A landfill clean-up system and an 80MW industrial throughput system are not automatically the same thing.

A smaller Proof-of-Concept (POC) facility:

• 15–20MW

• located near landfill zones

• designed around actual local waste throughput

would align more closely with Fiji’s real waste scale.

Because the engineering principle is simple:

infrastructure should match actual local system demand.

Not force the country to artificially feed oversized infrastructure for decades.

And this brings us back to the Gatekeeper question again.

If proper national appraisal systems existed for NSIPs (Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects):

would the recommendation have been:

• smaller-scale phased development?

• proof-of-concept first?

• landfill remediation first?

• or full-scale 80MW dependency from the beginning?

SUMMARY, SECTION A FINDINGS

From engineering, thermodynamics, transport logistics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis:

Fiji supplies only:

200,000 ÷ 900,000 × 100

= 22% of required feedstock

System shortfall:

900,000 − 200,000

= 700,000 tonnes/year

Required WtE feedstock:

900,000 tonnes/year ÷ 365 = 2,466 tonnes/day

Estimated Fiji municipal waste:

200,000 tonnes/year ÷ 365 = 548 tonnes/day

Daily shortfall:

2,466 − 548 = 1,918 tonnes/day

Daily throughput gap:

2,466 − 548

= 1,918 tonnes/day

Heavy truck requirement:

1,918 ÷ 10

= approximately 192 truck movements/day

Estimated local transport burden:

200,000 × $60

= $12 million/year

30-year domestic logistics exposure:

$12 million × 30

= $360 million

Potential imported waste gate fee revenue:

700,000 × $80

= $56 million/year

30-year imported waste revenue potential:

$56 million × 30

= $1.68 billion

Engineering findings:

• Fiji’s waste alone cannot sustain full-scale throughput

• Thermodynamic efficiency depends on stable high-calorific feedstock

• Domestic waste is fragmented and expensive to consolidate

• Inter-island logistics create major long-term operational cost

• Imported waste arrives more efficiently through bulk shipping systems

• Financial viability improves significantly with imported throughput

• The infrastructure logic aligns more strongly with port-based import systems than domestic collection systems

And this leads to the central question of Section A:

If the system performs more efficiently with imported waste than with Fiji’s own domestic waste…

then what is the system actually designed to optimise?

B. MACRO-ECONOMIC IMPACT, WHAT THIS REALLY COSTS FIJI OVER 30 YEARS

Now we move away from engineering for a moment and look at the money.

Not just the project cost.

The national cost.

Because once a system like this is built, Fiji is no longer simply observing it from the outside.

Fiji begins carrying it:

financially,

logistically,

structurally,

and politically

for the next 30 years.

That is the part many people still do not fully understand.

This is no longer just:

“Should we build a Waste-to-Energy plant?”

The real question becomes:

What kind of long-term national system are we actually locking ourselves into?

And once we ask that question properly, the discussion changes completely.

That is why major infrastructure projects around the world go through strict appraisal systems before approval.

These include:

• Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA)

• Net Present Value (NPV)

• Life Cycle Costing (LCC)

• Life Cycle Assessment (LCA)

• Internal Rate of Return (IRR)

These are not political terms.

They are tools used internationally by:

• governments

• treasury departments

• transport authorities

• development banks

• IMF-supported infrastructure frameworks

Their job is simple:

To test whether a project genuinely leaves the country better off over time…

or whether the country quietly carries more cost than benefit once the full system is operating.

And this matters especially for:

• landowners

• students

• young people

• future leaders

Because they are the ones who will inherit the consequences long after today’s decisions.

1. WHAT IS NPV, IN SIMPLE ENGLISH

NPV means Net Present Value.

In simple terms, it asks:

When all money going out and all money coming in is added over 30 years…

does Fiji end up ahead or behind?

But in infrastructure reality, NPV is not just money.

It also reflects:

• fuel volatility

• transport inflation

• maintenance escalation

• climate disruption costs

• logistics system stress

• import dependency risk

Meaning:

NPV is not static.

It moves with real-world pressure.

2. WHAT PEOPLE SEE FIRST, THE BENEFIT

People are told:

• 80MW of electricity

• jobs

• modern infrastructure

• waste solution

• economic development

On the surface, this looks positive.

But we must test it properly.

Plant size:

80MW

Realistic output:

80 × 0.8 = 64MW

Annual generation:

64 × 24 × 365 = 560,640 MWh

Convert:

560,640,000 kWh

Tariff environment (2026):

$0.34 per kWh

Annual value:

560,640,000 × 0.34 = $190 million/year

30 years:

$190M × 30 = $5.7 billion

But this is only the output side.

It does NOT include:

• transport

• fuel logistics

• road damage

• import dependency

• maritime systems

• downtime risk

So the real question becomes:

What is the NET position after costs are deducted?

3. WHY 30 YEARS MATTERS

Waste-to-Energy plants are locked into:

• Power Purchase Agreements (PPA)

• investor repayment cycles

• debt financing structures

• equipment lifespan cycles

• guaranteed throughput contracts

Meaning:

Once signed, Fiji is structurally committed for decades.

And if the system is misaligned early…

the country carries the correction cost later.

4. TRANSPORT ENGINEERING, THE HIDDEN NATIONAL SYSTEM COST

This is where the real structural cost begins.

Fiji is not one landfill.

It is an island network.

So waste must be:

• collected locally

• moved regionally

• consolidated centrally

• transported inter-island

• transferred again

• then delivered to Vuda

This is not waste management.

This is a permanent national freight system.

4.1 “BUILD BEFORE DEMAND” INFRASTRUCTURE LOGIC

In transport engineering, one key principle applies:

Infrastructure must be built ahead of demand.

But here is the issue:

Fiji’s current system already shows:

• congestion stress

• ageing bridges

• limited freight corridors

• weak inter-island logistics capacity

So if we add:

• 300-400 daily heavy truck movements

• continuous waste freight

• inter-island barge operations

We are not improving the system.

We are loading an already constrained network.

That means:

The system does NOT start clean.

It starts under strain.

4.2 LOCAL WASTE TRANSPORT COST

200,000 tonnes × $60 = $12 million/year

30 years:

$360 million

But this is conservative.

It excludes:

• congestion delays

• fuel inflation

• weather disruption

• vehicle replacement cycles

So real cost is higher over time.

5. MARITIME TRANSPORT-MSAF COMPLIANCE REALITY

Inter-island waste movement requires:

• MSAF compliance

• certified vessels

• safety systems

• waste containment protocols

• trained crews

• inspection regimes

Assume barge capacity:

300 tonnes

200,000 ÷ 300 = 667 trips/year

2 trips per day

Estimated cost:

$4M–$8M/year

30 years:

$120M–$240M

Now add a key engineering truth:

Domestic maritime waste logistics are:

• weather-sensitive

• high maintenance

• fuel intensive

• operationally fragile

So, disruption risk is constant.

6. ROAD + BRIDGE SYSTEM STRAIN (LCC REALITY)

Heavy freight impact:

• pavement degradation

• bridge fatigue

• drainage failure

• increased maintenance cycles

Estimated burden:

$15M to $20M/year

30 years:

$450M to $600M

And this excludes:

• extreme flood repair

• cyclone damage

• emergency reconstruction

7. SEMO CULVERT ECONOMIC LOSS

Real-world example of infrastructure failure impact.

Assume:

10,000 vehicles/day affected

$15 loss per vehicle:

10,000 × 15 = $150,000/day

Annual:

$54 million/year

This is only:

• time loss

• fuel inefficiency

• productivity loss

Now scale that across a national freight-heavy system:

losses multiply, not stay linear.

8. MSMEs ,THE REAL ECONOMIC ABSORBER

When transport costs rise, MSMEs feel it first:

• food prices increase

• freight costs rise

• tourism margins shrink

• logistics costs increase

• retail inflation builds

This is hidden taxation through cost transfer.

So eventually:

national infrastructure cost becomes household cost.

9. CLIMATE + THROUGHPUT RISK

Fiji operates in:

• cyclones

• floods

• landslides

• road closures

• port disruption

But Waste-to-Energy requires:

• continuous feedstock

• stable calorific value

• uninterrupted throughput

So, climate disruption becomes:

• revenue disruption

• energy instability

• financial risk

10. IMPORTED WASTE -THE REAL OPERATIONAL DRIVER

Now the key reveal in transport engineering terms:

Imported waste is:

• compacted

• containerised

• bulk shipped

• pre-processed

• internationally regulated

And most importantly:

It arrives directly at the proposed private Vuda port

Meaning:

• no inter-island collection

• no fragmented logistics

• no national consolidation system

• no municipal burden

10.1 IMPORTED WASTE TRANSPORT ECONOMICS

700,000 tonnes × $80 = $56 million/year (gate fee)

But transport advantage is critical:

Shipping economies of scale:

• bulk vessels

• long-distance optimisation

• container efficiency

• international compliance already built-in

This makes imported waste:

cheaper per tonne than domestic collection

So structurally:

Imported waste is not secondary.

It is logistically dominant.

11. FOLLOW THE MONEY

Annual flows:

Electricity:

$190M

Gate fees:

$56M

Total:

$246M/year

But:

This only works if throughput is stable.

So, system dependency becomes:

high-volume continuous import supply

12. GDP LEAKAGE, THE NATIONAL RETENTION PROBLEM

Now the deeper macro impact:

When Fiji imports waste-related systems:

• equipment

• technology

• shipping logistics

• fuel

• spare parts

• specialist operators

Most payments leave the domestic economy.

Assume:

60% to 70% of operational spend is offshore linked

On $246M annual system value:

Leakage:

$150M to $170M/year leaving Fiji economy

30 years:

$4.5B to $5B GDP leakage

Meaning:

Money circulates briefly inside Fiji…

then exits through:

• fuel imports

• foreign contractors

• shipping companies

• technology providers

• maintenance systems

This is the silent macro cost.

13. FINAL STRUCTURAL QUESTION

Now combine everything:

• Fiji supplies only 22% of waste

• 78% requires external input

• domestic logistics are expensive and fragmented

• maritime systems add recurring cost

• road systems are already under strain

• climate disruption is constant

• imported waste is operationally more efficient

• financial model depends on high-volume throughput

• GDP leakage reduces national retention

So, the question becomes:

Is this system designed around Fiji’s waste reality… or around an imported feedstock system that keeps the plant financially and operationally alive?

SECTION B, FINAL FINDINGS

From macro-economics, transport engineering, logistics, thermodynamics, and lifecycle costing:

• Local waste is structurally expensive to collect

• Imported waste is structurally cheaper to move

• Transport systems are already under national strain

• Maritime logistics require continuous funding

• Road and bridge systems face long-term degradation

• Climate disruption threatens throughput stability

• MSMEs absorb inflation pressure over time

• GDP leakage reduces national economic retention

• System only works at high-volume imported throughput

• Financial model becomes dependent on foreign feedstock

FINAL REALITY

This is not just a waste project.

It is a 30-year national logistics and financial system.

And once the numbers are laid out clearly…

the real question is no longer emotional.

It becomes structural:

Who carries the cost… and who captures the value over time?

C. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS, WHERE THE SYSTEM IS FAILING

At this stage, this is no longer about one project.

It is about something more uncomfortable:

how national decisions are being formed inside the system itself.

Because when large infrastructure proposals repeatedly reach advanced stages with unresolved engineering, logistics, land-use, and financial contradictions…

the issue is no longer the project.

It becomes the structure that allowed the project to reach this stage.

From a global infrastructure standpoint, one thing must be stated clearly:

When transport engineering, land zoning, environmental safeguards, maritime logistics, and financial modelling are not fully integrated at the front end…

the country is no longer evaluating systems.

It is evaluating separate parts of a system that are never tested together under real operating conditions.

That is where structural failure begins.

1. THE REAL ISSUE, FRAGMENTATION INSIDE GOVERNMENT DECISION PATHWAYS

Large infrastructure decisions move across multiple silos:

• land administration

• environmental authorities

• energy planning units

• transport and maritime agencies

• municipal councils

• finance and investment divisions

Structural reality

Each institution evaluates only its own boundary:

• land is checked for zoning compliance

• environment is assessed through EIA documentation

• energy is modelled independently

• transport is reviewed separately or late

• finance is assessed in isolation

Engineering consequence

No single stage evaluates:

the full system as one integrated national infrastructure model.

And in engineering systems, failure does not occur in isolation.

It occurs at the interaction points.

2. WHY THIS CREATES SYSTEM DRIFT

This fragmentation produces predictable outcomes:

• incomplete cross-sector validation

• logistics not fully embedded in energy planning

• land use not aligned with transport reality

• environmental assessment separated from system design

Engineering analogy

It is like designing:

• power generation

• fuel supply

• transport logistics

• and demand systems

separately…

without testing whether they function together under real-world stress.

3. LAND ZONING, WHERE SYSTEM INTEGRITY BREAKS DOWN

Land zoning is meant to be a strong national control mechanism.

But fragmentation weakens it.

