Why is the Fiji Ministry of Environment and Climate Change still supporting Dome/Magna?

DOME/MAGNA HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED BY ASX quotation since October first, twenty twenty-six, under Listing Rule seventeen point five for failing to lodge its annual report on time. The underlying reason is that Dome can’t currently finish its audit for the year ended June thirtieth. Dome/Magma were asked repeatedly by Government officials to release a digital copy of the EIA, But they refused. Which explains why you can see from the Facebook posts less than 40 people actually read the document under the archaic rules that apply.

As of its October thirtieth quarterly report, the suspension was still in place, with the AGM pushed to November twenty-sixth. Magma itself isn’t a separate ASX-listed company anymore — Dome acquired Magma Mines, which held the Sigatoka project, back in twenty twenty-one. So there’s no Magma code to suspend; it’s all folded into DME. One thing worth watching: ASX’s long-term suspension rules give Dome a one-year deadline from the missed report due date and a two-year window to get trading resumed before it risks being removed from the official list entirely.

Here’s what reinstatement actually takes. Under Listing Rule seventeen point eight, once Dome lodges the outstanding annual report and pays any fees, ASX will normally reinstate before the next trading day opens. The catch is the note attached to that rule — ASX can refuse if there’s another reason to suspend, and Dome’s nil cash and going-concern flag are exactly that kind of reason. Bougainville Copper just went through this: lodged late, then had to show ASX it had rebuilt its reporting systems before reinstatement was granted. On the clock, Dome’s annual report was due September thirtieth, twenty twenty-six. The one-year lodgement deadline is September thirtieth, twenty twenty-seven. The two-year suspension deadline is October first, twenty twenty-eight. Whichever hits first triggers removal from the official list. ASX can also delist earlier under Rule seventeen point twelve if it decides Dome no longer has adequate financial condition — and with zero cash at June thirtieth, that argument is already live. Now the Fiji side. The EIA public review closed yesterday, October thirtieth. Public meetings are November sixth and seventh in Sigatoka. After that, Fiji’s Department of Environment analyses everything and decides next steps — but there’s no published statutory timeline for that analysis phase. The feasibility study was expected later this year, and a mining lease application follows feasibility. No mining lease exists yet, only the prospecting licence, and Fiji’s lands minister has publicly stressed that submitting an EIA is not approval. So the sequencing problem is stark. Dome’s audit needs a valuation of Sigatoka, the valuation needs permitting momentum, and the permitting momentum is stuck in an open-ended Fijian review while Dome’s cash is essentially gone and it’s drip-feeding twelve percent convertible notes. If the DOE drags into mid-twenty twenty-seven, Dome is staring down the one-year lodgement deadline with an unfinished audit. The one escape hatch is that ASX may grant a short extension if Dome can show it’s in the final stages of a signed, financed transaction that restores trading — but final stages is a high bar when your main asset’s approval is still in public consultation. One angle worth a closer look: Dome’s June twenty twenty-five accounts already carried a material going-concern uncertainty with about half a million in cash. The convertible notes are building an interest and conversion overhang on a twenty-one million dollar company.

The Pensioners would like to know who exactly in the Rabuka government is supporting Dome/Magna, who is prepared to sacrifice our Nations National Parks to get their Thirty Pieces of Silver

Which Political Party Should The People of Fiji Vote For?

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We all, each and every one of us, should be aware that since 1987, we have been governed by an assortment of the Almost Good, the Very Bad and the Disgustingly Ugly, plus corrupt, incompetent, greedy, and idiotic.

The time has come when we must for the future of the children and our Nation ensure that we vote and that we vote for a party that we truly believe is capable of working in the best interest of Fiji, its aged, its young, its poor, its future generations, which frankly rules out most government members we have had for the past 40 years.

This is a pragmatic assessment grounded in Fiji’s structural realities as a small, open, climate-vulnerable Pacific island economy with a history of political instability, ethnic diversity, high public debt, tourism dependence, and exposure to external shocks. These considerations could guide ANY FUTURE PARTY seeking durable national outcomes rather than short-term electoral advantage.

Political foundations

Long-term viability depends more on institutional quality than on any particular ideology:

  • Prioritise political stability and the rule of law. Fiji’s repeated coups and periods of tension have raised the cost of capital, deterred investment, and fragmented policy continuity. Strengthening independent institutions (judiciary, electoral bodies, anti-corruption mechanisms) and predictable constitutional rules reduces the risk of abrupt reversals that destroy credibility.
  • Build inclusive, multi-ethnic governance. Policies that systematically advantage or disadvantage one community over another recreate the zero-sum dynamics that have repeatedly destabilised the country. Broad-based legitimacy is more resilient than majoritarian or identity-based mobilisation.
  • Focus on competence and continuity over personality or patronage. High debt levels, climate risks, and the need for sustained investment reward parties that can maintain coherent multi-year strategies in infrastructure, education, and fiscal management rather than cyclical spending spikes before elections.
  • Maintain civilian supremacy and clear civil-military boundaries. Recurring military involvement in politics has been a source of uncertainty; durable democracy requires both professional security forces and civilian accountability.

These are enabling conditions. Without them, even well-designed economic policies tend to under-deliver.

Trade and economic orientation

Fiji’s size, remoteness, and vulnerability to cyclones and global commodity swings favour openness combined with deliberate capacity-building:

  • Deepen and diversify trade rather than retreat into protectionism. Tourism remains the dominant foreign-exchange earner, but concentration creates fragility. Expanding higher-value agriculture (including branded products), fisheries, niche manufacturing, and services while improving logistics, biosecurity, and quality standards increases resilience. Preferential access to Australia, New Zealand, and other markets is valuable only if domestic producers can meet standards and compete.
  • Engage regional and bilateral arrangements selectively and with clear safeguards. Agreements such as PACER Plus or others with major partners should be judged by whether they expand realistic market access, support infant-industry development where feasible, and avoid locking in rules that permanently constrain policy space. Fiji has historically approached some of these deals cautiously for exactly these reasons.
  • Balance major partners without exclusive alignment. Australia and New Zealand remain critical for tourism, labour mobility, and security; China, India, the United States, and others offer investment, infrastructure, and market opportunities. A non-aligned, interest-based approach that maximises options while preserving sovereignty is more sustainable than ideological dependence on any single external power.
  • Integrate climate resilience into trade and investment policy. Physical risks (cyclones, sea-level rise, droughts) already impose large costs. Policies that encourage climate-smart agriculture, resilient infrastructure, and insurance mechanisms protect both export capacity and fiscal sustainability. International climate finance can complement, but not replace, domestic reform.
  • Improve the investment climate through governance rather than solely through incentives. Rule of law, contract enforcement, transparent regulation, and reduced bureaucratic friction matter more for sustained foreign direct investment than temporary tax holidays. High public debt constrains fiscal giveaways; credibility is the scarcer resource.

