EFL Shares Sale:

10 Saturday Jan 2026

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The sale of shares in Energy Fiji Limited (EFL) involved several key advisers for the Fijian Government, EFL, and the buyers.

The major transaction took place in March 2021, when a consortium comprising Chugoku Electric Power Company (CEPCO) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) acquired 44% of EFL (24% from the Fijian Government and 20% from FNPF).

Advisers to the Fijian Government & EFL (Sellers)
Financial Adviser: ANZ Corporate Advisory

ANZ International acted as the lead financial adviser to the Fijian Government and EFL throughout the divestment process.

Legal Advisers:

Buddle Findlay: A New Zealand law firm that played a lead role in advising the EFL Board and senior management on the transaction structure and sale. Partner Grant Dunn led the team.

Squire Patton Boggs: An international law firm that advised the Fijian Government on the deal.

Howards Lawyers: Fiji-based law firm (Partner Alesi Macedru) is also listed as having advised on the sale of shares in EFL, likely providing local counsel.

EFL Board Adviser: Prasann Patel

He served as a specific advisor to the EFL Board and was instrumental in navigating the transaction and previous syndicated financing.

Strategic/Technical Support:

World Bank / IFC (International Finance Corporation): The Fijian Government utilized expertise from the World Bank and IFC during the international selection process to identify the strategic partner.

The Transaction Context

The Deal: The Japanese consortium (via a Singapore-based special purpose vehicle called Sevens Pacific Pte Ltd) paid approximately FJD $440 million for the 44% stake.

Shareholding Structure Post-Sale:

Fijian Government: 51% (Majority control retained)

Sevens Pacific (Chugoku/JBIC): 44%

Domestic Account Holders: 5% (Held by the public)

Advisers to the Buyer (Chugoku/JBIC)

While the specific private advisers for the Japanese consortium were not as widely publicized in Fijian press releases, Japanese corporations typically engage major “Big Four” Japanese law firms (such as Nishimura & Asahi or Anderson Mori & Tomotsune) and global investment banks for cross-border acquisitions of this size.

The sale of EFL shares to the Sevens Pacific Pte Ltd consortium (Chugoku Electric Power Company and JBIC) was structured as a strategic partnership rather than a full privatization.

Here are the specific details regarding the valuation and the management rights agreed upon in the Shareholder Agreement.

1. Valuation Details

The valuation was significant because it set a benchmark for Fijian infrastructure assets. The consortium paid a premium to secure a significant minority stake.

Purchase Price: The Sevens Pacific consortium paid approximately FJD $440 million for 44% of the shares.

Implied Enterprise Value: This transaction valued the entire entity (EFL) at approximately FJD $1.2 – $1.3 billion.

Share Breakdown:

24% was acquired from the Fijian Government.

20% was acquired from the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) (which exited its investment to realize a capital gain).

The remaining 51% is retained by the Fijian Government.

5% is held by domestic account holders (the public).

2. Management & Governance Rights

While the Fijian Government retained majority ownership (51%), the Shareholder Agreement granted specific minority protection rights and management influence to the Japanese consortium to protect their investment and leverage their technical expertise.

Board Representation:

The EFL Board typically consists of seven directors.

Sevens Pacific (Chugoku/JBIC) holds the right to appoint three directors to the Board.

The Fijian Government appoints the remaining directors (including the Chair), retaining control over the Board but ensuring the Japanese consortium has a significant voice.

Technical & Operational Role:

The agreement was not just financial but it also included a Technical Services Agreement. Chugoku Electric acts as the technical partner, advising on grid stability, renewable integration, and decarbonization.

Their specific mandate is to help EFL achieve the target of 90%+ renewable energy generation by 2030–2035 (shifting away from diesel).

Veto Rights (Minority Protections):

As is standard in deals where a strategic investor takes a large minority stake (44%), the consortium likely holds “negative control” or veto rights over “Reserved Matters.” These typically include veto rights over:

(i) Changes to the company constitution.

(ii) Issuance of new shares (dilution protection).

(iii) Large capital expenditures or assumption of significant new debt outside the agreed business plan.

(iv) Changes to the dividend policy.