Intended function

Land zoning ensures alignment between:

• land use classification

• infrastructure capacity

• environmental sensitivity

• national development intent

Structural issue

Zoning becomes influenced by:

• project proposals

• investment momentum

• silo-based approvals

Engineering consequence

This creates mismatch between:

• declared land use intention

AND

• actual infrastructure scale being introduced

Real implication

When zoning is not fully integrated:

land absorbs long-term system mismatch risk.

4. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, ROLE SHIFT

Globally, EIA is meant to:

inform decisions BEFORE approval, not validate decisions after direction is set.

Structural distortion

In fragmented systems, EIA becomes:

• a compliance checkpoint

• a documentation requirement

• a late-stage justification tool

Engineering consequence

Risk is assessed after system direction is already formed.

Not before.

5. TRANSPORT AND LOGISTICS, THE MISSING CORE SYSTEM

Transport is not a supporting function.

It is the backbone of infrastructure systems.

Proper integration requires:

• energy demand modelling

• waste throughput planning

• port capacity design

• road lifecycle planning

• inter-island logistics modelling

Fragmented reality

Transport is often:

• assessed separately

• introduced late

• or adjusted after approval momentum begins

Engineering truth

But in real systems:

transport determines whether everything else actually works.

6. WHY IMPORTED WASTE BECOMES STRUCTURALLY MORE EFFICIENT

Once full system integration is applied:

a clear pattern appears.

Imported waste aligns with:

• port-based logistics systems

• containerised shipping efficiency

• predictable large-volume throughput

• reduced internal transport burden

Local waste reality

• dispersed across islands

• requires inter-island logistics

• dependent on road and barge systems

• weather-sensitive

• high consolidation cost

Engineering conclusion

In fragmented systems:

imported waste becomes the most stable input stream at scale.

Not by design.

But by system behaviour.

7. NO SINGLE SYSTEM OWNER

There is no unified authority evaluating:

• land + transport + energy + environment + finance together

Result

No institution owns:

the full 30-year national system outcome.

Engineering reality

Without full-system ownership:

• risks are distributed

• accountability is fragmented

• system-level failure is not detected early

8. WHY THIS MATTERS FOR FIJI

Fiji operates under:

• island logistics constraints

• climate variability

• limited redundancy

• high import dependence

• fragile transport corridors

Engineering sensitivity

In such environments:

small fragmentation in planning

becomes

large national exposure over time.

9. NATIONAL CAPACITY EXISTS, THE ISSUE IS STRUCTURE

Fiji has a generation of professionals with:

• global exposure

• technical capability

• systems understanding

The real issue

It is not capability.

It is:

how early that capability is integrated into national decision architecture.

10. WHY NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT SHOULD NEVER BE POLITICISED

National development should not be driven by political cycles alone.

Not because leadership lacks capability.

But because:

infrastructure systems do not operate on political timelines.

They operate on:

• engineering lifecycles

• logistics systems

• financial structures

• environmental constraints

Structural reality:

Political leadership sets direction.

Technical systems must validate feasibility.

Where systems fail

When:

• political urgency overrides technical validation

• project momentum replaces engineering stress testing

• approval speed replaces lifecycle modelling

Engineering consequence:

Decisions are made at political speed…

but paid for over engineering lifespans of 20-30+ years.

11. CORE ROOT CAUSE

When all layers are combined:

• fragmented decision-making across institutions

• weak integration of transport engineering

• zoning misalignment with infrastructure scale

• EIA used beyond its intended function

• lifecycle cost not fully central to approval logic

• imported waste becomes structurally dominant due to logistics efficiency

• no single authority owns full system outcome

Engineering conclusion:

Fragmentation leads to one outcome:

the system optimises itself around the most stable external input source.

In this case:

imported waste becomes structurally central.

Not by intention.

But by system design behaviour.

FINAL REFLECTION FOR DECISION MAKERS

Fiji is not short of projects.

It is short of fully integrated system thinking at the front end of national decision-making.

Because once infrastructure systems are locked in:

they stop being proposals.

They become 30-year national operating systems.

FINAL QUESTION

If decisions continue to be made through fragmented institutional pathways…

then the question is not whether individual approvals are correct.

The question is:

Are we designing national infrastructure as one integrated system… or assembling outcomes from disconnected decisions that never see the full picture at the same time?

CLOSING…..WHAT COMES NEXT?

At this stage, we now understand:

• the numbers

• the economics

• the transport reality

• the logistics exposure

• the financial structure

• and the system fragmentation behind it

But even after all of that…

there is still one more layer.

One that is not visible in spreadsheets.

Not captured in engineering models.

And not fully reflected in approvals.

Because when systems reach this scale…

they don’t just operate.

They begin to shape direction.

Quietly.

Over time.

And often before it is fully recognised.

So, the real question is no longer what we have already measured.

It is this:

what is this system beginning to change in Fiji that we are not yet fully seeing?

And that is where the next part goes.

Not back into engineering.

Not back into economics.

But into something deeper…

and far more consequential for the country’s future path. POST 3B coming soon

A Rose by any other name

20 Monday Apr 2026

Posted by fijipensioners in Articles & Reports

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Tags

constitution, history, news, politics

THESE last few weeks the Great Council of Chiefs has stirred up the hornets’ nest by calling for the term “Fijian” to be reserved for indigenous Fijians only and that citizens in general be called “Fiji Islanders” as in the 1997 Constitution.

Prime Minister Rabuka has responded with the contrary view also supported by former Deputy Prime Minister Professor Biman Prasad, that all Fiji citizens should be called “Fijian” as that would tend to unify the nation.

We can all have our own personal views on these questions: PM Rabuka, the political parties, the social organizations, the GCC, the Non-State Actors, international commentators, etc.

But may I humbly suggest that with Fiji facing so many intractable and worsening problems (like collapse of the sugar industry, rising cost of living and fuel, our still rising Public Debt, continued emigration of much needed skills, continued subordination of women, and many others) there is no need to waste our valuable social energy on this issue of a common name for Fiji citizens.

I suggest that whatever our personal views, the only solution is that Fiji must follow the “Rule of Law” and whatever the “prevailing Fiji Constitution” stipulates.

If anyone, including the GCC or ethnonationalists think otherwise, then they are free to bring about the relevant changes in the Constitution through Parliament and the “Rule of Law”- not through guns or coups or public social agitation.

May I also humbly suggest that the Fiji Parliament uses the opportunity afforded by the next General Elections to have a simple Referendum ballot paper which asks all voters: What should Fiji citizens be called: “Fijians” OR “Fiji Islanders” OR “don’t care” (tick one box)?

But what “Prevailing Fiji Constitution”?

If you had asked me this common name question between 2009 and August 2025 (the date of the “Supreme Court Opinion”), I would have had a different answer from that today, probably agreeing with the GCC views today.

In that earlier period:

-I had argued that the Fiji Appeals Court in 2009 had rejected Bainimarama’s treasonous overthrow of the lawfully elected Qarase Government and rejected the alleged abrogation of the 1997 Constitution (in which all Fiji citizens were called “Fiji Islanders”);

-I had opposed the Bainimarama Government’s Military Decree which declared that all Fiji citizens be called “Fijians”. My article “Fijians and iTaukei by military decree” was censored in Fiji but published in Auckland University’s Pacific Scoop of 16 February 2011 (readers can find this in my Volume 4 of community education articles Towards a Decent Fiji, Reading 77 available for free on my website NarseyOnFiji.

-I had opposed the 2013 Constitution which had been brutally imposed on Fiji by military decree; never approved by any parliament (although the Bainimarama Government controlled Parliament from 2014 to 2022); never approved by any Referendum (despite three opportunities during the elections of 2014, 2018 and 2022).

Yet to change a single line in the 2013 Constitution the Bainimarama Government dictators required a 75% majority in Parliament and a Referendum supported by 75% of the registered voters (a virtual impossibility). What a joke and constitutional farce I had thought.

So my strong view in this period before August 2025 was that the term “Fijian” was a contested term and should not be forcibly used for all Fiji citizens, however desirable from the point of view of national identity and unity.

By opposing the Bainimarama Regime, I had even lost my many progressive friends of thirty years, because they approved of Bainimarama and his use of that term for Indo-Fijians, 90% of whom voted for Bainimarama in the 2014 elections.

Then the astonishing Auguest 2025 Supreme Court Opinion

For me, this debate was turned on its head by the August 2025 Supreme Court Opinion which had been strangely sought by the Coalition Government on a number of issues, including the conditions for changing the 2013 Constitution.

Read my Fiji Times article of 13 Aug. 2025 (“The Fiji Constitution: pragmatists defeat the purists”) when I had argued that the fundamental principles of “Rule of Law” required that no treasonous illegal changes to constitutions should ever be approved socially or go unpunished.

But the Panel of Supreme Court judges (including a former Australian Chief Justice) chaired by current Chief Justice Salesi Temo ruled that despite the “democratic deficit” in the origins of the 2013 Constitution, it had been in place for more than 12 years during which time three elections were held, over 400 laws passed by parliament and many public officials (including the judges themselves) had been appointed, effectively becoming Fiji’s “Common Law”.

The learned Panel of Supreme Court Judges therefore held “that the 2013 Constitution was legally effective and provided the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to answer the questions referred to it by the Cabinet. This decision also confirmed that the 1997 Constitution no longer applies”.

Who are we mere mortals to challenge this conclusion even if it did lead one of my esteemed senior legal friends to exclaim “the law is an ass”.

The Supreme Court Panel also ruled positively that any Parliamentary Bill to change the Constitution would require only two-thirds majority and that a Referendum would need just a simple majority of actual voters. Quite doable.

Section 159(2)(c), which sought to prohibit any changes to the amendment provisions themselves, was removed and the 2013 Constitution supposedly became a “living document” serving the people of Fiji.

So as of August 2025, Fiji’s Rule of Law states that all Fiji citizens must be called “Fijians” not “Fiji Islanders”. Indigenous Fijians must therefore continue to be called “iTaukei”. End of the debate.

But there are positives here.

National names, national identity and national contribution

Many public commentators have talked about their pride at being known internationally as “Fijians” and how the term unites Fiji’s different ethnic groups just as PM Rabuka and the Hon Biman Prasad think.

International commentators refer to Fiji’s international golfer (Vijay Singh) who once dethroned Tiger Woods as No.1 as the “Big Fijian”, who even last weekend was flying the Fiji flag at the Augusta Masters, watched all over the world.

In 2004 I was privileged to organize support for this “Fijian” to be awarded Fiji’s highest honour (Companion of the Order of Fiji- the equivalent of a knighthood) for putting Fiji on the world map. Signing my petition were most respected Fiji citizens like the Sir Tim Tuivaqa, Sir Moti Tikaram, Charles Walker, Archbishop Mataca, Bill Cruikshank, Lionel Yee (junior signatories were Eroni Mavoa and Dr Wadan Narsey).

When I have been watching NRL or rugby union in Melbourne I feel great joy when the increasing numbers of “Fijian” names jump out, just to name a few: Lote Tuqiri, Marika Koroibete, Rob Valetini, Sevu Reece, Viliame Kikau, Tui Kamikamica.

While I have the greatest of respect for the Chairman of the GCC (Ratu Viliame Seruvakula), I would request him to ask who are the Fiji citizens who have contributed to the welfare of Fiji, including the iTaukei, for over a century.

The answer would be the hundreds of thousands of non-indigenous sugar farmers, tourism operators, business owners, managers, civil servants, professionals of all kinds, media organization owners etc.

The names that would jump out would be Hedstroms, Carpenters, Stinsons, Tappos, Patels, Punjas, Kasabias, Prasads, Singhs, Parkinsons, Wesleys, Lees, Yees, Mars, Marches, Wing Sangs, Hong Tiys, etc.

Why on earth would the GCC like to exclude the above stalwarts and creators of social wealth in our society from the term “Fijian” when even their ostentatious GCC building has been built by the sweat, blood and tears of non-indigenous citizens and residents?

Why should the GCC wish to deny the label “Fijian” to the many productive Fiji citizens like Professor Vijay Naidu, Dr Subash Appana, Shamima Ali and even surgeon and my fellow kai-Tooraki Dr Vijay Kapadia and writer Colin Deoki abroad, who all continue to contribute passionately to Fiji’s development in their respective fields?

I personally cannot forget the many indigenous Fijians who were my friends at Marist; or those who wrote to me during the dark days of censorship by the Bainimarama Regime when I was forced out of my job at USP, thanking me for being a “true Fijian” born and bred in Fiji, standing up for democracy and fairness to all races, and even for defending the GCC.

There were names such as Jale Moala, Paula Raqeukai, and countless anonymous writers like “FijianBlack”.

I cannot forget the many respected indigenous Fijians who over the years unreservedly supported my writings like the late Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, the late Amelia Rokotuivuna, the late Ropate Qalo, the late Savenaca Siwatibau, and still active Professor Steven Ratuva, Mere Nailatikau, and too many others to mention. They all saw me as a “true Fijian” and never as a vulagi.

Many in the public cynically ask what exactly have the GCC and ethnonationalists contributed to the economy and welfare of Fiji, apart from lending great support to the destructive coups of 1987 and 2000?