Trade-offs and realism

Openness can expose domestic producers to competition and widen trade deficits if competitiveness does not improve. Protection can shelter jobs short-term but often raises costs for consumers and input-using industries. Fiscal expansion may be politically attractive yet risks debt sustainability given already elevated ratios. Climate adaptation requires upfront spending that competes with other priorities.

A future party’s most constructive contribution would be to treat these trade-offs explicitly, ground policy in evidence about what actually raises productivity and resilience in a small island setting, and build cross-community coalitions around shared material interests (jobs, security from disasters, rising living standards) rather than identity cleavage. Success will be measured less by ideological purity than by whether living standards, institutional trust, and shock-absorbing capacity rise over successive electoral cycles.

Wise words from Pramesh Sharma

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The latest report that the FNPF pension dispute could potentially cost $700 million raises fundamental questions about justice, accountability, constitutional constraints and the responsibility of those entrusted with managing our national retirement savings.

First, the pensioners have been hard done by the previous Fiji First Government and the FNPF Board and Senior Management responsible for the 2012 pension reforms. These pensioners made their retirement decisions based on the terms and expectations that existed at the time.

For many, their pensions were not simply another financial product; they were the foundation of their retirement security, dignity and peace of mind. To reduce their pensions after they had committed their working lives and savings to the Fund has caused lasting hardship. Behind every financial estimate are elderly citizens, families and individuals who have lived with the consequences for years. The fact that a decision may have been defended on actuarial or financial grounds does not, by itself, settle the wider questions of fairness, legitimate expectations and accountability.

Second, the entrenchment of these provisions in the 2013 Constitution has created a serious obstacle to finding a just resolution. The present FNPF Board and Management must operate within the law as it stands. Even where there may be a genuine desire to address historical grievances, constitutional restrictions can severely limit their options. This is precisely why constitutional provisions affecting the pension dispute deserve careful scrutiny. A Constitution should uphold the rule of law, protect rights and provide access to justice. It should not become an unquestionable shield against examining whether past decisions were fair, lawful or consistent with the rights of those affected.

The current Board and Management should not be expected to act outside the law. Equally, they should not be left without a lawful avenue to address a longstanding injustice if a proper review establishes that redress is warranted.

Third, the application of Section 51 of the Constitution, whether rightly or wrongly interpreted in relation to this dispute, should be tested through appropriate judicial proceedings. No institution, Government or interested party should simply assume that its interpretation is beyond challenge.

A properly constituted judicial review, pursued by parties with the necessary legal standing, could examine the relevant legal provisions, their application and the extent to which the courts have jurisdiction to consider the issues raised. The courts would need to determine the precise legal questions, including the effect of any constitutional restrictions on their jurisdiction.

This is not about asking the courts to disregard the Constitution. It is about asking the courts to determine what the Constitution means, how its provisions interact and whether the legal barriers being relied upon have been correctly interpreted. The objective should be clarity, accountability and a lawful pathway forward.

Fourth, prudent governance requires the FNPF Board and Management to prepare responsibly for the possibility of future liability. If the Fund faces a credible historical claim, it would be poor governance to ignore that possibility simply because the present legal position appears restrictive. The Board should (or may have done already) commission independent legal advice, obtain an actuarial assessment and ensure that the potential financial exposure is properly evaluated and disclosed. Where appropriate, under the applicable accounting standards, a provision should be recognised if there is a present obligation, a probable outflow of resources and a sufficiently reliable estimate of the amount. If those recognition criteria are not met, the potential exposure should nevertheless be assessed for disclosure as a contingent liability where required.

This is not a call to pay an unproven claim prematurely, nor to use the retirement savings of current contributors indiscriminately to meet a historical obligation. It is a call for responsible financial planning, transparent risk management and a clear distinction between the Fund’s legal obligations and any responsibility that may properly rest with the State. The principle is simple; today’s legal obstacles should not be mistaken for a guarantee that tomorrow’s liability can never arise.

If a future constitutional review changes the relevant legal position or a competent court determines that a claim can lawfully proceed, the question of restitution could return with renewed force. The Fund and Government should not be caught unprepared.

The estimated $700 million figure reported in the Fiji Times must also be treated carefully. Any final assessment must distinguish between the amount claimed, the amount legally recoverable, the cost of any future pension adjustments and the party that may ultimately be responsible for payment. An estimate is not, by itself, proof of liability.

Ultimately, this matter is bigger than money. It concerns trust in our institutions, respect for retirement security and the principle that public decisions affecting people’s livelihoods must be capable of proper scrutiny.

The current Government, the FNPF Board and Management and the relevant legal authorities should work towards a transparent, lawful and financially sustainable resolution. If constitutional reform is necessary to remove an unjust barrier, that debate must be confronted honestly and through the proper constitutional process.

Our elderly pensioners deserve to have their grievances heard, their claims properly examined and their rights determined according to law. They should not be denied the prospect of justice merely because the passage of time has made the matter politically, legally or financially inconvenient.

Justice delayed is justice denied. But justice must also be pursued lawfully, transparently and with due regard for every FNPF member whose retirement savings must be protected.

The Priceless Pot, a Lapita People’s History of Fiji.

LAPITA PEOPLE: The most vivid direct evidence of Lapita occupation in the Lau Group comes from a discovery made during Simon Best’s 1976 fieldwork on Lakeba.

Best, an archaeologist at Auckland University working with a scientific team directed by Professor John Young of Adelaide University, was investigating a cave on a small island approximately eleven miles off Lakeba when the team noticed large pieces of pottery nestling in the mud beneath a clear pool.

Divers brought up two virtually complete pots and many additional pieces. The two complete pots were transported to Auckland sealed in damp sawdust and plastic bags — carried on the archaeologists’ laps for the entire return journey.

Radiocarbon analysis dated the pots at approximately 2,300 years old, or 325 BC.

Best identified them as probable cooking pots, possibly left at the pool when being washed.

The pots were among the rarest of Lapita finds: most ancient pottery is reconstructed from tiny sherds, like a jigsaw assembled with glue and imagination.

These two were almost completely whole, preserved by the water in the cave for over two millennia.