3. Regulatory Context

Post-transaction reviews (including by the subsequent coalition government) have highlighted concerns regarding the regulatory safeguards.

The deal reduced government flexibility to intervene in electricity tariffs, as the investor requires a commercial return on the $440m investment.

A key benefit to the government was the removal of sovereign guarantees on EFL’s debt. Following the partial privatization, EFL’s debt is meant to be self-sustaining without the government backing it, improving the national debt profile.

Under the Shareholder Agreement, Sevens Pacific Pte Ltd (the Chugoku Electric/JBIC joint venture) is entitled to appoint three directors to the EFL Board. These appointees act as the voice of the 44% shareholder and provide technical oversight.

Current Sevens Pacific Appointees (as of 2024):

Mr. Chitoshi Fukuda: He is a key figure in the partnership, having served as a Director since the acquisition in 2021. Unusually for a non-executive director, he also holds the operational role of Deputy Chief Executive Officer, ensuring direct Japanese oversight in daily operations.

Mr. Tsutomu Fujita: Appointed in April 2024.

Mr. Akira Irie: Appointed in April 2024.

These directors replaced the initial 2021 appointees, Mr. Koichi Tsunematsu and Mr. So Horikiri, illustrating how the consortium rotates its technical and financial experts into these roles.

2. Dividend Policy

The dividend policy was a critical part of the negotiation. While the Fijian Government (51%) might typically prioritize low tariffs or social objectives, the private investors (44%) require a commercial return on their ~FJD 440m investment.

Changes to the dividend policy are a “Reserved Matter.” This means the Fijian Government cannot unilaterally decide to stop paying dividends or change the payout ratio without the approval of Sevens Pacific.

The agreement generally stipulates that EFL acts as a commercial entity. While the exact formula is confidential, the policy balances shareholder returns with the massive capital expenditure (CapEx) required for the renewable transition.

he policy has resulted in consistent payouts despite the heavy infrastructure investment needs. For example:

In 2022, EFL paid FJD 23.8 million in dividends to the Government (and a proportional amount to Sevens Pacific).

This confirms that the asset is now run with a strict focus on profitability to support these cash flows.

The presence of Chitoshi Fukuda as Deputy CEO is the most significant detail here. It means the Japanese consortium isn’t just sitting on the Board; they are actively managing the “engine room” of EFL to protect the profitability that funds their dividends.

The term “Reserved Matters” is the most critical part of the EFL shareholder agreement. It is the mechanism that prevents the Fijian Government (even though it owns 51%) from making decisions that would hurt the financial value of the Japanese consortium’s 44% stake.

Because Sevens Pacific (Chugoku/JBIC) paid FJD 440 million, they required protections to ensure the government didn’t just lower electricity prices for political votes, which would destroy their profits.

What are “Reserved Matters”?

A “Reserved Matter” is a specific type of high-level decision that cannot be passed by a simple majority vote. Even if the Government directors (majority) vote “Yes,” the decision fails unless the Sevens Pacific directors also vote “Yes.”

While the full list is confidential, based on standard infrastructure deals and recent government critiques, the Reserved Matters for EFL almost certainly include:

Dividend Policy: The government cannot decide not to pay dividends (or pay too much) without Japanese approval.

Annual Business Plan & Budget: The consortium must approve the yearly financial targets, which are based on specific revenue (tariff) expectations.

Incurring Large Debt: New loans (like for a new dam or solar farm) likely require their sign-off.

Changes to the Constitution: The government cannot change the rules of the company to remove these protections.

2. Can they block the Government from lowering tariffs?

Technically: No. The Fijian Competition and Consumer Commission (FCCC) is the independent regulator that sets the tariff rate, not the EFL Board. Therefore, the Japanese investors cannot simply “veto” a regulator’s decision.

Practically: Yes (Indirectly). The shareholder agreement creates a “financial trap” that makes lowering tariffs extremely difficult for the government:

The Commercial Mandate: The agreement mandates that EFL operates as a commercial entity seeking a profit.

The Implied Contract: When Chugoku invested, they did so based on a financial model that assumed a certain “Rate of Return.” If the government forces EFL to apply for a lower tariff (or refuses to let EFL apply for a hike), it could be seen as oppression of minority shareholders.