Why did the chiefs quietly disappear when Bainimarama closed the GCC down and banished them to “sit under the mango tree and drink homebrew” (see the great cartoon in Fijileaks).

What about the select few chiefs who actively supported the 2006 treasonous coup against an iTaukei Prime Minister, and legitimised the imposition of the 2013 Constitution on the people of Fiji?

Has the current GCC ever acknowledged that it took a Coalition Government led by “commoners” like Sitiveni Rabuka, Manoa Kamikamica, Bill Gavoka and Indo-Fijians like Professor Biman Prasad to bring the GCC back out of oblivion?

Nationalities versus Decency

Ultimately, do we really care what we Fiji citizens are called? Does nationality matter to our everyday lives?

I know many “Americans” who hate being associated with the “American” Government of President Trump who is massacring thousands of innocent men, women and children in Iran for his pathetic foreign policy objectives, while wholeheartedly supporting Israel which is committing genocide in Lebanon and Palestine.

I know many “Australians” who are horrified at how Australian people and government have massacred Aboriginals in the past, who continue to marginalise them today, who refuse to give them a Voice in Parliament, who even refuse to change Australia Day from one that commemorates the arrival of whites to Australia and is a day of mourning for Aboriginals.

While residing here in Melbourne, even though my heart and soul are in Fiji, do I feel better if I am called a “Fijian” even though that is the most logical description for my origins?

Like my learned legal Rotuman friend commenting in the Fiji Times, I don’t really care. I would just like to be labelled a “decent human being” whatever my nationality or ethnicity.

The future: much ado about nothing

Given that Fiji is the only country in the world to house iTaukei, I can well understand that once upon a time ethnonationalists did have cause to fear being outnumbered in Fiji by Indo-Fijians, leading to the first 1987 coup (see the graph before 1990 when Indo-Fijians did outnumber iTaukei).

But because of their massive emigration since the coups, and lower fertility and birth rates, the Indo-Fijian population has been catastrophically declining.

The graph here shows that just over 26% currently, in ten years time Indo-Fijians will be less than 19% of Fiji’s population and still dropping fast. The iTaukei proportion will be 73% and continue rising forever ensuring their control of government. The military have always been more than 90% iTaukei. So what is the fuss all about?

The tragedy for the once valuable sugar industry is that the hard underpaid work once done by Indo-Fijians, now needs imported labourers from Bangladesh while there is paradoxically serious underemployment and unemployment among the iTaukei.

Researchers might wish to explore that even the past population projections based on the 2017 Census are gross over-estimates because of the massive emigration of Fiji people in the last ten years.

The latest data from the FBS’ 2023-24 Employment and Unemployment Survey indicates that Fiji’s population, far from approaching one million by now, is currently less than 846 thousand and still falling.

The way forward

May I suggest that at the next General Elections, there be an extra Referendum Ballot paper which asks all voters (tick one box):

Should the Fiji Constitution call Fiji citizens

“Fijians” OR “Fiji Islander” OR “Don’t care”.

If any of these three choices gets more than 50% of the votes, responsibility for this decision will be on ALL voters of Fiji, not on Governments, or political parties, or Parliament, or the GCC, or anyone else for that matter.

Fiji can stop wasting valuable emotional energy and time on an irrelevant “name game”.

PROFESSOR WADAN NARSEY is a former Professor of Economics at The University of the South Pacific.

Professor Wadan Narsey makes a request: March 2026.

17 Tuesday Mar 2026

Posted by fijipensioners in Articles & Reports, Press Releases

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democracy, finance, investing, news, pension, personal-finance, politics, retirement-planning

I request Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka to note that the FNPF, for the first time, has admitted that a Pension Buffer Fund (PBF) had been established in 1975 and also that it had also been invested for income like all other funds in its possession (FNPF Statement, The Fiji Times, March 7, 2026).

In many of my previous articles I had pointed out (as had the late Jackson Mar independently) that with the proper crediting of interest income, the Pension Buffer Fund had accumulated to more than enough in 2011 to pay the 2012 Pensioners without drawing on the funds allocated to the General Members or drawing on government subsidies.

This last FNPF statement, in response to the article by Daniel Fatiaki and me, falsely denied this latter basic fact while still alleging, falsely, that for FNPF to make full restitution to the 2012 Pensioners, they would need to draw on funds belonging to the General Members or Government.

The FNPF statement of March 7, 2026 went on to speculate on a whole range of solvency issues, nothing to do with the claims by the 2012 Pensioners for fulfilment of their lawful contracts with FNPF, unilaterally broken by FNPF in 2012. There is no need to discuss these other issues which are mere red herrings thrown up by the FNPF management and board.

Here I draw on FNPF’s own statement of March 7, 2026, admitting the existence of the Pension Buffer Fund, and my estimates of its likely size in 1999, 2011 and 2025.

I also regret that the FNPF board and management are now acting like accessories justifying the illegal theft of the 2012 Pensioners’ lawful property.

The Pension Buffer Fund (PBF) set up by Parliament

FNPF has now acknowledged that the PBF was set up by the Ratu Mara Government in 1975 through parliamentary approval for a 2 cents injection from all FNPF members.

Of course, it could be seen as “unfair” to those FNPF members contributing, but who would eventually not take the pension option when they reached 55.

But the primary objective of the Ratu Mara Government was to encourage those retiring at age 55 to take the pension option which would support them until the end of their lives, rather than take the lump sum which in Fiji tended to be frittered away all too soon.

Most importantly, the decision to set up the PBF was a parliamentary decision and therefore the “law” which has to be obeyed, not the views of actuaries seeking generous income from FNPF or World Bank experts who are never accountable to local people anywhere in the world.

The late Jackson Mar and myself have independently estimated that by 1999, the PBF with interest would have accumulated to $535 millions, when pension annuities that year were less than $25m annually.

Clearly, the PBF even then was more than capable of paying another 20 years of pensions without resorting to General Members’ Funds or Government subsidies.

So quite sensibly, the 2 cents injection into the PBF was stopped by Parliament in 1999 and that was also the law and had to be obeyed.

What was also passed by Parliament in 1999 was the higher pension annuity rates steadily coming down from 25 per cent to 15 per cent (by 1 percentage point per year), which I had argued against when I was in the Fiji Parliament in 1999.

I had stated then (and it is in the Hansards records) that the Pension Annuity Rate should have been reduced immediately to 15 per cent, but Parliament decided otherwise. Those higher relatively generous Pension Annuity Rates also were approved by Parliament and became the law.

But the PBF kept growing

Despite the high annuity rates and pensions paid, the PBF kept growing, especially if it had been credited properly with interest.

How utterly outrageous that the FNPF statement (FT March 7, 2026) claims “the assertion that interest should have been credited to the PBF has no basis in law. The PBF was not a separate ring-fenced account owed exclusively by pensioners.”

Hullo, we have never said the PBF was “owned” by pensioners. We have said the PBF was set up by the Fiji Parliament precisely for the purpose of paying pensions and receiving the lump sums of those reaching 55 and choosing the pension option.

The FNPF statement (March 7, 2026) itself acknowledges that the PBF “formed part of the over-all pooled investment fund. All assets were invested collectively and investment income was managed as part of the broader fund reserves”.

Clearly, those funds allocated to the PBF by the Fiji Parliament decision through the 2 cents injection were also earning income. So why should there be any law to stipulate that the PBF should have received interest? Why should the PBF be denied the same interest that was credited to other funds invested by the FNPF?

We point out that by 2011, the PBF ought to have had around $903m, when the total pensions being paid out was a mere $49m, i.e. the FNPF even then was in a position to pay another 18 years of pensions at that level – more than enough given that average life expectancy was only around 65 for males and 67 for females.

It was therefore outrageous for FNPF to claim in 2012 that the PBF would run out in just a few years (as they did in a graph) in order to justify their reduction of the Pension Annuity Rate from 15 per cent to 8.7 per cent.

We do not dispute FNPF reducing the PAR to 8.75% after 2012

Let us be clear that the 2012 Pensioners do not dispute the right of FNPF to reduce the Pension Annuity Rate after 2012 to 8.7 per cent, but that should have been applied only to new retirees at age 55.

What the 2012 Pensioners disputed and took to court was FNPF’s decision to apply that reduction of Pension Annuity Rate to existing pensioners who had lawful contracts signed with FNPF on the 9NOP forms, which declared that they could not change their minds after they signed that Form 9NOP.

FNPF strangely went against the advice from one of their ethical actuaries (Shona Tomkins from firm Promontory) who had stated that reduction of existing pensions would be against “the law of contracts”.

But FNPF callously ignored that sensible advice. Although in a Key Features Statement clearly admitted their guilt when they tried to assure future new retirees “The rates in Table 1 will be regularly reviewed by the FNPF board subject to actuarial advice. Any change in rates in the future will only affect new purchasers, not those who have already purchased the product.”

Ha ha ha. too late for the 2012 Pensioners?

While the FNPF called the reduction of pensions a “reform” it resulted in a total disaster which the FNPF (board and management) to this day have still not acknowledged despite what they can see with their eyes: the total collapse of the Pension Take Up Rate to below 4 per cent by those reaching age 55.

Today, 98 per cent of all retirees at age 55 (yes, 98 out of every 100 new retirees) refuse to take the pension option, but take their lump sums. They do not trust the FNPF after the 2012 robbery.

No amount of costly “rebranding” by the FNPF management and board is going to take away that disastrous reality of totally collapsed Pension Take Up rates. No amount of lipstick on a pig will change the fact that it is a pig.

Note that the FNPF board and all its members blatantly ignore the collapse of the Pension Take Up Rate: It is not even mentioned in their annual reports.

Instead, both FNPF board members and senior management in 2011 went on a propaganda rampage alleging that the FNPF would be made insolvent unless they reduced not just the pension rate for future retirees, but also existing pensioners.

The FNPF article of March 7, 2026, is still making those fallacious arguments against the 2012 Pensioners’ claims when it was abundantly clear that the PBF had more than enough in 2012 to pay the existing pensions without drawing on General Members funds.

We have also shown that the PBF in 2025 with interest credited would have around $1382m.

This massive sum is far more than needed to pay for full restitution of the 2012 Pensioners (backpay plus ongoing pensions at the pre-2012 rate), and still leave some $800m for General Members and the FNPF solvency reserves.

So why do the FNPF board and management keep repeating the falsehood that the General Members or Government will have to “cross-subsidise” the 2012 Pensioners?

Other irrelevant FNPF arguments

Throughout the FNPF statement, over and over, there are claims of FNPF after 2012 needing to satisfy “solvency requirements” set by international “authorities” like World Bank or actuaries.

There is ample data to show that FNPF has never lacked for adequate liquidity.

I see no need to address these arguments as they are totally irrelevant to the claims of the 2012 Pensioners which are based entirely on the illegal trashing of their lawful signed contracts with FNPF (clearly pointed out by former Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki) and the adequacy of the Pension Buffer Reserve (pointed out by the late Jackson Mar and myself).

FNPF Employees and Board now” accessories” to a robbery

More than a year ago, the FNPF chairman (Daksesh Patel) had lamented to me that while he fully sympathised with the 2012 Pensioners, his “hands were tied” by the 2011 Decrees.

But with this FNPF statement of March 7, 2026, it is clear now that the FNPF management and board members are willing to be accessories to the FNPF’s criminal seizure of the property of the 2012 Pensioners by using all kinds of false arguments to justify it.

Far from being FNPF employees and board members accountable to all FNPF members including the 2012 Pensioners, they have become accessories justifying the 2012 restructuring which the previous Minister of Finance called “illegal”.

Why address PM and not the Minister of Finance?

Why am I addressing Prime Minister Rabuka in this article and not the new Minister of Finance?

Sadly, even though the previous Minister of Finance (Professor of Economics Biman Prasad) had labelled the FNPF action against the 2012 Pensioners as “illegal”, the recent statement by the new Minister of Finance suggests that he does not have the financial acumen to understand the intricacies of FNPF lies about the 2012 Pensioners’ claims.

The new Minister of Finance still calls the 2012 restructure “reforms” the way the FNPF board and management have done consistently.

The new Minister of Finance does not seem to understand that he should not even have issued that statement he did a few weeks ago given that the 2012 Pensioners’ claims are not against Government, but against the FNPF.

Indeed, what role did the FNPF board and senior management have in that statement by the new Minister of Finance?

It is tragic that while the board and FNPF management are supposed to be accountable to all FNPF members and pensioners (including the 2012 Pensioners) they have steadfastly refused to be accountable.

When the previous Minister of Finance (Professor Prasad) had informed me a few months ago that he would consider some compromise solution, I had requested anonymous data on an Excel spreadsheet from the FNPF board on the approximate numbers of 2012 Pensioners, their monthly pensions and their ages, in 2012 and 2025.

I have been contemplating some compromise equitable solution which would fully restore all the low income pensions (including their backpay by three instalments) and put some moderate monthly cap on well-off pensioners so as to reduce the total financial liability for FNPF (I had suggested a cap of around $5000 per month). I am confident most high income pensioners would accept some compromise in order to benefit the low income pensioners.