One pot was later donated to the Fiji Museum, where it was handed carefully into the arms of the then-director Mr Charles Hunt in December 1978.

Best’s subsequent PhD thesis (Lakeba: A Prehistory of a Fijian Island, University of Auckland, 1984) established from radiocarbon analysis across multiple sites that Lakeba was first occupied by humans around 1300 BC…

[Source: Vunirewa, Rusiate. ‘The Priceless Pot.’ Fiji Times, 2 December 2022 (republishing and contextualising the original Fiji Times report of 15 December 1978); Best, S. Lakeba: A Prehistory of a Fijian Island. Unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of Auckland, 1984.]

Best’s 1300 BC date for Lakeba’s first human occupation is significant for the Matuku research, but it is not the earliest possible date for the Yasayasa Moala group as a whole.

If Lakeba was first occupied around 1300 BC, the pot found in the cave — dated to 325 BC — was made approximately 1,000 years after first occupation.

The Lapita sherds confirmed at Totoya (Udu, Lawakilevu, Waroka) by Clark (1999) suggest settlement of the Moala group from approximately 1,000 BC.

However, the Yasayasa Moala, including Matuku, may well have been occupied earlier — around 1400 to 1500 BC — consistent with the Lapita settlement timeline at Naigani in the Lomaiviti Group and with the broader pattern of Lapita expansion across Fiji during this period. Naigani Island (northeast of Ovalau) is one of the earliest confirmed Lapita sites in Fiji, with settlement dates broadly consistent with a 1400–1500 BC horizon.

The Yasayasa Moala sits geographically between the Lomaiviti Group and the outer Lau islands — precisely the migration corridor along which Lapita peoples moved as they expanded eastward from the Bismarck Archipelago through the Melanesian and Polynesian island chains.

An earlier occupation horizon of 1400–1500 BC for the Yasayasa Moala, predating the Clark (1999) confirmed Totoya date by two to five centuries, would be consistent with both the regional pattern and the depth of oral tradition documented in this research. [Author’s note: Based on Best (1984), Clark (1999), and the regional Lapita settlement sequence.

This is a working hypothesis, not yet confirmed by specific radiocarbon dating at Matuku.]

A further dimension of Fiji’s deep-time human history is raised by the linguistic anthropologist Dr Paul Geraghty, whose research findings — brought to wider community attention by the Fijian digital historian Elaine Lini Falita Schroeder — posit the existence of a pre-Lapita human population in Fiji approximately 5,000–6,000 years ago.

Geraghty’s analysis suggests that this earlier population may have survived into the historical period as a very small remnant — perhaps one to two percent of the population by the time of European contact — with the majority having died out or been absorbed into the arriving Lapita and post-Lapita populations.

The question of whether this earlier population is connected to the skeletal remains found at the Sigatoka Dunes — excavated across three distinct archaeological phases — remains open.

From an entirely independent direction, Ronald Gatty — a lifetime Fiji resident with seventy-five years of engagement with highland oral tradition, NLC access, and the Fiji National Archives collection — provides corroboration for the pre-Nakauvadra population layer from the highland perspective.

Gatty states explicitly that ‘the highlanders are not people primarily of Nakauvadra Mountain origin. They were here much earlier than immigrants who settled around Nakauvadra.

Those were a later people, associated with the ancestral god Degei’ (Gatty, Naitasiri).

He further reports that ‘Ratu Sukuna’s study of official records shows that not a single tribe of Naitasiri Province claimed its origin from the Nakauvadra Mountain range of Ra Province.’ American archaeologist E.W. Gifford’s survey of NLC yavutu (founding settlement sites) likewise found none in Naitasiri attributing Nakauvadra origins.

Gatty’s central thesis is that the kaiColo (Viti Levu highlanders) represent a Melanesian cultural and genetic stratum that predates the Polynesian-influenced Nakauvadra migrations — exactly the cultural division that Geraghty’s linguistic analysis and the Sigatoka Dune skeletal evidence suggest at the physical-anthropological level.

Gatty further identifies the yavusa concept itself as a Polynesian import: ‘the term yavusa developed from the Polynesian immigrants who mostly settled around the Nakauvadra mountain range,’ and ‘the concept of paramount chiefs is a foreign concept, imported from Polynesia,’ taking root first in Laucala before extending through Verata to the wider Fijian world.

The constitutional hierarchy of the Roko Sau, Tui Ketei, Tui Yaroi, and Tui Nayau documented in this research is therefore, in Gatty’s analysis, a Polynesian-origin paramountcy system layered over an earlier Melanesian social order — precisely the process that the Kubunavanua/Tuivanuakula founding wave enacted when it brought the yavusa framework to Moala and the Yasayasa Moala.

Gatty also identifies a moiety system among central highlanders called tako and lavo — a dual-category system governing marriage and social roles, found in Naitasiri, Namosi, Ra, Navosa, and Ba — which he notes ‘does not exist among the diluted highlanders who came under Bauan influence along the Waidina River.’

This dissolution of the moiety system on contact with Bauan/Polynesian culture maps the social transition undergone by highland communities as they descended via the Wainibuka corridor to the Tailevu coast — the same corridor through which Tuivanuakula’s genealogical world connected the Nakauvadra interior to Verata and the outer islands.

[Source: Gatty, Ronald. Naitasiri: Custom and Culture of the ‘Real’ Fijians. Province series on Fijian Tribes and Territories. Wainadoi Gardens, Namosi Province, n.d.]”

Prologue 1B — Pre-Migration Highland Traditions: The Tako/Lavo System and the Five Siblings of Tomaniivi!!

Kitione Vuataki’s ‘Softly Fiji’ (WestBow Press, 2013) adds a theological dimension to the tako/lavo moiety system that Gatty’s account (above) identifies only as a social institution. Vuataki records: ‘In the hills of the Nalawa district, to the west of Namatakula and on the coast of Nadroga to the south, are the Father and the Son, who are remembered by custom as Tako-Lavo.

The word Tako means “Father”, and Lavo means “Son”.’ Vuataki interprets the surviving tako/lavo tradition — which his book documents as a pre-Christian theological memory preserved in geographical and ceremonial form across the Nalawa-Nadroga highlands — as encoding the names of a Father-and-Son divine pair.

His reading is explicitly from within the community’s own explanatory tradition, not an external scholarly imposition.