The Consequence: If the government wants to lower tariffs for the public, they can’t just order EFL to cut prices. Instead, the government typically has to subsidize the difference using taxpayer money (paying EFL the cash it would have made) to keep the Japanese investors’ returns whole.

Current Example (January 2026): Just this month, there has been controversy regarding a proposed tariff increase for EFL. While the Government “paused” the hike for consultation, EFL (backed by its investors) argued that the increase is necessary for “sustainability” and “infrastructure investment.” This is the Reserved Matters dynamic in action: the investors require the revenue to maintain their returns.

3. Why is this controversial?

Critics argue that this deal “privatized the profits”:

Before the sale the government could run EFL at a break-even point or a loss to help the poor, absorbing the cost as a public service.

After the sale: EFL must make a profit to satisfy the 44% shareholder. If they don’t, the foreign investor can potentially sue for breach of agreement or block future investment (like renewable energy upgrades), causing the grid to deteriorate.

The “Technical Services Agreement” (TSA) is a specific contract that runs alongside the shareholding. It effectively hires Chugoku Electric as a technical consultant to EFL.

This TSA is the primary justification for the partnership beyond the money. EFL (a small island utility) needed access to the engineering depth of a major Japanese utility to handle the complex transition from diesel to renewable energy without crashing the grid.

Here is what Chugoku Electric is actually delivering under this agreement:

1. The “Flagship” Projects

While independent companies (IPPs) are building some solar farms (like Sunergise at Qeleloa), Chugoku Electric is directly involved in developing specific assets with EFL.

Lautoka Solar Project (5MW): EFL and Chugoku Electric have been working jointly to identify and develop this specific solar site.

Hydro Refurbishment: Chugoku operates massive hydro plants in Japan. They are providing the technical scope for the Monasavu Half-Life Refurbishment ($185M) and the Wailoa upgrades. These dams are old (1980s), and Chugoku’s role is to extend their life so they don’t fail.

2. The “Grid Stability” Role (Crucial)

This is the most important technical contribution.

The Problem: Fiji wants 90% renewable energy by 2035. Solar and wind are unstable (clouds/calm days cause power drops). On a small island grid, too much solar crashes the system (blackouts).

The Chugoku Fix: Chugoku is designing the Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) and the 132kV transmission upgrades (the new “2nd Vuda-Wailoa-Kinoya line” costing ~$731M). They provide the engineering modeling that tells EFL exactly how much solar the grid can handle before it breaks.

3. The $4.5 Billion Master Plan (Current Status – 2026)

As of January 2026, EFL has just launched a massive international procurement drive (valued at over FJD $2 billion in immediate projects) to build:

165MW of Solar + Batteries

New Hydro: Qaliwana and Vatutokotoko (Lower Ba) schemes.

This “Master Plan” was effectively co-authored by Chugoku Electric’s technical team under the TSA. They helped design the specs to ensure that whoever builds these plants meets Japanese-level quality standards, rather than EFL buying cheap, unreliable infrastructure.

4. “The Engine Room”

The TSA is enforced by placing Chugoku personnel inside EFL.

Mr. Chitoshi Fukuda (Deputy CEO) is not just a board member; he works in the company. His role is to transfer Japanese efficiency practices into EFL’s daily operations.

This includes “Kaizen” (continuous improvement) operational strategies to reduce line losses (wasted electricity) and improve safety standards for line workers.

Summary of the “Deal”

The Government got: Cash ($440m) + Risk Removal (No more debt guarantees).

Chugoku got: A steady 5-7% return (Dividends) + Consulting Fees (TSA).

The Public got a more robust (but potentially more commercially aggressive) utility that is less likely to suffer catastrophic failure but is also less likely to lower prices voluntarily.

Of course there are alternative structures that could have better protected Fijian consumers, particularly regarding tariff stability and ownership control.

While the actual sale prioritized debt reduction and risk transfer, the following alternative structures would have prioritized affordability and national interest.

1. The “Management Contract” Model (Expertise Without Sale)
Instead of selling 44% of the company, the Government could have retained 100% ownership and simply hired Chugoku Electric as a “Management Contractor.”