Sadly, despite all their grand claims in their Vision and Mission Statements about accountability, both the FNPF board and the Minister of Finance have declined to provide me with this information which has absolutely nothing confidential.

How extraordinary and arrogant that FNPF declares in its March 7, 2026, statement “The FNPF does not intend to make further public comments in this matter.”

May I request the Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka to consider the facts that are in this article and discuss a constructive way forward with his new Minister of Finance, the FNPF board chairman and the 2012 Pensioners’ Core Group (chaired by Ross MacDonald) perhaps with the previous Minister of Finance in attendance given that he would understand all the financial issues discussed here.

The Westin and the Widow:

14 Saturday Mar 2026

Posted by fijipensioners in Articles & Reports

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The Westin and the Widow: Why the FNPF Pension Fight is About Prioritisation, Not Poverty

The FNPF finds itself in an increasingly untenable position. On one side, it is locked in a bitter, decade-long battle with the 2012 Pensioners—a group of retirees whose contracts were unilaterally altered, slashing their lifelong income. On the other, it is grappling with the financial fallout from its own ambitious, and allegedly mismanaged, forays into the hospitality industry, namely the multi-million dollar losses associated with the Denarau Westin renovation and the Marriott saga.

The FNPF’s latest defense, articulated in a March 7 statement, is a familiar one: paying the 2012 Pensioners their contractual dues would require “cross-subsidising” from General Members or the Government, threatening the Fund’s solvency. But as economist Professor Wadan Narsey meticulously argues in today’s Fiji Times (P12/13), the existence of the long-ignored Pension Buffer Fund (PBF) fundamentally undermines this narrative of poverty.

This raises a critical, and deeply uncomfortable, question for the FNPF board and the government: Is the resistance to restoring the 2012 pensions truly about a lack of funds, or is it about a profound failure of priorities? If the Fund can absorb the staggering losses from luxury hotel ventures, why can it not honour the solemn contracts of its elderly members?

The argument must shift. We are no longer just debating the legality of the 2012 restructuring, which former Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki has condemned as an illegal trashing of contracts. We are now debating the moral and financial stewardship of an institution that seems to have its priorities tragically inverted.

Professor Narsey’s calculations, based on the FNPF’s own admission of the PBF’s existence, suggest that by 2012, the buffer fund had accumulated to approximately $903 million. This was a pool of money, established by an Act of Parliament in 1975, specifically to underwrite the pension scheme, that was more than capable of covering the $49 million annual pension bill. Yet, the Fund chose to slash pensions rather than utilise this dedicated reserve.

Fast forward to today. The same institution that claimed poverty in 2012 has since been embroiled in headline-grabbing commercial disasters. The exact figures of the losses at the Westin Denarau Island Resort & Spa renovation and the Sheraton Marriott project are murky, but reports and anecdotal evidence, point to hundreds of millions of dollars in cost blowouts, design flaws, and financial restructuring. These were not acts of God or unforeseeable market crashes; they were investment decisions made by the board and management—the very same bodies now hiding behind “solvency requirements” to deny a few thousand pensioners their due.

This is the crux of the new argument. The FNPF cannot have it both ways. It cannot be an institution with such poor investment acumen that it haemorrhages member funds on luxury developments, while simultaneously claiming to be so financially fragile that it must break the law to survive.

The 2012 Pensioners are not asking for a handout. They are not asking for government subsidies. They are asking for the return of what is rightfully theirs—payments for which they contributed via a specific levy and signed binding contracts. The money, as Professor Narsey illustrates, is demonstrably there. The PBF, which should have grown to nearly $1.4 billion by 2025; if properly credited with interest, is more than sufficient to cover back-pay and restore full pensions, with a surplus left over.

The real “cross-subsidisation” happening here is not from General Members to Pensioners. It is from the Pensioners—and all FNPF members—to a management culture that prioritises glossy, high-risk developments over the fundamental security of its members’ retirement.

The Minister of Finance’s reluctance to intervene, still referring to the 2012 action as “reforms,” suggests a troubling lack of financial acumen or a willful ignorance of the facts. This is not a complex mathematical puzzle. It is a simple test of integrity.

Does the FNPF have the money to pay the 2012 Pensioners? The evidence, from the PBF’s very existence to the vast sums deployed and lost in the tourism sector, screams “yes.”

The only remaining question is whether the institution has the will. Will it continue to act as an “accessory to a robbery,” using false arguments to protect the status quo? Or will it finally acknowledge that the path to redemption lies not in “rebranding” with lipstick, but in honouring the contracts of the very people it was created to serve—even if it means admitting that its priorities, and its investments, have been catastrophically wrong?

FNPF are they good enough? ONE MIND ONE GOAL FB CLAIMS

03 Tuesday Mar 2026

Posted by fijipensioners in Articles & Reports

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SANJAY KABA AND HIS WEB OF CORRUPTION DURING KHAIYUM & BAINIMARAMA REIGN

1) Momi Bay Hotel project :….- $300m Project to Sanjay Kaba

Sanjay Kaba was appointed to the FNPF board by Khaiyum. The Momi bay project was at the time project managed by a NZ company. He got on the board and fired the NZ company. Having studied all the inside details on the project as board member, he then resigned from the board and put in his proposal to be the new project manager and consultant. Got the project approved by the Board under directive from Khaiyum for $300m of which he took 6% or $18m million dollars.

2) $14m Holiday Inn Renovations:…. for Sanjay Kaba

After approving the purchase of Holiday Inn Hotel by FNPF as a board member on FNPF Board. Sanjay kaba quickly got another $14m approved for renovations at the hotel and became the Project Consultant and Engineers pocketing 6% approx. $1m

3) $40m Renovations approved for GPH:…

Sanjay Kaba sitting on FNPF Board had already got $40m renovations job approved for himself for the GPH Hotel.

This is how corrupt this guy is he should be immediately taken into custody and investigated before he leaves Fiji.

4) FNPF Nadi Building $32m Contract to Sanjay Kaba:……

Sanjay kaba was on FNPF Board. Got inside information about the Nadi FNPF building Project coming up. Got out of the Board for few months. Submitted tender and won the contract for $32m as project engineer and consultants and after that got appoint back on the FNPF Board by Khaiyum.

Both taking home $1m in commission in corrupt dealing stealing FNPF member members retirement fund.

5) My FNPF Building Behind MH :……

– Sanjay Kaba $25m as Project Engineers and 4R as Building Contractors.

Once again, Sanjay kaba gets FNPF the Project Engineer and Consultant contract on the My FNPF plaza behind MH Suva for $25m he was sitting as Board member on FNPF Board. This is clearly a conflict of interest and inside trading.

Where is the transparency and accountability? This is corruption and abuse of the highest level by two people khaiyum and Sanjay Kaba benefitting from the hard-working Fijians retirement fund.

What has FICAC done about this?

Wake Up! They have destroyed your Fijians culture and traditions and now robbing ordinary Fijians of their life savings in FNPF.

6. Navosa Hospital from $6m initial project to $30m:……………………… – Sanjay kaba

Navosa hospital initial project cost for which tender was awarded to Chinese Company with Sanjay Kaba as Project Engineers and Consultant. The Chinese company knew of Sanjay Kaba’s connection with Khaiyum and signed him on as Project Engineers to help them win the contract.

After the project started, Sanjay kaba advised the Chinese contractors to make variations claims which he got approved through his connections in government with Khaiyum. The final cost of the project went from $6m to $30m and Sanjay Kaba and Khaiyum pocketed 6% or $1.8m.

Sanjay Kaba because of inside job wins all major building contract to himself. How is this fair on other building Project Engineers many of who are indigenous business?

7. Sheraton Resort Sale:…….

– Sanjay Kaba pockets millions of dollars.

Sanjay Kaba was on the Board of FNPF involved in the initial purchase of Sheraton Resort by FNPF. The purchase price was $230m. But he made sure in the same deal he got another $130m additional approved for renovations.

He than got out of the FNPF Board and bid for the Sheraton job and was awarded the Project Engineer and Consultant job pocketing 6% of the $130m renovations contract thus pocketing $8m to himself.

This corruption is rife on all the board he is appointed with help of kaiyum and together they are making millions of dollars from the retirement fund of FNPF putting at risk the only financial security the retired workers have.

These two must be put behind bars as they ransacked the FNPF coffers .

Sanjay Kaba is Not Tax and FNPF Compliant since he has not filed his tax returns for last 3 years. How did Sanjay Kaba Win Government Tenders and Serve on Boards as Board member?

Two of the main requirements for any business or person to submit tenders for Government jobs is that they must be tax compliant meaning they must be up to date with their tax returns to FRCS and must pay their employees FNPF contribution on time. This compliance certificate has to be submitted with the tenders.

One of the bidders who bid for the government job was tipped off by staff of FRCS that Sanjay kaba should not be allowed to tender for any Government job because he was not compliant with the requirement of FRCS and FNPF because he and his company had not lodged their tax return since 2020. Also, his staff FNPF contribution to FNPF was also not paid for a number of months.

If this is a requirement to submit tenders, then how come he continues to be awarded government tenders when he is not tax and FNPF compliant. Why did he get this special treatment winning millions of dollars government tenders when businesses who are fully compliant were been overlooked and penalised?

Why is FICAC not investigation Sanjay Kaba and these corrupt deals worth millions of dollars? Have they been directed by Khaiyum to keep the hands of Sanjay Kaba because he is partner in all these deals and himself pocketing millions of dollars.

There is only one way this will be Exposed allow independent investigations in the tenders and projects that Sanjay kaba has received from government and hold all board members and Sanjay Kaba to task defrauding the people of Fiji millions of dollars in corrupt deals.

8. Sanjay Kaba Helps sale of Sheraton Tokiriki owned by Romit of P Meghji and pockets millions:….

During COVID the tourism business was really affected and Sheraton Tokiriki was in dire financial trouble and was near mortgagee sale. Romit of P Meghji who owned Sheraton Tokiriki then approached Sanjay Kaba to get FNPF to buy the hotel.

The price paid by Fijian Holding for the hotel was 10 times higher than what Fijian Holding could have bought on mortgagee sale. The FHL Shareholders would have received much higher return on their investment if the purchase was through mortgage sale as opposed to inside corrupt deals.

However, by assisting his Cousin and buying the property at much higher price, the two shared 50/50 from the millions of dollars paid for the hotel which otherwise would have been bought at less than half the price paid.

This is how Sanjay kaba works behind the scene to rob ordinary FNPF member of millions of dollars.

9. Sanjay Kaba buys new New Property In Tamavua worth Millions. Where does the money come from?

Recently, Sanjay Kaba bought a property in Tamavua from Kalpesh Patel Owner of Autocare in mid-road to clean all the dirty money that Sanjay has accumulated from corrupt deals. Kalpesh Patel is the treasurer of Fiji First election fundraising. He called businesses on behalf of Sanjay Kaba and Khaiyum to give money to Fiji First Party else FRCS will be tipped to investigate them and fined. Small businesses are asked to give $20k and big businesses up to $100k and companies like RCM and Vinod Patel $0.5m.

It was a mafia type operation and those who didn’t give money to fiji First were targeted by FICAC and FRCS.

Why out of so many good businesses only a select group of Khaiyum’s friends got all the deals. ???

Why were other Fijian businesses specially iTaukei businesses didnt benefit from government contracts in their own homeland???

If Fiji has to move forward we need to clean up corruption and send it to the pits.

HOWEVER THE FACTS ARE

Here’s a breakdown of key claims versus available information:

Momi Bay Hotel project ($300m to Kaba, 6% commission ~$18m after resigning from board):
FNPF did develop the Fiji Marriott Resort Momi Bay (construction completed around 2017, opened as a major investment). Kaba was on the FNPF board from around 2016 onward (confirmed in FNPF annual reports). However, no credible reports confirm he personally received the project management contract, resigned specifically to bid, or pocketed $18m. FNPF annual reports discuss the project as a board-approved investment for member returns, not individual enrichment.
Holiday Inn renovations ($14m, Kaba as consultant, ~$1m pocketed):
FNPF owns Holiday Inn Suva and undertook refurbishments (e.g., completed around 2018–2019 per reports). Kaba’s board role overlapped with some decisions. No evidence supports him securing the contract personally or taking a 6% cut.
GPH (Grand Pacific Hotel) $40m renovations:
FNPF has stakes in GPH and has invested in upgrades. No verification of Kaba personally getting $40m in work or approvals for his benefit.
FNPF Nadi Building ($32m contract) and My FNPF Plaza ($25m):
FNPF has undertaken property developments in Nadi and Suva (e.g., Provident Plaza). Kaba’s engineering firm (HLK Jacob) operates in project management/consulting, but no public evidence ties him to winning these via insider info or rejoining the board corruptly.
Navosa Hospital ($6m to $30m via variations, Kaba as engineer for Chinese firm):
No credible news or reports link Kaba or his firm to the Navosa Hospital project, cost escalations, or variations benefiting him/Khaiyum.
Sheraton Resort purchase/renovations ($230m purchase + $130m renovations, Kaba pocketing $8m):
FNPF acquired/holds interests in Sheraton Fiji Resort (Denarau) and related Marriott properties (around 2018). Renovations occurred (e.g., pre-ADB conference in 2019). No evidence Kaba bid and won consultancy post-board exit for personal millions.
Sheraton Tokiriki sale (helped cousin Romit/P Meghji at inflated price):
No verifiable reports on this specific deal or Kaba’s involvement/sharing proceeds.
Tax/FNPF non-compliance (not filing returns since 2020, yet winning tenders):
No public FRCS (Fiji Revenue and Customs Service) confirmations or investigations reported on this. Government tender rules do require compliance certificates, but no evidence of special treatment or violations here.
Property purchase in Tamavua (laundering dirty money via Kalpesh Patel/Fiji First fundraising):
Pure speculation with no evidence. Claims of “mafia-type” extortion for Fiji First donations (threats via FRCS/FICAC) are unsubstantiated and echo broader political allegations against the former government, but lack proof.