Whether this interpretation is accepted as pre-Christian theology or as a Christian interpretive overlay onto an indigenous moiety system, Vuataki’s record adds a significant dimension to Gatty’s social description: the tako/lavo distinction that Gatty documented as governing marriage and social roles in Naitasiri, Namosi, Ra, Navosa, and Ba was, in the community’s own explanatory tradition, named after divine figures — Father and Son — rather than being merely a classificatory social device.

This cosmological grounding of the moiety system is consistent with the research’s documentation of the pre-Christian sacred landscape of Viti Levu’s highlands, including the Kalinimolikula Scroll’s recording of the 899 AD TuaLeiTa assembly and the Five Siblings of Tomaniivi tradition recorded in the Lomaidreketi corpus (see Prologue 3; Part XII).

Vuataki’s book also records that the Nakauvadra oratory tradition — in which blessings end with the words ‘mudu o’ (‘to end with He who comes in the pillar of clouds’) — was later changed by Degei’s followers to end ‘in Nakauvadra’, encoding a religious transition from the Father-and-Son cosmology to the snake-god tradition. [Source: Vuataki, Kitione. Softly Fiji.

Bloomington, IN: WestBow Press (A Division of Thomas Nelson), 2013. ISBN 978-1-4497-8995-4. Period 1, Chapter 1.]

Two newly available sources confirm and substantially extend the Tako/Lavo analysis already documented in this research. First, a community-produced Fijian-language text titled ‘Na veiwekani Qaqa ni TAKO kei na LAVO’ provides an authoritative insider account of the system.

It confirms that Tako/Lavo is ‘a very ancient relationship found in the Colo (highlands) of Viti Levu’ (‘dua na veiwekani makawa sara ka kunei ena Colo ni noda Veivanua e Viti Levu’).

Its documented distribution extends across: Ra, parts of Naitasiri, Serua, Namosi, NAVOSA, and specifically the Ba highlands (Colo i Ba) — a geographic spread that precisely encompasses the Nadrau/Taladrau highland world, the Nadakuni/Waimaro world, and the Navosa corridor from which both branches of the Matuku migration originated. The text states the constitutional mechanism explicitly: ‘kevaka e Lavo na iTubutubu Turaga, o ratou na Luvena (Tagane se Yalewa) era na Tako taucoko’ — if the founding ancestor is Lavo, ALL of his children are Tako; their children are Lavo again; and so on in strict patrilineal alternation.

The social binding function is equally explicit: ‘kevaka e rau mani sota e lewe rua ka rau Lavo se Tako ruarua rau wili me rau Veitacini dina’ — if two strangers meet and both are Lavo or both Tako, they count as true blood siblings (veitacini dina). And: ‘ke rau sota e dua e Tako ka dua tale e Lavo, rau sa na wili vaka Veiluveni se Veitamani. O koya e Tako ena wili me Tama vua e Lavo’ — if one is Tako and the other Lavo, they relate as parent-and-child: the Tako is the Father (Tama) of the Lavo.

This constitutional-social mechanism is the living operational form of the Tako=Father / Lavo=Son theology documented by Vuataki (above): the two names encode not only a cosmological Father-and-Son pair but a practical social technology for binding dispersed highland communities into an extended kin network across hundreds of kilometres.

The Two Brothers tradition can now be read through this lens: the elder brother who travels (becomes the founder of the new Matuku community) may be the Tako (Father/elder), while the younger brother who stays at Nadakuni (Buinimasi) holds the Lavo (Son/younger) role — and their descendants across the highland-island distance would recognise each other as veitacini dina (true siblings) by virtue of their shared Tako or Lavo classification.

Second, Adrian Tanner’s peer-reviewed article in Oceania (66[3]:230–251, 1996) provides independent scholarly confirmation: ‘Throughout the interior there is an unusual moiety system.

Membership in each moiety is alternating patrilineal… One implication of the moieties, named “Tako” and “Lavo”, is that they effectively extend familiar kin relationships to otherwise socially distant individuals.’

Tanner adds, citing Paul Geraghty (personal communication, 1994): ‘These moieties do not exist anywhere else in Fiji, including the Vitilevu coast, except for small areas of Serua and Ra.’

The Navatusila founding legend — as recorded by Tanner’s fieldwork in the western interior — states that the yavusa that scattered from Navatusila ‘can be identified today as all those having the tako-lavo moiety system’: making the moiety distribution map a direct tracing of the Navatusila dispersal.

Tanner’s article further documents (relevant to the name BUINIMASI) that masi (barkcloth) in the western interior was manufactured by MEN, unlike elsewhere in Fiji where it is a women’s practice (citing Roth 1934, who documented this in Navatusila, Viti Levu).

A man named Buinimasi — ‘the heart/core of the masi’ — would thus be the custodian of a specifically male highland ceremonial craft tradition, fully consistent with the ‘keeper brother’ role at Nadakuni.

[Source: Community text, ‘Na veiwekani Qaqa ni TAKO kei na LAVO’ (unpublished Fijian-language community document); Tanner, Adrian. ‘Colo Navosa: Local history and the construction of region in the western interior of Vitilevu, Fiji.’ Oceania 66(3):230–251, 1996; Geraghty, Paul. Personal communication, 1994 (cited in Tanner 1996); Roth, G.K. ‘The Manufacture of Bark-cloth in Fiji (Navatusila, Viti Levu Island).’ J. Royal Anthropological Institute 64:289–303, 1934.] – THE MIGRATION OF THE WAIMARO PEOPLES TO YASAYASA MOALA AND THE ISLE OF MATUKU — (A Genealogical and Constitutional History of Matuku Island, Lau, Fiji.)

Can we only expect 4 more years of the same?

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Another excellent article from the pen of Charlie Charters:

AND SO IT STARTS …

The Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka readies us not for what he MAY deliver, but what he MAY NOT deliver in the next six months.

And his messaging is clear.

Get ready for the possibility of no Referendum on the wretched 2013 Constitution this side of the General Election.

That means at least one more General Election under the hated ‘who is my MP’ d’Hondt + Single Constituency system.

But that also means, get ready for the possibility of no referendum on the Great Council of Chiefs and the long tail of hot button, i-Taukei issues that have dominated submissions to the Constitutional Review Committee.

Why?

We may not have the money, Rabuka says, shrugging his shoulders, rather improbably playing the role of thrifty housekeeper after splashing upwards of $6m on the fiasco that is the Commission of Inquiry.

[The Fiji Revenue and Customs Service also messed up the PM’s ‘poor-me’ messaging last week by saying they had collected a record $3.51 billion in revenues – that’s $136m more than the $3.374b that has been factored in to all Government projections.]