How it works: The Government pays Chugoku a fixed annual fee (e.g., $10m/year) to run the grid and implement renewable technology.

Consumer Benefit:

Price Control: The Government retains the sole right to set tariffs based on social needs (subsidizing the poor), without needing to satisfy a foreign investor’s profit margin.

No “Forever” Dividend: In the current deal, Fiji pays dividends to Japan forever. In a contract model, once the contract ends, the payments stop.

Why it wasn’t chosen: It would not have provided the immediate $440 million cash injection the previous government wanted to reduce national debt. Aiyaz needed money to plug the National Budget.

2. The “Green Bond” Financing (Debt vs. Equity)

EFL needed money for renewable upgrades. Instead of selling shares (equity) to raise this capital, EFL could have issued Sovereign Green Bonds or accessed concessional climate finance (e.g., from the World Bank or Asian Development Bank).

How it works: Fiji borrows the money at low interest rates (e.g., 2-3%) to fund the solar/hydro projects.

Consumer Benefit:

Cheaper in the Long Run: Debt eventually gets paid off. Equity (shares) requires paying dividends (aiming for 8-10% returns) indefinitely. It is cheaper for consumers to pay off a low-interest loan than to fund a foreign investor’s high expected return.

Ownership: The asset remains 100% Fijian-owned.

Why it wasn’t chosen: The Government wanted to remove debt from its books (de-risk), not add more.

3. The “Consumer Cooperative” or Trust Model

This is a model used in parts of the US and New Zealand. The utility is owned by the consumers rather than the government or private investors.

How it works: Every electricity account holder effectively owns one share.

Consumer Benefit:

Profit Recycling: The goal of the company shifts from “Maximizing Profit” to “Minimizing Cost.” Any surplus profit at the end of the year is returned to consumers as a rebate on their bill.

Alignment: There is no conflict between “The Company” wanting higher prices and “The People” wanting lower prices because they are the same group.

Why it wasn’t chosen: It creates a complex governance structure and makes it harder to raise billions of dollars for new dams/solar farms quickly.

Anyway, the structure chosen (Strategic Partnership) prioritizes efficiency and government debt reduction. An alternative structure like a Management Contract or Green Bond financing would have better prioritized consumer affordability and national sovereignty, but it would have left the Government carrying more financial risk.

The decision to sell was driven largely by risk avoidance. If the Fijian Government had chosen either of the alternative structures (Management Contract or Green Financing/Keeping 100%), they would be carrying a significantly higher financial burden today.

The key number to understand here is FJD $4.3 Billion. This is the estimated cost of the 10-year Power Development Plan (to build new solar, hydro, and transmission lines) required by 2031.

Here is the breakdown of the financial risk the Government avoided by selling:

1. The Debt Burden (The $4.3 Billion Problem)
If the Government had kept 100% ownership (under either alternative model), it would be solely responsible for funding the infrastructure upgrades.

In the Alternative Structures (100% Gov Owned):

The Liability: The Government would need to either borrow the $4.3 billion itself or issue Sovereign Guarantees so EFL could borrow it.

The Impact: In 2021, Fiji’s Debt-to-GDP ratio was already at crisis levels (~80-90% due to COVID). Adding billions more in guaranteed debt for energy infrastructure would likely have led to a credit rating downgrade, making borrowing more expensive for the entire country (hospitals, roads, schools).

In the Actual Deal (Current Structure):

The Benefit: EFL is now a commercial entity with a wealthy foreign partner. EFL borrows money on its own balance sheet.

Risk Transfer: Lenders (banks) now look at Chugoku Electric’s strength and EFL’s profits, rather than asking the Fijian taxpayer to guarantee the loan. The Government effectively removed a potential $4.3 billion contingent liability from its books.

2. Operational “Shock” Risk
Financial risk isn’t just about loans but about what happens when things break.

In the Alternative Structures:

If a cyclone destroys a major transmission line or the Monasavu Dam requires an emergency $200m repair, the Government (as 100% owner) must find that cash immediately.

Example: When the catastrophic damage from Cyclone Winston happened, the Government had to scramble for funds.

In the Actual Deal:

Shared Pain: If a disaster hits EFL, the loss is shared. Chugoku Electric (44%) must contribute its share of the emergency capital to fix it.