Related verified information:
Sanjay Kaba has faced corruption-related charges, but not for these FNPF/hotel claims. In February 2025, FICAC charged him with one count of obtaining a financial advantage (~$766,000) related to a Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL) project management tender (2017–2019), allegedly while on the board without declaring his interest in his company (HLK Jacob). He pleaded not guilty, was granted bail (with variations), and his trial is set for April 2026. This involves conflict of interest but is separate from FNPF/hotel allegations.Broader corruption probes have targeted figures from the Bainimarama/Khaiyum era (e.g., FICAC cases against others), but nothing publicly confirms the sweeping conspiracy described here involving Khaiyum directing deals to Kaba.In summary, the post mixes real elements (FNPF investments in hotels, Kaba’s board roles and engineering background, political connections) with unproven accusations of personal enrichment and systemic corruption. It reads as politically motivated criticism of the former government rather than factual reporting. No major investigations, audits, or court cases have substantiated the bulk of these specific claims. For reliable info, refer to official FNPF reports, FICAC statements, or reputable Fiji media like Fiji Times or FBC News. If new evidence emerges (e.g., from ongoing cases), this could change, but as of now, treat the article as largely inaccurate and sensationalized.

FNPF Mismanagement:Pension Funds, Corporate Veils, and the $157 Million Question at Westin Denarau

24 Tuesday Feb 2026

Posted by fijipensioners in Articles & Reports

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Pension Funds, Corporate Veils, and the $157 Million Question at Westin Denarau

The redevelopment of The Westin Denarau Island Resort & Spa has moved beyond a routine hotel refurbishment. What began as a reported renovation budget of approximately FJD $74 million has allegedly escalated to FJD $231 million — an increase of FJD $157 million — while observers claim the scope of works has remained substantially unchanged.

If accurate, that escalation demands urgent public scrutiny.

The resort is ultimately owned by the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF), custodian of retirement savings for hundreds of thousands of Fijians. However, the asset is not held directly by the Fund. It sits within a subsidiary vehicle, Dubbo Pte Limited, which functions as the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) for the Westin property.

The Money Trail

The structure appears to operate as follows:

FNPF (parent pension fund)

→ Advances long-term loan funding

→ Dubbo Pte Limited (SPV borrower and asset holder)

→ Payments to main contractor

→ Payments to subcontractors and consultants

If renovation funding was advanced as a secured internal loan from FNPF to Dubbo, that loan should be reflected in registered charges and security filings. From there, Dubbo — as the legal contracting party — would engage construction contractors, project managers, quantity surveyors, and consulting engineers.

In major capital projects, cost escalations typically arise from:

Scope variation

Design changes

Material price inflation

Delay claims

Latent structural defects

Currency fluctuations

However, when a project reportedly increases by more than 200% while the scope remains materially consistent, governance professionals classify this as a “red flag event.”

Why the $74M to $231M Jump Raises Serious Concerns

A tripling of project cost without a corresponding expansion of deliverables raises several structural risk indicators:

Variation Inflation Risk – Were numerous variation orders issued? If so, who approved them?

Contract Structuring Risk – Was the contractor engaged under lump sum, cost-plus, or hybrid pricing?

Consultant Oversight Risk – Were quantity surveyors certifying progressive claims independently?

Board Approval Trail – Did the SPV board formally approve each cost escalation?

Conflict-of-Interest Exposure – Do any directors or consultants hold cross-relationships within the contracting chain?

In large pension-fund projects, best practice requires layered independent controls: independent quantity surveying, external project auditing, and board-level escalation approval thresholds.

A 212% budget increase without demonstrable expansion of scope would typically trigger:

Immediate forensic audit,

Independent cost benchmarking,

Contractor claim verification,

Insurance claim reconciliation,

Disclosure to pension stakeholders.

Consultants and Engineers

Where engineering consultants or project engineers are involved in design certification or variation approval, their professional certifications form part of the cost validation chain. If cost escalation occurred, questions naturally arise:

Were scope expansions technically justified?

Were original estimates materially inaccurate?

Were professional certifications relied upon for payment releases?

Were peer reviews conducted?

At this stage, there is no public finding implicating any specific consultant or firm in wrongdoing. However, in any capital project of this scale, consultants play a central role in validating the legitimacy of escalating claims.

The Governance Question

The central issue is not merely cost — it is accountability.

FNPF manages compulsory retirement savings. When capital is deployed through a subsidiary SPV, transparency can become diluted unless rigorous oversight mechanisms are enforced.

Key public-interest questions now include:

1. Has an independent forensic audit been conducted?

2. Were pension members formally informed of the revised capital commitment?

3. Do registered charges reflect the full FJD $231 million exposure?

4. Were contractors paid under independently verified certification?

5. Has any regulator reviewed the escalation?

Conclusion

Corporate structuring through SPVs like Dubbo Pte Limited is legally standard. But when public pension funds are involved, standards of scrutiny must exceed the ordinary.

A cost increase from FJD $74 million to FJD $231 million — absent material scope expansion — is not a routine variance. It is a structural anomaly that demands transparent explanation supported by documentation.

Until a full breakdown of approved variations, certified payments, consultant validations, and financing instruments is publicly disclosed, the FJD $157 million differential remains one of the most consequential unanswered financial questions in Fiji’s tourism sector. Where retirement savings are concerned, silence is bad governance.

FIJI TIMES OPINION | Fiji government betrayal of 2012 pensioners and rule of law Features By PROFESSOR WADAN NARSEY AND DANIEL FATIAKI

22 Sunday Feb 2026

Posted by fijipensioners in Articles & Reports

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By: Mick Beddoes.

A week ago, the newly appointed Minister of Finance, Esrom Immanuel, out of the blue, issued a “Government statement on 2012 FNPF Reform” (communicated to the 2012 pensioner’s core group Chairman Ross MacDonald).

This statement represents firstly, a horrendous betrayal of the 2012 pensioners who had suffered the robbery of their property (i.e. irrevocable pensions) by the Bainimarama military regime and who have struggled for restitution after the Rabuka Coalition Government took office at the end of 2022.

Secondly, the MoF statement is also an egregious betrayal of parliamentary “rule of law” by explicitly using as a justification, the imposed dictates of the 2013 Constitution which has never been ratified by any Parliament or referendum, but instead, was unilaterally imposed on Fiji by the unelected Bainimarama/Sayed-Khaiyum military regime.

Sadly, this MoF statement is thereby also implicitly justifying the treasonous overthrow in 2006 of the democratically elected Qarase Government and all the illegal decrees that came after and were entrenched in the 2013 Constitution.

Can Fiji afford to give the message that “crime pays”.

Not ‘reform’ but robbery

THE personal pain and suffering of the 2012 pensioners have been frequently described in the media by letter writers such as Ronnie Chang, Rick Rickman, Dewan Chand, Colin Deoki, Libby Reade-Fong and many others who continue to write every week.

We remind that the reductions imposed on the 2012 pensioners by the military decrees was not any “reform” as euphemistically claimed, but a blatant robbery of their lawful property.

In 2012, the Bainimarama regime and FNPF broke the irrevocable contracts which had been offered to pensioners by FNPF on its own 9NOP forms.

These forms specified a pre-quantified pension payable per month (in dollars) for life, in return for FNPF taking over their accumulated lump sums at age 55.

The form specifically stated that no changes by the pensioners would be allowed. Neither did FNPF’s 9NOP Form permit or authorise FNPF to unilaterally change, amend, or alter its solemn undertakings given under it.

Through FNPF’s illegal breaking of contracts (which its consultants Promontory had specifically advised against) FNPF forced the 2012 pensioners to accept one of several options offered:

• accepting a reduced pension; or

• withdrawing their original lump sums; or

• adopting some combination of the two; or

• taking an annuity.

All options inevitably led to financial loss for the 2012 pensioners in the long term, with all their foregone entitlements being enjoyed by FNPF. It is a fundamental foundation of all good legal systems that wrong-doers should never be allowed to benefit from their wrong doing!!

The unelected Bainimarama/Sayed-Khaiyum regime also issued unratified Decree No.51 that illegally reduced pensions and stopped the lawful challenge of the late David Burness which was already being heard in the High Court. They thereby denied the 2012 pensioners their basic international human right to take their legitimate grievances to court for redress.

This statement by the new Minister of Finance is a sad reversal of the position adopted by his predecessor (Professor Biman Prasad) who, in his 2024 budget speech, had labelled this unilateral breaking of the pensioners’ contracts as “illegal”.

Using taxpayer funds, Prof Prasad had prospectively restored the pensions of those who had accepted reduced pensions, but he did not address the others who had also lost out, nor was there any settlement of back-pay.

So why, did the current Minister of Finance in his statement call the 2012 robbery of property belonging to the 2012 pensioners a “reform” as FNPF had tried to call it in 2012 ?

Who indeed are the people who drafted the minister’s statement which was allegedly approved by Cabinet?

The MoF statement merely states that “Cabinet has made the decision that there will be no backdated reinstatement of these pension payments… The total estimated cost is about $582 million, including about $372 million in backdated payments and a further $210 million in future liabilities.”

While we can accept these numbers for the moment, importantly, the rest of the MoF statement is full of erroneous misstatements and outright lies which have been perpetuated for more than 15 years by FNPF managements and boards.

Let us focus on the outright lies before we come to the “rule of law” betrayals which are the “elephants in the room” with significant long-term implications for Fiji.

Outright lie No.1: Ignoring the Pension Buffer Fund (PBF)

The MoF statement claims that: “Reinstating pensions backdated to 2012 would undermine (FNPF’s) sustainability and would require either the use of other members’ funds to subsidise previously high and actuarially unsustainable pension rates or significant additional fiscal resources beyond Government’s financial capacity. FNPF does not have the capacity to absorb this cost without compromising member balances and future returns.” This is a blatant outright lie.

The FNPF has always had the ability to pay for the lawfully contracted pensions because the democratically elected Parliament under the able leadership of the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, established a Pension Buffer Fund (PBF) in 1975 precisely to pay for these pension liabilities.

All FNPF members at the time including most of the present aggrieved pensioners were required by a law of Parliament, to inject 2 cents in the dollar into the PBF between 1975 until 1998, when the cash injection was stopped by a similarly elected Parliament (as also was its sovereign right).

The law also provided a Government loan guarantee that could be resorted to whenever FNPF was unable to meet its financial commitments.

Inexplicably, however, in 2000 without any explanation by FNPF in its annual reports, the parliamentary established Pension Buffer Fund was absorbed into the General Reserve. Who in FNPF authorized this move which undermined an Act of Parliament?

The account was still maintained in name by FNPF and received all the lump sum balances of members who chose the pension option and from which was paid out, the contracted pensions.

But the FNPF Board omitted (or perhaps refused) to pay interest into the Pension Buffer Fund even though (as part of all FNPF Reserves) also invested to earn income. That interest income from the PBF was then improperly credited to the benefit of all members, but not the pensioners.

We say that a statute that provides inter alia for the payment of interest generally and which does not expressly exclude or prohibit the payment of interest to a specified account, is obliged to pay interest to the unspecified account.

Had the Buffer Fund been credited with the interest all other funds were being credited with, even in 2011 when the robbery took place, Narsey has estimated that the Buffer Fund would have amounted to a massive $877 million.

This figure far exceeds the $582 million supposedly required to pay for the full restitution of the 2012 pensioners’ irrevocable contracts (the MoF statement informed that the $582 million comprised $372 million for backpay and $210 million to be paid for future pensions).

Narsey has estimated that by 2025 the Pension Buffer Fund receiving its due interest income, receiving new pensioners’ lump sums on retirement and paying pensions, would have a credit of $1,382 millions (more than a billion).

In other words in paying what is due to the wronged 2012 pensioners, FNPF would today still have a surplus of $800 million in the Pension Buffer Fund, if it had been properly credited with interest as it should have been.

Contrary to claims in the MoF statement, full restitution to the 2012 pensioners can be made without any need for subsidies from General Members who would indeed still be profiting by $800 million. There would certainly not be any need whatsoever for any subsidy from Government.