This is how the table of options looks to me.

– The staging of the once-every-ten-years national census is a non-negotiable. The census has to happen on time or every aspect of managing the country is put out of whack.

– And the general election has to happen before February next year or the country falls off a constitutional precipice into a place we’ve never been before.

– So, axing the referendum, according to Rabuka’s not-so-subtle nudging, is may be the prudent thing to do. Fiji Government needs to live within its means etc.

And that is what Rabuka is openly suggesting in this Fiji One News report in a way I have not seen happen before.

In truth, as we see the shape of the next election, you could understand Rabuka’s thought process.

Unlike 2014, 2018 and 2022 this is not shaping up into a binary contest – one big name vs another.

It’s more like Rabuka vs a raindow of alternatives, principally his former Coalition partners and the FijiFirst/PeopleFirst offer.

And then some parties new and old, for whom crossing the five percent threshold could actively discourage voters for the fear of ‘wasting’ their vote.

So by any analysis, Rabuka stands to profit the most from the continuity offered by d’Hondt + Single Constituency.

Just like Bainimarama did until the Coalition’s one-MP-win in 2022.

The mirror image of that is true too.

Rabuka’s prospects in 2026/2027 make him the politician most disadvantaged by disbanding d’Hondt + Single Constituency in favour of a return to the multi-constituency structure and either first-past-the-post or any other form of proportional representation.

Rabuka is the last ‘Big Man’ standing in this wretched single constituency d’Hondt system that Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum and advisors so obviously selected for Bainimarama for that very same reason.

Rabuka’s calculation would be that with his brand recognition and The People’s Alliance‘s rather tragic retreat towards appealing to an i-Taukei audience and no-one else, he can get enough personal votes to pull through a larger number of MPs than anyone else.

If the CRC determine to break away from Single Constituency and put that option to a national referendum, the quality of candidate MPs becomes of much greater significance, not just that they are attached to the tailcoats of a Big Man.

My old ‘constituency’ of Vuda, however that’s marked out under a potential return to multi-constituences, would give me maybe a half-dozen potential MPs to consider.

All the voters would get to give them a hard looking-at because the number of candidates is bite-size and manageable.

You can’t hope to do that with the ridiculous 342 candidates you had to wade through in 2022, all asking for your vote under the Single Constituency model.

The big question from the Rabuka nudge – get ready to give up something I promised you – is:

a) is this a trial balloon? Just Rabuka floating an idea, as he does regularly, and then walks it back – civil service job losses, no civil service job losses etc.

b) or is this a way of triangulating public opinion so that, with the excuse of prudent financial housekeeping, he gets us ready to nod along when Rabuka boots the CRC’s proposed Constitution into the long grass of the next Parliament of the Republic of Fiji?

and c) how will ‘Sorry but no referendum’ play with his increasingly narrow i-Taukei voter base, which is shrinking back to having a definite older, more traditional and rural vibe?

Will it break through that no referendum means delaying for at least another two to three years a vote on re-establishing the GCC within the constitution, and all that that might mean?

Will that prove one broken or fudged promise too many or will the avalanche of returned titles and other i-Taukei goodies prove to be enough sugar to make this bitterest of pills go down?

#Fiji#FijiPolitics#FijiPol#FijiGovernment#elections

Niko Nawaikula

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A list of wrongdoings from the honest pen of Charlie Charters.

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AND SO … it comes to pass.

Today in Justice Dane Tuiqereqere’s High Court No.13 we will understand the fate of the Commission of Inquiry – one of the most extraordinary legal and political chapters in Fiji’s history.

There are three separate parties who petitioned for the judicial reviews of the COI Report after they were ‘adversely named’ in it: Barbara Malimali; Graham Leung; and Wylie Clarke and Laurel Vaurasi.

Malimali and Leung lost their jobs directly as a consequence of the COI Report.

All three sets of petitioners, as well as the State, acting on behalf of the COI, have the right to appeal whatever is Tuiqereqere’s decision.

To paraphrase another writer: this may not be the end but it may be the beginning of the end.

I would not want to predict Tuiqereqere’s decision.

But on this significant date – just to contribute one final piece of the jigsaw.

Attached below is a copy of the police report I made on the subject of David Ashton-Lewis.

It was dated August 11 – almost exactly one year ago today – which seems like serendipity.

I had never filed a police report before. But I was requested to by the Chief Registrar, writing on behalf of the Judicial Services Commission, after I brought to the JSC’s attention Ashton-Lewis’s dodgy CV.

Only 18 months previously, the JSC had approved the appointment of David Ashton-Lewis to the Fiji Supreme Court even though Ashton-Lewis’ last judicial service ‘on the bench’ was 1995 – 28 years earlier.

Ashton-Lewis’s career after he left Fiji in 1995, a year before his term concluded, was almost 20 years in corporate law.

This included Ashton-Lewis’s employment as general counsel to Professional Investment Services [PIS] who sunk millions in client money into a number of failed investments including the infamous Westpoint collapse.

This and other similar schemes relied on complex and controversial ‘mezzanine’ financing, the cash for which was provided by high-pressure sales teams [supposedly supervised and regulated by Ashton-Lewis and his officers] who were often found to be taking commission both from customers and developers.

All that was missing from the CV that Ashton-Lewis sent to the JSC – no reference whatsoever to Professional Investment Services for instance.

And no reference to the long-running legal fights that PIS and its ownership had with the Australian financial regulator, ASIC, and ASIC’s adverse findings.

What Ashton-Lewis did reveal in the judicial CV sent to the JSC contained at least three major falsehoods:

– that he was entitled to use the letters ‘SC’ after his name indicating he was raised to the status of a silk, as Senior Counsel

– that at the time he was applying for the Supreme Court, he was an adjunct law professor and

– that he had been honoured by the late Queen for services to the law

On August 11 my police complaint was emailed to CID.

Victor Lal of Fijileaks made a similar police complaint to CID on September 7 and a supplementary complaint on September 13.

Lal’s focus was more on exposing the lie that Ashton-Lewis had ever been honoured by the late Queen [whose name he spelt Elisabeth in his CV – a sure tell of a wrong’un].

Ultimately, the police submitted mine and Victor’s files to the ODPP and any other research they had done, and the ODPP decided in January this year not to prosecute Ashton-Lewis.

That he was claiming honours and titles that were plainly false remains true. I called him a conman. Alex VB complained to FICAC because calling him a conman was mean; even FICAC didn’t think it was worth investigating.

The ODPP’s decision is their prerogative and I have no issue with that.

Despite his CV [and whatever we discover from Tuiqereqere’s judgement today], Ashton-Lewis is still a Fiji Supreme Court judge.

It’s an honour he clearly luxuriates in – see The Judge on 4CRB – but he has not been assigned any Supreme Court cases, not one, since his peculiar elevation to Fiji’s apex court.

The JSC has made no move [that I am aware of] to put him in front of a tribunal of his judicial peers to investigate his CV.

That’s the JSC’s responsibility: to make peace with history, their consciences and the precedent that this conman’s accession to the pinnacle of Fiji law sets for all time.

My conscience is clear. I did what I felt was my duty as a citizen to do by filing the police report.

My thinking was there was no point clanging away like an empty vessel on the social-media sidelines and refusing to help when the police come to you for assistance.

What Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka would have been hoping for from his pal Ashton-Lewis, in exchange literally for the millions he handed over to him and Janet Mason [who Ashton-Lewis insisted was a ‘KC’ when she never was], was a Commission that was at the very least a reliable and fair custodian of the legal process.

Maybe, Rabuka might be willing to accept, the COI Report reached conclusions that were a bit of a reach.

But at least, the PM would have expected, his pal Ashton-Lewis could be trusted to run the COI on a legally sound and fair, and professional basis.

That’s the crux of what Tuiqereqere is being asked to rule on today: was the whole thing fair to those adversely named?

Ashton-Lewis looked like he was a judge from central casting: his waistcoat, fob watch and old-world affectations.

But he was a woefully out of touch and hadn’t been a judge running a court room, let alone a Commission of Inquiry, since the year before John Howard became Australian PM

It always struck me as unlikely that Ashton-Lewis managed to do something with the COI – keep everything straight, fair and legal – that he couldn’t even manage with his own CV.

Anyway, the police report is interesting.

It explains how it was all thanks to Vilisi Nadaku uploading Amani Bale’s video testimony which I watched one early morning while staying with my mother.

I was hopelessly jet-lagged and looking for something to send me back to sleep.

But Amani Bale’s testimony – and Ashton-Lewis’ appalling rudeness to him – set in motion something of a personal mission.

I began to ask questions about a judicial figure who has caused Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka one High Court catastrophe after another, and sucked the air of the Fiji Government’s tires.

Fiji’s current House of Cards

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Courtesy of the pen of Charlie Charters.

A NON-EXHAUSTIVE … list of people who, imho, have contributed to the mess that Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption – FICAC is in today.

The extent of that mess we can see clearly now following the collapse of the Manoa Kamikamica prosecution.

1. Lavi Rokoika. During my two nights in FICAC House I would listen to her barking instructions to her employees. She would call someone’s mobile who would set it to Speaker, so she could screech one set of instructions one time to everyone. All the key decisions were hers.

2. David Ashton-Lewis ‘SC’

3. Janet Mason [#2 and 3]. We will know more on August 10 but the COI process was so deeply flawed, and the motives of #2 and 3 so deeply compromised from the beginning, that the COI could only produce, in my assessment, deeply flawed conclusions.

Having her lost her solo practioner’s licence in 2015 and been suspended for a month last year, Mason is facing a third set of misconduct charges from her national law society, one of which she has already had to admit to.

That is simply staggering.

As we remember with Tony Stephens et al, the PM is loyal to his friends to a point beyond recklessness, of actual self-harm.

Far from fixing FICAC, which was their goal, they have helped to propel Fiji’s elite law enforcement agency off the edge of a cliff.

4. Chief Justice Salesi Temo for declining to attend, and therefore make quorate, a sequence of Judicial Services Commission meetings earlier this year when the JSC were ready to remove Rokoika

5. The Fiji Labour Party

6. Alex Forwood

7. Graham Davis

8. Rajendra Chaudhry [#5-8 for mindless, hysterical cheerleading of the COI Report and its recommendation as if it was an artefact from the Ark of the Covenant or a Holy Scripture]

9. Tevita Vakalalabure who, I am told, plays Lady Macbeth in this dynamic to his wife’s Macbeth

10. The Judicial Services Commission for not acting on a detailed whistleblower complaint in February against the acting FICAC Commissioner.

Where does a whistleblower go to blow the whistle on allegedly unlawful conduct inside FICAC?

11. Acting Attorney-General and Counsel from the Offices of the Attorney-General and Solicitor-General. Meant to provide the legal guardrails to limit the President and PM’s behaviour and did not.

12. The President, any opportunity taken to expand Cakaudrove’s influence and now paranoid that he may face removal as President in the course of the examining who did what in the weeks and months after the COI Report was published

13. Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka. Directly responsible for 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12 and 14. Allowed his leadership of the country to be completely captured by his subservient relationship to the Tui Cakau.

14. All of those Cabinet members, Coalition MPs and People’s Alliance leadership who knew, or should have known, what was going on from May 29 2025 onwards.

And that we would therefore end up where we are today:

– bullsh*t prosecutions, now collapsing all over the place;

– meantime the serious stuff doesn’t get done. No information on Walesi [files submitted in December 2024], Lautoka pool [two investigations 2019-2020 and April 2025], the Fiji Sports Council and how a crooked businessman owing the Govt $20m managed to evade a stop departure order.

The largest, most handsomely paid Cabinet in Fijis history sat on their hands and watched while Rabuka crashed the Constitution and unlawfully installed his kinsfolk to lead FICAC so that he could avenge past sleights against him or presumed future intrigues [aka ‘the crocodiles’].

Fiji Constitution Review Commission

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I submit this as a concerned citizen and pensioner regarding the profound injustice inflicted on thousands of FNPF members, particularly the oldest and most vulnerable pensioners, through the Fiji National Provident Fund reforms introduced in 2012 (via the FNPF Decree 2011) and subsequently shielded and purportedly legalized by provisions in the 2013 Constitution.

The 2012 changes drastically reduced pension conversion rates (e.g., from around 15% to 8% in some descriptions) for existing or transitioning pensioners. This altered long-standing contractual expectations based on contributions made over decades under prior rules.

An Act or constitutional mechanism under the 2013 Constitution then backdated or entrenched these changes, effectively validating actions that many viewed as unlawful at the time.

This was morally indefensible and legally flawed in both principle and application. I urge the Commission to recommend amendments that uphold the rule of law, protect acquired property and contractual rights, and prohibit such retrospective deprivations.