If the backpay is done in three installments (as Narsey has previously suggested in his The Fiji Times article of December 13 2025: The 2012 FNPF Pensioners’ Robbery: the way forward”), only $132 million per year would be required for the backpay (and only for the first three years), and perhaps a mere $20 million annually for continuing pensions (currently paying $23 million annually).

Given the buoyancy of FNPF annual financial flows according to it’s annual reports, FNPF can easily accommodate restitution to the 2012 pensioners, as even greater adjustments were made during the recent COVID period.

But the Coalition Government, the Fiji Parliament and Fiji should note the far more dangerous long term implications of the MoF statement for Fiji’s Rule of Law and Parliamentary Democracy.

A brutal dagger into the Fiji’s rule of law

Soon after the Fiji Government had changed, there was a light satirical piece by lawyer Richard Naidu “Rule of law – Maybe a time for Aiyaz to reflect” (FT Jan 28 2023). More on Richard Naidu below as he is currently a legal adviser to FNPF.

Readers would be better off reading a far more serious article Narsey wrote on the universal principles of good “rule of law” (FT 16 March 2024: “The rule of law cancer in Fiji”) when he had called on the Rabuka Government to urgently address unresolved constitutional issues in its term in Parliament.

One essential cog in the rule of law “wheel” Narsey had pointed out was that laws must be made and changed in an open and transparent way by the people and all decisions must be made by a representative elected Government.

In complete contrast, no one knows to this day who were responsible for the drafting of the 2013 Constitution, which was never passed by an elected Parliament or adopted in a public referendum.

Yet somewhat ironically, to change a sentence in the 2013 Constitution, the draftsman demanded that there must be a three quarters majority vote in Parliament followed by a three quarters “yes” vote in a referendum of all the registered voters in Fiji (not voters actually voting), a virtual impossibility.

With far reaching implications for the rule of law are sentences in the MoF statement that use as justification for Government’s impotence and inertia, the provisions of the 2013 Constitution. These sentences plunge a dagger into the heart of the Constitution as a “living document”.

The MoF statement thus asserts: “The 2013 Constitution of the Republic of Fiji provides clear legal guidance on this matter. Section 173(3) expressly prohibits Parliament or Government from enacting any law that would retrospectively alter the legal effect of the 2012 FNPF reforms. This means Government cannot undo past decisions, restore old pension rates from 2012, or authorize compensation, damages, or backdated payments arising from those reforms. Any such action would be unconstitutional.”

How extraordinary that the MoF statement asserts that in resolving the case of the 2012 pensioners, the elected Coalition Government must strictly abide by a self-proclaimed Constitution that begins with a blatant untruth : “We , the people of Fiji …..hereby establish this Constitution…”.

What is more, the same document has never been accepted in a national referendum nor has it been scrutinised, debated and passed by an elected Fijian Parliament despite the Bainimarama Government being in effective control from 2006 to 2022 and despite it winning 2 parliamentary elections.

Undermining sacred principle of parliamentary democracy

How utterly extraordinary that the unknown, nameless, and faceless individuals who drafted the 2013 Constitution can with the stroke of disingenuity, insert a clause that boldly asserts that no future Parliament can enact any law that would retrospectively “alter the legal effect of the 2012 FNPF reforms”.

We have no hesitation in rejecting such an unprecedented wholesale trashing of the long established doctrine of “parliamentary supremacy” which declares that a democratically elected Parliament must have absolute sovereignty and can make or unmake any law it chooses.

This also means some unnamed creator of the 2013 Constitution cannot bind or hamstring a future democratically elected Parliament, as all democratically elected Parliaments have the same unlimited legislative powers to enact laws for the peace, order and good government of Fiji and its people at any point in time.

How extraordinary also that the MoF statement ignores a recent Supreme Court opinion that was sought by the Coalition Government itself where the court opined inter alia that the amendment provisions of the 2013 Constitution were not set in stone, but that two thirds of the elected Parliament and a simple majority in a referendum would be enough to change elements in the Constitution.

The Supreme Court also declined to recognise the validity of parts of sections 173 which is referred to in the MoF’s ‘Statement’.

Ignoring “property” rights of the 2012 pensioners

It is extraordinary that The MoF statement asserts “Section 26 of the Constitution protects property rights. The retirement savings of FNPF members constitutes their private property. Using those funds to finance retrospective reinstatement would amount to taking members’ property without consent and would expose Government and FNPF to significant legal challenge”.

Pray, what about the even earlier and similar property rights of the 2012 pensioners? Aren’t they also entitled to the same protection?

Their property rights were forcibly taken and altered without their consent by a military regime and without any compensation in the 2012 robbery.

Indeed, the restitution that the 2012 pensioners have called for would come completely from the PBF, not the General Members’ balances or property rights.

Note that the PBF surpluses which strictly belong to pensioners have instead been used for the benefit of the General Members for more than twenty and they continue to rise annually even now.

Why is it that the legal advisers of the MoF and FNPF so brazenly ignore the property rights of the robbed 2012 pensioners?

Who are FNPF’s legal advisers?

We have no idea if there was any input of FNPF lawyers into the MoF statement.

But we do know that in a meeting that the core group of the 2012 pensioners had with the FNPF Board a few months ago (with Narsey attending by zoom from Melbourne), Richard Naidu was present and spoke as FNPF’s lawyer.

Astonishingly Naidu lectured us at length on the need for FNPF to follow the “law” as it stood. He repeated over and over that the 2011 Decrees stopped the FNPF from addressing the 2012 pensioners’ grievances.

Richard Naidu made no mention of the dastardly origins of the 2013 Constitution as opposed to the 1997 Constitution which had been approved by both Houses of the Fiji Parliament yet treasonously trashed by the Bainimarama Government.

The MoF statement also totally ignored that the core group in its submissions to Government and the FNPF Board had included, with the assistance of former chief justice Daniel Fatiaki, a draft Bill which would set aside the FNPF Act 2011 and the FNPF Transition Act 2011.

Most pensioners have had the greatest of respect for FNPF’s lawyer Richard Naidu, as an ethical and courageous opponent of military coups, illegal governments and media censorship, despite his persecution by military regimes.

Just three years ago when the Bainimarama Government tried to criminalise him over a trivial social media post, Professor Narsey wrote an article defending Naidu, published internationally by Asia Pacific Review (15 October 2022 “Shameful silences at another unfolding tragedy in Fiji”).

The 2012 pensioners would like to hope that ethical FNPF’s lawyers, including Richard Naidu, would have some professional sympathy for the 2012 Pensioners whose lawful irrevocable contracts were trashed by FNPF, their property stolen, and their lawful case in court thrown out, denying them their fundamental human right to go to court.

The 2012 pensioners hope that the legal justice of their case and avenues for lawful solution, are recognised by FNPF’s ethical lawyers who could then ethically advise FNPF to seek a lawful and just settlement, especially as the 2012 pensioners are prepared to consider compromises to enable speedy resolution.

Sadly, their numbers dwindle by the week.

Qarase the Pensioner

26 Monday Jan 2026

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FNPF pension dispute – Qarase verdict

By Dewan Chand

I have written at length about the 2012 illegal and damaging pension plan hatched
by the Bainimarama-Sayed-Khaiyum dictatorship and supported by the Fiji
National Provident Fund.

In this article I will share strong criticism of this notorious scheme by one of Fiji’s
most famous sons. The late Laisenia Qarase, who served twice as elected Prime
Minister of Fiji, wrote scathingly on what he described as “pension aggression”
unleashed on elderly innocents. He was not complimentary about the role of the
FNPF.

Mr Qarase’s description of what happened is in Part 111 of his biography Prisoner
302 under the heading Pension Malice and Punishment. I have read the book
which has an important place in the story of Fiji.

For context, I include some of my own comments on the ongoing and still
unresolved pension saga. After that I will quote from Mr Qarase’s condemnation
of the then government and his view of the role of the FNPF in the scandal.

The victims were hit with an unexpected loss of income – in some cases above 60
per cent – and a nightmare of uncertainty.

For good measure the dictators denied us the right of seeking justice through the
courts.

That was a protective benefit for the FNPF which it appears to be relying on to this
day.

As all this crashed down on us, we asked ‘what will happen to us now?’ We knew
what occurred was unprecedented and wrong. Those representing us made our
opposition known publicly at the time. This was risky given the regime’s
intolerance of dissent.

Throughout the years that went by, the flame of justice flickered in our hearts.
There was, however, little prospect of relief until democracy returned. That
happened when the Coalition Government came to power at the start of 2023.
We began to organise again and to communicate our case for restitution. About
1500 of us have survived. With our numbers continuing to decline we are still
asking: How long will it be before justice is finally done?

We have received no assurances and support from the FNPF. We believe the Fund
has totally abandoned its duty of care to us, its fiduciary responsibilities.

In one article, I accused the FNPF of being in a state of “stubborn denial” and
afflicted by “wilful blindness”. This was because the financial giant with money
coming out of its ears, has steadfastly refused to settle the debts it owes to us.

I drafted another broadside about the untold human cost involved. There were
letters from me touching on many other facets of this unprecedented and cruel
episode in the history of the FNPF. For instance, under duress, some of the
casualties decided to withdraw partial or full amounts from their contributions to
the Fund. These lump sums of course were not pensions. Penury eventually
followed.

The reason for the pension reduction was because the Fund allegedly could not
afford to pay us. This was never proven.

A central issue is that the pensions violated were protected by irrevocable
contracts. The FNPF didn’t hesitate to break those contracts.

And so it is that several thousand innocent pensioners endured a retirement
nightmare instead of enjoying their final years in security, peace and happiness.

A ray of light came in the June 2024 Budget when then Minister of Finance,
Professor Biman Prasad, announced the Coalition Government would take
responsibility for restoration of some pensions to the tune of $4 million a year.
This was a welcome relief, but it did not take account of the years that FNPF had
refused to pay what it owed. Neither did it serve those who had taken partial or
full lump sums and were left in virtual poverty.

It was notable that Minister Prasad branded as illegal the unilateral reduction in
the pensions. Also broken, he said, was the statutory arrangement and trust
between the Fund and the pensioners.

Here was the FNPF line Minister proclaiming that what had been forced on the
pensioners was illegal. And yet the Fund’s board and management remain silent.
How can that be?

The current number of surviving victims appears to be about 1500, as old age
thins our ranks and reduces the FNPF’s liability.

My first contact with Mr Qarase was when I was appointed Senior Administration
Officer (SAO) in the Labour Party’s Opposition Office in Parliament. Mr Qarase, as
parliamentary leader of the SDL Party, was twice Prime Minister.

We began to meet in the Parliamentary corridors; it wasn’t long before we found
ourselves chatting around the tanoa with Government and Opposition members
and officials. He was quiet and polite and enjoyed the yaqona socialising.

Things changed substantially for me when I accepted an invitation to contest the
General Election of 2006 on a Labour ticket. Campaigning in the Laucala Indian
Communal constituency, I won in a landslide. I was now a Member of Parliament
and felt a bit more qualified to engage in conversations with Mr Qarase.

He was easy to talk to and always had details of Government initiatives at his
fingertips. Of course we didn’t agree on everything, but we were able to enjoy
some verbal jousting without acrimony.

Like me, Mr Qarase was caught in the pension squeeze. However, he suffered
what he called a “double hit”. First his pension as a former Prime Minister was
withheld by the Bainimarama-Sayed-Khaiyum government. The PM believed the
duo had begun to see pensions as a weapon against those who had criticised
them. He reported how his Prime Minister’s pension was withheld for eight years.

The late PM related how the regime embarked on another project that left many
people “bitter, disillusioned and in despair”. He was referring to the so-called
FNPF reforms that have penalised so many of us. Mr Qarase was also at the
receiving end.

“As an FNPF pensioner,” he wrote, “I was also caught in this new onslaught on
senior citizens.”

The victims, his book relates, fought hard to escape the clutches of the regime.
“They could not, however, prevail against a military dictatorship which was used
to imposing its will and had the means to do so.”

Then came Mr Qarase’s direct attack. “It was a mark of enduring shame for the
FNPF, its board and senior management, that they became willing accomplices of
the dictators.”

He indicated he had documents about the “disgraceful betrayal” of FNPF
dependants. He signed a petition calling for an independent inquiry into the plan
to cut pensions of recipients. He described them as mainly the poor, retired
working people, and some from the middle class.

According to Mr Qarase, the petitioners said that for the first time in its history the
FNPF had broken binding pension contracts. The FNPF had initially ignored advice
from its own consultants to honour contracts to existing pensioners.

He made short work of the FNPF argument that pensions had to be reduced to
ensure the FNPF was sustainable.

“…..its case fell apart on the details. In fact, it seemed to be making things up as it
went along.”

The late PM referred to the “bitter reality” of a future on substantially lower
incomes than the pensioners had been receiving through “irrevocable”
arrangements with the FNPF.

“They contended, with justification that the Fund had never proven that the
continuation of their pensions at the existing contractual levels would send the
FNPF into bankruptcy.”