Legal Wrongs in Principle and Application

  1. Violation of Acquired Rights and Contractual Expectations:
    FNPF contributions were made under a defined scheme with promised pension benefits. Altering these mid-stream for those already retired or near retirement breached the fundamental principle that pension rights, once vested, constitute property rights protected under basic rule of law norms. Retrospective legislation that deprives individuals of benefits they had reasonably relied upon undermines legal certainty (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege extended to civil/property contexts) and the prohibition on ex post facto laws that harm individuals.

The 2013 Constitution’s provisions that entrench or backdate the 2012 changes prioritize state/fund “sustainability” over individual rights. This inverts the proper hierarchy: the Constitution should protect citizens from arbitrary state interference in vested rights, not shield past illegal or unfair executive decrees.

  1. Retrospective Legalization of Questionable Actions:
    If the 2012 Decree was challenged or perceived as illegal (due to lack of proper process, unfairness, or exceeding powers under the then-prevailing framework), using the 2013 Constitution to immunize it retroactively sets a dangerous precedent.
  2. Constitutions should not be tools for validating past wrongs but for establishing enduring protections. Backdating validation deprives affected parties of remedies they might have pursued and erodes public trust in institutions.

This contravenes international best practices and common law principles against retrospective laws that divest property or accrued benefits without fair compensation or justification.

  1. Discriminatory Impact on the Oldest Members:
    The reforms disproportionately harmed older pensioners who had contributed under the old rates, had limited working years left to adjust, and could not benefit from any “sustainability” gains for future generations. This age-based impact raises equality and non-discrimination concerns. Protecting the fund’s long-term health is a valid policy goal, but it should not come at the expense of those least able to bear the burden without transitional justice measures (e.g., phased adjustments, government top-ups funded by general revenue, or exemptions for pre-reform retirees).

Moral Wrongs

  • Breach of Trust and Social Contract: Citizens contributed to FNPF in good faith, expecting the state/Fund to honor the terms. Breaking this for the elderly—who often have fixed incomes, health issues, and no recourse— is a profound moral failure. It treats pensioners as adjustable variables in actuarial models rather than people with legitimate expectations and dignity.
  • Intergenerational Injustice Misapplied: While cross-subsidization from young to old can be unsustainable, abruptly shifting the entire burden onto those already retired is inequitable. True fairness requires balancing sustainability with honoring past promises, perhaps through broader fiscal support rather than raiding individual savings pots.
  • Undermining Social Cohesion: Such actions foster cynicism toward government and institutions, especially when combined with perceptions of the 2013 Constitution’s legitimacy and amendment difficulties. Affected pensioners and families feel betrayed, leading to ongoing calls for reinstatement that the current framework blocks.

Recent government statements acknowledge the human impact but cite the Constitution and a $582 million backdating cost as barriers. This highlights the problem: the Constitution itself obstructs remedies for an acknowledged injustice.

Recommended Constitutional Amendments:

To prevent recurrence and provide justice, I recommend the Commission propose:

  • Explicit protection for vested pension and retirement benefits as property rights, immune from retrospective diminution without compelling justification and fair compensation.
  • Stronger prohibitions on retrospective laws that adversely affect accrued rights.
  • Provisions requiring transitional fairness in any fund reforms (e.g., grandfathering clauses for existing pensioners).
  • Mechanisms for independent oversight of FNPF governance and reforms to ensure member interests are prioritized.
  • Easier, people-driven amendment processes so future generations can correct entrenched injustices without undue barriers.

These changes would align the Constitution with principles of justice, human rights, and good governance.

Conclusion:

The backdating or entrenchment via the 2013 Constitution of the 2012 FNPF changes was legally wrong because it violated rule of law fundamentals, property rights, and non-retrospectivity.

It was morally wrong because it deprived vulnerable elderly citizens of contracted security after a lifetime of contributions.

The Constitution must be amended to remedy this specific injustice (where feasible) and safeguard against similar future actions.

Failure to do so perpetuates harm and erodes the Constitution’s moral authority.

I urge the Commission to consider the voices of affected pensioners during nationwide consultations and recommend changes that restore faith in Fiji’s constitutional framework.

Thank you for considering this submission.

R T. Rickman Vuda Fiji. 04 June 2026

GROSS INJUSTICE IN FIJI

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Pramesh Sharma

The injustice faced by Fiji’s FNPF pensioners since 2012 remains one of the darkest unresolved financial and moral issues in our nation’s history.

In 2012, the FijiFirst Government, through an unelected and controversially appointed FNPF Board, drastically changed the pension scheme for a specific group of retired pensioners who had legally opted for the 25% life pension arrangement offered by the Fund at the time of their retirement.

These pensioners did not force the scheme upon FNPF. They entered into a lawful agreement with the Fund. The Fund itself promoted and guaranteed these pension arrangements. Members made retirement decisions based on those promises. Many surrendered lump sums and committed their life savings to FNPF because they were assured of guaranteed pension payments for life.

Today, some try to justify the pension cuts by arguing that retirees had already received “more than what they contributed.” That argument is fundamentally flawed, illogical and rather irresponsible!

This was never meant to be an ordinary savings withdrawal account. It was a LIFE ANNUITY arrangement, a pooled pension system based on risk sharing. If a pensioner died shortly after retirement, the remaining balance stayed with the Fund. The member’s family did not continue receiving those payments. In those cases, it was the Fund that benefited.

The understanding was simple; some members would die early, others would live longer and the Fund accepted that actuarial risk in exchange for holding and investing pensioners money. That is how pension systems around the world operate.

What makes this issue even more painful is that these early retirees were among the very people who helped build FNPF into the financial giant it is today. They kept faith in the Fund during its formative years. Their money was invested over decades into the very assets and developments that helped grow FNPF into a fund now reportedly worth over $12 billion. Yet the same pensioners were later told they were suddenly a “burden” on the Fund.

The justification used in 2012 was “actuarial sustainability.” The Board argued that continuing to pay the agreed pension rates would threaten the future stability of FNPF. But this raises a very important questions, in a country where FNPF membership is compulsory and regulated by the State, should the Government not ultimately stand behind the sustainability of the national provident fund?

Around the world, governments routinely support or guarantee national pension systems because retirement security is not merely a commercial investment issue; it is a social obligation.

Instead, Fiji chose to reduce the pensions of elderly retirees AFTER they had already retired and AFTER contracts had already been entered into. Even more disturbing is that while pensioners endured reduced incomes for more than a decade, FNPF in recent years has declared annual interest rates of 8% to 9% to existing members and now reports record financial strength.

This naturally leaves many asking, if the Fund is financially healthy today, why were pensioners made to suffer for so long without full justice or restoration?

Another major concern is the constitutional protection surrounding the 2012 reforms. The decrees and amendments introduced during that period were later entrenched under the 2013 Constitution, making legal challenges extremely difficult. Many pensioners believe they were denied proper access to judicial review and constitutional remedy. The current Board and Management can do nothing as it is now LAW imposed by one man!

This is why the issue refuses to disappear.

This is not just about money, it is about trust, it is about contractual fairness and it is about dignity. Most importantly it is about how a nation treats its elderly citizens after they have spent their lives contributing to the country.

Every year, more affected pensioners pass away without seeing justice. Many die believing they were betrayed by both the Fund and the State. The Fiji Government through Hon Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka must address this matter with compassion in finally addressing this issue properly. A humane and honourable resolution is long overdue.

A country cannot build a just future while ignoring the unresolved pain of its elderly citizens. ⚖️

Pramesh Sharma

The 1987 Culprit still holds the reins of abused power and corruption!

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The man who started it all in 1987 is still Prime Minister of Fiji today.

By Eremasi Matanatabu

On May 14, 1987 — 39 years ago today — Sitiveni Rabuka walked into Fiji’s Parliament with armed soldiers and overthrew a democratically elected government. He granted himself immunity, became Prime Minister in 1992, and is Prime Minister again now.

In that time: 4 coups. 70,000+ people fled. Poverty tripled. HIV is now the fastest growing epidemic in the world. Children as young as 6 are rape victims. Meth floods our streets. And the man who opened that door has never faced a single day of accountability for what he started.

What research says: how moral decay works in societies:

Stage 1 — The signal event

Research on societal collapse (Blanton et al., 2020, studying 30 pre-modern societies) found that moral decay begins with a single decisive act by a leader that breaks the social contract. The message sent to an entire society is: rules do not apply equally to everyone.

Fiji: May 14, 1987 — Rabuka enters Parliament with armed soldiers.

Stage 2 — Impunity is formalised

When the perpetrator not only escapes punishment but is rewarded — with power, promotion, and legal immunity — the signal is amplified. Research calls this the “impunity cascade”: if the most powerful break the law and face no consequence, why would anyone else feel bound by rules?

Fiji: Rabuka promoted, granted amnesty, becomes PM 1992.

Stage 3 — Institutions hollow out

The judiciary, police, and civil service lose independence when they see that power — not law — determines outcomes. Research shows this leads to selective enforcement, corruption, and a public that stops trusting institutions entirely. People stop reporting crimes. Courts become tools of whoever holds power.

Fiji: 4 coups, judiciary placed on leave (2007), police commanders loyal to coup leaders

Stage 4 — Social norms collapse

Once formal institutions fail, informal social norms — community accountability, family structures, cultural expectations — come under enormous pressure. Research (ResearchGate, 2022) identifies “economic pressure, weak governance, corruption, cultural erosion and family breakdown” as compounding drivers once this stage is reached.

Fiji: Begging, street children, drug use in schools, rape victims are children

The Fiji impunity chain — each coup rewarded, not punished

1987 ×2

Coup 1 & 2

Lt. Col. Sitiveni Rabuka

Overthrows the elected Bavadra government twice. Declares himself Head of State. Economy contracts. 70,000+ people flee.

Governor-General grants amnesty. Rabuka promoted to Commander of RFMF. Returns as elected PM in 1992. Serves until 1999. Returns as PM again in 2022 — and leads today.

2000

Coup 3

George Speight (civilian nationalist)

Takes Parliament and PM Chaudhry hostage for 56 days. Tourism collapses 30%. Economy contracts 8.2%. Soldiers tortured and killed.

Military signs Muanikau Accord granting Speight amnesty in exchange for releasing hostages. Speight later sentenced to life — but in September 2024, pardoned by the Mercy Commission. Rabuka reportedly orchestrated the pardon and planned a personal meeting with Speight as a “friend.”

2006

Coup 4

Commodore Frank Bainimarama

Overthrows elected PM Qarase. Suspends constitution. Places Chief Justice on leave. Media censored. Dissidents arrested. Rules by decree for 8 years.

Issues the “Immunity (Fiji Military Government Intervention) Promulgation 2007” — full, unconditional immunity for all coup participants. In 2010, the Limitation of Liability for Prescribed Political Events Act grants irrevocable, absolute immunity. The 2013 Constitution bakes this in permanently. Bainimarama becomes elected PM in 2014, rules until 2022.

What researchers and Fiji’s own commentators say about this pattern:

“It is no secret that the 1987 coup let the proverbial genie out of the bottle, which continues to rage through the political landscape in Fiji. It altered the role of the military, the executive branch of the government, the civil service and party politics to what we have today.”

— Fiji Times opinion, March 2024

“The only coup leader to have actually suffered as a result of their actions is George Speight — and he was not a soldier. Both Bainimarama and Rabuka were senior military leaders, and they were clever and powerful enough after their coups to ensure that Fiji’s constitution was rewritten to absolve them of any legal wrongdoing.”

— Devpolicy Blog, Australian National University, September 2022

“Amnesty, as a symbol of freedom, was more and more seen as a kind of ‘insurance on impunity’ with the emergence, then proliferation, of self-amnesty laws proclaimed by declining military dictatorships.”

— UN Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet, cited in international law research

“Corruption, selective law enforcement and impunity erode belief that rules apply equally, reducing citizens’ intrinsic motivation to follow norms.”

— Converging research from sociology, political science and behavioural economics

The cascade: how impunity at the top becomes moral decay at every level

Coup leader declares immunity for himself → The message to every Fijian: power protects you from consequences

Military and police become politicised → Law enforcement serves power, not justice. Crimes go unpunished if the right people are involved

Skilled professionals and community leaders emigrate → 61% of skilled workforce leaves. Moral anchors of communities disappear.

Families fragment

Poverty deepens, youth unemployment hits 60% → Young people without hope, family stability or role models become vulnerable to drugs, gangs and crime

Drug trafficking networks fill the vacuum → Organised crime exploits weak institutions. Meth becomes the economy for those with no other options

HIV, sexual violence, street children, begging → The visible face of what 40 years of impunity produces at street level

Churches multiply but moral authority fragments → More denominations, less unity, less community accountability. Each group retreats into its own walls

The coup leader who started it all is back in power → The cycle is complete. Impunity is not just tolerated — it is rewarded, permanently, at the highest level