Mr Qarase submitted that the FNPF further undermined its case when it stressed
that the Fund as it stood was sustainable for up to 45 years. According to the
aggrieved pensioners, this did not provide any foundation for default on current
payments.

He quoted from the pensioners’ petition: “…..Our plea is for the FNPF to leave us
alone in our final years, without inflicting on us the destruction and stress caused
by savage reductions in income for citizens who will find it difficult to re-enter the
workforce to make up for their loss…the government and FNPF have, without
justification, cut away the foundation of the last phase of our lives.”

Mr Qarase highlighted what he called a “new ploy” – refunds of the original
amounts pensioners had in their accounts.

“A refund is not a pension. The offer was seen as a ‘sweetener’ to soften the
impact of what the Fund had done.”

“In the circumstances, a good number of pensioners decided to take refunds. The
question I saw was when the money is gone, which in many cases was likely to be

sooner rather than later, what will happen to the recipients? Destitution will stare
them in the face.

“The petition described this as a social and human disaster for the pensioners
concerned. That’s exactly what it was. In fact, the entire business was disaster.”

The late Prime Minister then took a swipe at Mr Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum. He wrote
that to make things even harder for the innocent pensioners, Mr Sayed-Khaiyum
tossed into the arena a “dreadful” piece of legislation called the Transition Decree
(known also as Decree 51).

“Not only did this endorse the rescinding of contracts; it also denied the
fundamental right of seeking redress through the court system. The 1997
Constitution properly addressed this. It provided that every party to a civil dispute
had the right for the matter to be determined by a court of law or an independent
and impartial tribunal.

“Sayed-Khaiyum’s Transition Decree completely ignored this basic legal principle.
It put an end to a civil action already started by a courageous pensioner from Suva
Point, the late Mr David Burness. How shameful that Mr Burness was prevented
from seeking justice before he died.”

Mr Qarase passed away in 2020. He was a faithful and able servant of Fiji.

Meanwhile, the surviving pensioners continue their campaign for justice.

EFL Shares Sale:

10 Saturday Jan 2026

Posted by fijipensioners in Articles & Reports

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The sale of shares in Energy Fiji Limited (EFL) involved several key advisers for the Fijian Government, EFL, and the buyers.

The major transaction took place in March 2021, when a consortium comprising Chugoku Electric Power Company (CEPCO) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) acquired 44% of EFL (24% from the Fijian Government and 20% from FNPF).

Advisers to the Fijian Government & EFL (Sellers)
Financial Adviser: ANZ Corporate Advisory

ANZ International acted as the lead financial adviser to the Fijian Government and EFL throughout the divestment process.

Legal Advisers:

Buddle Findlay: A New Zealand law firm that played a lead role in advising the EFL Board and senior management on the transaction structure and sale. Partner Grant Dunn led the team.

Squire Patton Boggs: An international law firm that advised the Fijian Government on the deal.

Howards Lawyers: Fiji-based law firm (Partner Alesi Macedru) is also listed as having advised on the sale of shares in EFL, likely providing local counsel.

EFL Board Adviser: Prasann Patel

He served as a specific advisor to the EFL Board and was instrumental in navigating the transaction and previous syndicated financing.

Strategic/Technical Support:

World Bank / IFC (International Finance Corporation): The Fijian Government utilized expertise from the World Bank and IFC during the international selection process to identify the strategic partner.

The Transaction Context

The Deal: The Japanese consortium (via a Singapore-based special purpose vehicle called Sevens Pacific Pte Ltd) paid approximately FJD $440 million for the 44% stake.

Shareholding Structure Post-Sale:

Fijian Government: 51% (Majority control retained)

Sevens Pacific (Chugoku/JBIC): 44%

Domestic Account Holders: 5% (Held by the public)

Advisers to the Buyer (Chugoku/JBIC)

While the specific private advisers for the Japanese consortium were not as widely publicized in Fijian press releases, Japanese corporations typically engage major “Big Four” Japanese law firms (such as Nishimura & Asahi or Anderson Mori & Tomotsune) and global investment banks for cross-border acquisitions of this size.

The sale of EFL shares to the Sevens Pacific Pte Ltd consortium (Chugoku Electric Power Company and JBIC) was structured as a strategic partnership rather than a full privatization.

Here are the specific details regarding the valuation and the management rights agreed upon in the Shareholder Agreement.

1. Valuation Details

The valuation was significant because it set a benchmark for Fijian infrastructure assets. The consortium paid a premium to secure a significant minority stake.

Purchase Price: The Sevens Pacific consortium paid approximately FJD $440 million for 44% of the shares.

Implied Enterprise Value: This transaction valued the entire entity (EFL) at approximately FJD $1.2 – $1.3 billion.

Share Breakdown:

24% was acquired from the Fijian Government.

20% was acquired from the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) (which exited its investment to realize a capital gain).

The remaining 51% is retained by the Fijian Government.

5% is held by domestic account holders (the public).

2. Management & Governance Rights

While the Fijian Government retained majority ownership (51%), the Shareholder Agreement granted specific minority protection rights and management influence to the Japanese consortium to protect their investment and leverage their technical expertise.

Board Representation:

The EFL Board typically consists of seven directors.

Sevens Pacific (Chugoku/JBIC) holds the right to appoint three directors to the Board.

The Fijian Government appoints the remaining directors (including the Chair), retaining control over the Board but ensuring the Japanese consortium has a significant voice.

Technical & Operational Role:

The agreement was not just financial but it also included a Technical Services Agreement. Chugoku Electric acts as the technical partner, advising on grid stability, renewable integration, and decarbonization.

Their specific mandate is to help EFL achieve the target of 90%+ renewable energy generation by 2030–2035 (shifting away from diesel).

Veto Rights (Minority Protections):

As is standard in deals where a strategic investor takes a large minority stake (44%), the consortium likely holds “negative control” or veto rights over “Reserved Matters.” These typically include veto rights over:

(i) Changes to the company constitution.

(ii) Issuance of new shares (dilution protection).

(iii) Large capital expenditures or assumption of significant new debt outside the agreed business plan.

(iv) Changes to the dividend policy.

3. Regulatory Context

Post-transaction reviews (including by the subsequent coalition government) have highlighted concerns regarding the regulatory safeguards.

The deal reduced government flexibility to intervene in electricity tariffs, as the investor requires a commercial return on the $440m investment.

A key benefit to the government was the removal of sovereign guarantees on EFL’s debt. Following the partial privatization, EFL’s debt is meant to be self-sustaining without the government backing it, improving the national debt profile.

Under the Shareholder Agreement, Sevens Pacific Pte Ltd (the Chugoku Electric/JBIC joint venture) is entitled to appoint three directors to the EFL Board. These appointees act as the voice of the 44% shareholder and provide technical oversight.

Current Sevens Pacific Appointees (as of 2024):

Mr. Chitoshi Fukuda: He is a key figure in the partnership, having served as a Director since the acquisition in 2021. Unusually for a non-executive director, he also holds the operational role of Deputy Chief Executive Officer, ensuring direct Japanese oversight in daily operations.

Mr. Tsutomu Fujita: Appointed in April 2024.

Mr. Akira Irie: Appointed in April 2024.

These directors replaced the initial 2021 appointees, Mr. Koichi Tsunematsu and Mr. So Horikiri, illustrating how the consortium rotates its technical and financial experts into these roles.

2. Dividend Policy

The dividend policy was a critical part of the negotiation. While the Fijian Government (51%) might typically prioritize low tariffs or social objectives, the private investors (44%) require a commercial return on their ~FJD 440m investment.

Changes to the dividend policy are a “Reserved Matter.” This means the Fijian Government cannot unilaterally decide to stop paying dividends or change the payout ratio without the approval of Sevens Pacific.

The agreement generally stipulates that EFL acts as a commercial entity. While the exact formula is confidential, the policy balances shareholder returns with the massive capital expenditure (CapEx) required for the renewable transition.

he policy has resulted in consistent payouts despite the heavy infrastructure investment needs. For example:

In 2022, EFL paid FJD 23.8 million in dividends to the Government (and a proportional amount to Sevens Pacific).

This confirms that the asset is now run with a strict focus on profitability to support these cash flows.

The presence of Chitoshi Fukuda as Deputy CEO is the most significant detail here. It means the Japanese consortium isn’t just sitting on the Board; they are actively managing the “engine room” of EFL to protect the profitability that funds their dividends.

The term “Reserved Matters” is the most critical part of the EFL shareholder agreement. It is the mechanism that prevents the Fijian Government (even though it owns 51%) from making decisions that would hurt the financial value of the Japanese consortium’s 44% stake.

Because Sevens Pacific (Chugoku/JBIC) paid FJD 440 million, they required protections to ensure the government didn’t just lower electricity prices for political votes, which would destroy their profits.

What are “Reserved Matters”?

A “Reserved Matter” is a specific type of high-level decision that cannot be passed by a simple majority vote. Even if the Government directors (majority) vote “Yes,” the decision fails unless the Sevens Pacific directors also vote “Yes.”

While the full list is confidential, based on standard infrastructure deals and recent government critiques, the Reserved Matters for EFL almost certainly include:

Dividend Policy: The government cannot decide not to pay dividends (or pay too much) without Japanese approval.

Annual Business Plan & Budget: The consortium must approve the yearly financial targets, which are based on specific revenue (tariff) expectations.

Incurring Large Debt: New loans (like for a new dam or solar farm) likely require their sign-off.

Changes to the Constitution: The government cannot change the rules of the company to remove these protections.

2. Can they block the Government from lowering tariffs?

Technically: No. The Fijian Competition and Consumer Commission (FCCC) is the independent regulator that sets the tariff rate, not the EFL Board. Therefore, the Japanese investors cannot simply “veto” a regulator’s decision.

Practically: Yes (Indirectly). The shareholder agreement creates a “financial trap” that makes lowering tariffs extremely difficult for the government:

The Commercial Mandate: The agreement mandates that EFL operates as a commercial entity seeking a profit.

The Implied Contract: When Chugoku invested, they did so based on a financial model that assumed a certain “Rate of Return.” If the government forces EFL to apply for a lower tariff (or refuses to let EFL apply for a hike), it could be seen as oppression of minority shareholders.

The Consequence: If the government wants to lower tariffs for the public, they can’t just order EFL to cut prices. Instead, the government typically has to subsidize the difference using taxpayer money (paying EFL the cash it would have made) to keep the Japanese investors’ returns whole.

Current Example (January 2026): Just this month, there has been controversy regarding a proposed tariff increase for EFL. While the Government “paused” the hike for consultation, EFL (backed by its investors) argued that the increase is necessary for “sustainability” and “infrastructure investment.” This is the Reserved Matters dynamic in action: the investors require the revenue to maintain their returns.

3. Why is this controversial?

Critics argue that this deal “privatized the profits”:

Before the sale the government could run EFL at a break-even point or a loss to help the poor, absorbing the cost as a public service.

After the sale: EFL must make a profit to satisfy the 44% shareholder. If they don’t, the foreign investor can potentially sue for breach of agreement or block future investment (like renewable energy upgrades), causing the grid to deteriorate.

The “Technical Services Agreement” (TSA) is a specific contract that runs alongside the shareholding. It effectively hires Chugoku Electric as a technical consultant to EFL.

This TSA is the primary justification for the partnership beyond the money. EFL (a small island utility) needed access to the engineering depth of a major Japanese utility to handle the complex transition from diesel to renewable energy without crashing the grid.

Here is what Chugoku Electric is actually delivering under this agreement:

1. The “Flagship” Projects

While independent companies (IPPs) are building some solar farms (like Sunergise at Qeleloa), Chugoku Electric is directly involved in developing specific assets with EFL.

Lautoka Solar Project (5MW): EFL and Chugoku Electric have been working jointly to identify and develop this specific solar site.

Hydro Refurbishment: Chugoku operates massive hydro plants in Japan. They are providing the technical scope for the Monasavu Half-Life Refurbishment ($185M) and the Wailoa upgrades. These dams are old (1980s), and Chugoku’s role is to extend their life so they don’t fail.

2. The “Grid Stability” Role (Crucial)

This is the most important technical contribution.

The Problem: Fiji wants 90% renewable energy by 2035. Solar and wind are unstable (clouds/calm days cause power drops). On a small island grid, too much solar crashes the system (blackouts).

The Chugoku Fix: Chugoku is designing the Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) and the 132kV transmission upgrades (the new “2nd Vuda-Wailoa-Kinoya line” costing ~$731M). They provide the engineering modeling that tells EFL exactly how much solar the grid can handle before it breaks.

3. The $4.5 Billion Master Plan (Current Status – 2026)

As of January 2026, EFL has just launched a massive international procurement drive (valued at over FJD $2 billion in immediate projects) to build:

165MW of Solar + Batteries

New Hydro: Qaliwana and Vatutokotoko (Lower Ba) schemes.

This “Master Plan” was effectively co-authored by Chugoku Electric’s technical team under the TSA. They helped design the specs to ensure that whoever builds these plants meets Japanese-level quality standards, rather than EFL buying cheap, unreliable infrastructure.

4. “The Engine Room”

The TSA is enforced by placing Chugoku personnel inside EFL.

Mr. Chitoshi Fukuda (Deputy CEO) is not just a board member; he works in the company. His role is to transfer Japanese efficiency practices into EFL’s daily operations.

This includes “Kaizen” (continuous improvement) operational strategies to reduce line losses (wasted electricity) and improve safety standards for line workers.

Summary of the “Deal”

The Government got: Cash ($440m) + Risk Removal (No more debt guarantees).

Chugoku got: A steady 5-7% return (Dividends) + Consulting Fees (TSA).

The Public got a more robust (but potentially more commercially aggressive) utility that is less likely to suffer catastrophic failure but is also less likely to lower prices voluntarily.

Of course there are alternative structures that could have better protected Fijian consumers, particularly regarding tariff stability and ownership control.

While the actual sale prioritized debt reduction and risk transfer, the following alternative structures would have prioritized affordability and national interest.

1. The “Management Contract” Model (Expertise Without Sale)
Instead of selling 44% of the company, the Government could have retained 100% ownership and simply hired Chugoku Electric as a “Management Contractor.”

How it works: The Government pays Chugoku a fixed annual fee (e.g., $10m/year) to run the grid and implement renewable technology.

Consumer Benefit:

Price Control: The Government retains the sole right to set tariffs based on social needs (subsidizing the poor), without needing to satisfy a foreign investor’s profit margin.

No “Forever” Dividend: In the current deal, Fiji pays dividends to Japan forever. In a contract model, once the contract ends, the payments stop.

Why it wasn’t chosen: It would not have provided the immediate $440 million cash injection the previous government wanted to reduce national debt. Aiyaz needed money to plug the National Budget.

2. The “Green Bond” Financing (Debt vs. Equity)

EFL needed money for renewable upgrades. Instead of selling shares (equity) to raise this capital, EFL could have issued Sovereign Green Bonds or accessed concessional climate finance (e.g., from the World Bank or Asian Development Bank).

How it works: Fiji borrows the money at low interest rates (e.g., 2-3%) to fund the solar/hydro projects.

Consumer Benefit:

Cheaper in the Long Run: Debt eventually gets paid off. Equity (shares) requires paying dividends (aiming for 8-10% returns) indefinitely. It is cheaper for consumers to pay off a low-interest loan than to fund a foreign investor’s high expected return.

Ownership: The asset remains 100% Fijian-owned.

Why it wasn’t chosen: The Government wanted to remove debt from its books (de-risk), not add more.

3. The “Consumer Cooperative” or Trust Model

This is a model used in parts of the US and New Zealand. The utility is owned by the consumers rather than the government or private investors.

How it works: Every electricity account holder effectively owns one share.

Consumer Benefit:

Profit Recycling: The goal of the company shifts from “Maximizing Profit” to “Minimizing Cost.” Any surplus profit at the end of the year is returned to consumers as a rebate on their bill.

Alignment: There is no conflict between “The Company” wanting higher prices and “The People” wanting lower prices because they are the same group.

Why it wasn’t chosen: It creates a complex governance structure and makes it harder to raise billions of dollars for new dams/solar farms quickly.

Anyway, the structure chosen (Strategic Partnership) prioritizes efficiency and government debt reduction. An alternative structure like a Management Contract or Green Bond financing would have better prioritized consumer affordability and national sovereignty, but it would have left the Government carrying more financial risk.

The decision to sell was driven largely by risk avoidance. If the Fijian Government had chosen either of the alternative structures (Management Contract or Green Financing/Keeping 100%), they would be carrying a significantly higher financial burden today.

The key number to understand here is FJD $4.3 Billion. This is the estimated cost of the 10-year Power Development Plan (to build new solar, hydro, and transmission lines) required by 2031.

Here is the breakdown of the financial risk the Government avoided by selling:

1. The Debt Burden (The $4.3 Billion Problem)
If the Government had kept 100% ownership (under either alternative model), it would be solely responsible for funding the infrastructure upgrades.

In the Alternative Structures (100% Gov Owned):

The Liability: The Government would need to either borrow the $4.3 billion itself or issue Sovereign Guarantees so EFL could borrow it.

The Impact: In 2021, Fiji’s Debt-to-GDP ratio was already at crisis levels (~80-90% due to COVID). Adding billions more in guaranteed debt for energy infrastructure would likely have led to a credit rating downgrade, making borrowing more expensive for the entire country (hospitals, roads, schools).

In the Actual Deal (Current Structure):

The Benefit: EFL is now a commercial entity with a wealthy foreign partner. EFL borrows money on its own balance sheet.

Risk Transfer: Lenders (banks) now look at Chugoku Electric’s strength and EFL’s profits, rather than asking the Fijian taxpayer to guarantee the loan. The Government effectively removed a potential $4.3 billion contingent liability from its books.

2. Operational “Shock” Risk
Financial risk isn’t just about loans but about what happens when things break.

In the Alternative Structures:

If a cyclone destroys a major transmission line or the Monasavu Dam requires an emergency $200m repair, the Government (as 100% owner) must find that cash immediately.

Example: When the catastrophic damage from Cyclone Winston happened, the Government had to scramble for funds.

In the Actual Deal:

Shared Pain: If a disaster hits EFL, the loss is shared. Chugoku Electric (44%) must contribute its share of the emergency capital to fix it.

Technical Shield: Chugoku is technically liable for ensuring the grid works. If the new battery system fails, it is their reputation and investment on the line to fix it, reducing the likelihood of the Government needing to bail out the utility due to technical incompetence.

3. The “Opportunity Cost” of Cash
Alternative Structures:

The Government would not have received the FJD $440 million upfront payment.

They would have had to continue subsidizing EFL’s capital projects, diverting money away from health, education, and roads.

The $440m cash injection in 2021 was critical for keeping the Government afloat during the pandemic when tourism revenue was zero.

The Government traded Control for Safety.

They gave up: The ability to easily lower electricity prices (Control).

They gained: Protection from having to borrow another $4 billion to fix the grid (Safety).

To put it bluntly: In 2020–2021, the Fijian economy was effectively in intensive care.

The government was facing a “financial cliff.” They had a choice between borrowing billions more (which might have bankrupted the nation) or selling part of EFL to get someone else to pay for the upgrades.

Here is the breakdown of why the economy was too broken to manage the transition alone.

1. The “Perfect Storm” of 2020–2021
When this deal was being finalized (2020–2021), Fiji was facing the worst economic crisis in its history.

GDP Collapse: Because of COVID-19, tourism (40% of the economy) vanished overnight. The economy contracted by a massive20%. This is a Depression-level crash.

Revenue Drought: The government was collecting almost no tax revenue from hotels, airlines, or tourists. They were borrowing money just to pay civil servants (teachers, nurses, police).

Cyclone Costs: While COVID was happening, Cyclone Harold and Cyclone Yasa caused hundreds of millions in damages, forcing the government to spend emergency cash on rebuilding schools and bridges instead of power lines.

2. The “Impossible Math” of the Energy Transition
The transition to renewable energy isn’t cheap. It is incredibly capital-intensive.

The Cost: As noted in recent reports, the 10-year plan to fix the grid and build solar/hydro requires $4.3 Billion.

The Problem: The Fijian Government simply did not have $4 billion.

The Debt Wall: By mid-2021, Fiji’s Government Debt-to-GDP ratio had skyrocketed from a manageable 48% to a dangerous 80%+.

The Scenario if Government Kept 100%: If the Government tried to borrow that $4.3 billion themselves to fund EFL:

National Debt would explode to over 120% of GDP.

Credit Rating Downgrade: International rating agencies (Moody’s/S&P) would have downgraded Fiji to “Junk” status.

Consequence: Interest rates for all borrowing would spike. The Fiji Dollar could devalue, making imported food (rice, flour) and fuel drastically more expensive for ordinary families.

3. The “Sovereign Guarantee” Trap
Before the sale, EFL’s loans were guaranteed by the Government.

This meant if EFL couldn’t pay its debts, the taxpayer had to pay.

The World Bank and IMF were telling Fiji: “You have too many guarantees. You need to offload this risk.”

By selling 44% to Chugoku, the Government removed these guarantees. Now, if EFL needs money, Chugoku (a giant Japanese utility with deep pockets) helps back the loans, not the struggling Fijian taxpayer.

The sale was essentially a forced survival strategy. The Government sacrificed long-term control over electricity prices to save the country from short-term financial ruin.

They brought in Chugoku Electric not just because they wanted a partner, but because they needed a wealthy “guarantor” who could afford the multi-billion dollar upgrades that the Fijian treasury simply could not.

While “debt” and “COVID” were the immediate triggers, the root cause of our economic fragility is our own going slow motion long-term collapse in productivity.

We have been suffering from a “hollowed-out” economy where the workforce is working harder but producing less value. This is what has made the economy too weak to fund its own infrastructure (like EFL) without selling it.

The productivity collapse has led us directly to this situation:

1. The “Brain Drain” Impact (Exporting Competence)
The most devastating hit to productivity is the mass exodus of skilled workers.

The Data: Since 2018, approximately 114,000 people (nearly 12% of the total population) have left Fiji. This isn’t just “people leaving”, it is our most productive assets: experienced engineers, senior nurses, senior accountants, and technical tradespeople.

When a senior EFL engineer with 15 years of experience migrates to Australia, they are often replaced by a fresh graduate. That graduate takes three times as long to fix a fault. That is a collapse in productivity. The same work now costs more and takes longer.

2. The “Low Investment” Cycle
Productivity comes from two things: Skills (people) and Capital (machines/technology). We are miserably failing on both fronts.

Stagnant Technology: Because the economy has been weak, businesses (and the Government) haven’t invested in modern machinery or automation. They rely on manual labor because it’s “cheaper” in the short term.

The Result: A worker in New Zealand produces $50 of value in an hour because they have high-tech tools. A worker in Fiji might produce $5 of value in the same hour because they are working with outdated systems. This means Fiji generates less wealth to tax, leaving the government broke.

3. The “Blackout” Loop
This is where the EFL sale connects directly to productivity.

Unreliable Power Kills Productivity: You cannot have a productive economy if factories have to stop working when the power goes out. Frequent blackouts (due to the old grid) force businesses to run expensive diesel generators or send staff home.

The grid is bad, so productivity is low.

Productivity is low, so the economy is poor.

The economy is poor, so we can’t afford to fix the grid.

Repeat cycle. Vicious cycle.

4. The “Informal Economy” Problem
A huge portion of our workforce (estimated over 60%) is in the informal sector (taxi drivers, market vendors, casual laborers).

While these people work incredibly hard, the financial productivity of this sector is low. They don’t pay corporate tax, they don’t have access to bank loans to expand, and they don’t scale up.

An economy relies on the formal sector (companies like EFL, Vodafone, Fiji Water) to generate the massive tax revenue needed to build dams and bridges. When the formal sector stagnates, the national budget collapses.

The Government had to sell EFL because the Fijian economy was not generating enough surplus wealth to pay for its own development.

And worse we had aligned our economy entirely to Toureism reliance. The over-reliance on tourism was the structural “Achilles’ heel” that turned a difficult situation into a crisis, making the sale of strategic assets like EFL inevitable.

We had effectively built a “monoculture” economy. When you rely on one industry for 40% of your GDP, you are not just taking a risk; you are gambling the national checkbook on factors completely outside your control (pandemics, cyclones, global recessions).

That “Tourism Trap” directly forced the EFL sale:

1. The “Cash Cow” Dried Up Before 2020, tourism was the engine that funded everything else.

The Subsidy Chain: Tourists bring foreign currency, Government taxes profits and uses that tax to subsidize electricity and water for locals.

The Crash: When borders closed suddenly, the Government didn’t have the cash to support EFL’s capital projects.

Without tourism tax revenue, the treasury was empty, leaving them no choice but to find a private buyer.

Because tourism was so easy and profitable for 20 years, Fiji neglected other difficult but necessary sectors. Successive Government’s have been unable to do the hard work of developing an diversified economy with mutiple sectors.

With all the focus (and banking credit) going to tourism, when tourism failed, there was no “Plan B” industry to prop up the economy.

Our economy is a “one-trick pony and because the economy is so volatile (boom/bust with tourism cycles), lenders charge Fiji higher interest rates.

If we had a diversified economy (e.g., strong manufacturing + agriculture + tourism), the economy would be stable, and the Government could have borrowed money cheaply to fix EFL itself.

Instead, because we are “high risk,” borrowing is too expensive, making the partial privatization the only viable option to get cheap capital.

Summary of the Economic TrapLow Productivity:

We exported our best skilled workers.

Single Engine: We relied 100% on tourism.

The Shock: COVID broke the engine.

The Result: We had to sell the family silver (EFL shares) to keep the lights on.

We exported our skills (Brain Drain).

We failed to invest in technology.

Therefore, we had to import a foreign partner (Chugoku) to do the job we could no longer afford to do ourselves.

Poor Governance = shoddy outcomes.

Fiji Pensioners

~ GREY POWER

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