Technical Shield: Chugoku is technically liable for ensuring the grid works. If the new battery system fails, it is their reputation and investment on the line to fix it, reducing the likelihood of the Government needing to bail out the utility due to technical incompetence.

3. The “Opportunity Cost” of Cash
Alternative Structures:

The Government would not have received the FJD $440 million upfront payment.

They would have had to continue subsidizing EFL’s capital projects, diverting money away from health, education, and roads.

The $440m cash injection in 2021 was critical for keeping the Government afloat during the pandemic when tourism revenue was zero.

The Government traded Control for Safety.

They gave up: The ability to easily lower electricity prices (Control).

They gained: Protection from having to borrow another $4 billion to fix the grid (Safety).

To put it bluntly: In 2020–2021, the Fijian economy was effectively in intensive care.

The government was facing a “financial cliff.” They had a choice between borrowing billions more (which might have bankrupted the nation) or selling part of EFL to get someone else to pay for the upgrades.

Here is the breakdown of why the economy was too broken to manage the transition alone.

1. The “Perfect Storm” of 2020–2021
When this deal was being finalized (2020–2021), Fiji was facing the worst economic crisis in its history.

GDP Collapse: Because of COVID-19, tourism (40% of the economy) vanished overnight. The economy contracted by a massive20%. This is a Depression-level crash.

Revenue Drought: The government was collecting almost no tax revenue from hotels, airlines, or tourists. They were borrowing money just to pay civil servants (teachers, nurses, police).

Cyclone Costs: While COVID was happening, Cyclone Harold and Cyclone Yasa caused hundreds of millions in damages, forcing the government to spend emergency cash on rebuilding schools and bridges instead of power lines.

2. The “Impossible Math” of the Energy Transition
The transition to renewable energy isn’t cheap. It is incredibly capital-intensive.

The Cost: As noted in recent reports, the 10-year plan to fix the grid and build solar/hydro requires $4.3 Billion.

The Problem: The Fijian Government simply did not have $4 billion.

The Debt Wall: By mid-2021, Fiji’s Government Debt-to-GDP ratio had skyrocketed from a manageable 48% to a dangerous 80%+.

The Scenario if Government Kept 100%: If the Government tried to borrow that $4.3 billion themselves to fund EFL:

National Debt would explode to over 120% of GDP.

Credit Rating Downgrade: International rating agencies (Moody’s/S&P) would have downgraded Fiji to “Junk” status.

Consequence: Interest rates for all borrowing would spike. The Fiji Dollar could devalue, making imported food (rice, flour) and fuel drastically more expensive for ordinary families.

3. The “Sovereign Guarantee” Trap
Before the sale, EFL’s loans were guaranteed by the Government.

This meant if EFL couldn’t pay its debts, the taxpayer had to pay.

The World Bank and IMF were telling Fiji: “You have too many guarantees. You need to offload this risk.”

By selling 44% to Chugoku, the Government removed these guarantees. Now, if EFL needs money, Chugoku (a giant Japanese utility with deep pockets) helps back the loans, not the struggling Fijian taxpayer.

The sale was essentially a forced survival strategy. The Government sacrificed long-term control over electricity prices to save the country from short-term financial ruin.

They brought in Chugoku Electric not just because they wanted a partner, but because they needed a wealthy “guarantor” who could afford the multi-billion dollar upgrades that the Fijian treasury simply could not.

While “debt” and “COVID” were the immediate triggers, the root cause of our economic fragility is our own going slow motion long-term collapse in productivity.

We have been suffering from a “hollowed-out” economy where the workforce is working harder but producing less value. This is what has made the economy too weak to fund its own infrastructure (like EFL) without selling it.

The productivity collapse has led us directly to this situation:

1. The “Brain Drain” Impact (Exporting Competence)
The most devastating hit to productivity is the mass exodus of skilled workers.

The Data: Since 2018, approximately 114,000 people (nearly 12% of the total population) have left Fiji. This isn’t just “people leaving”, it is our most productive assets: experienced engineers, senior nurses, senior accountants, and technical tradespeople.

When a senior EFL engineer with 15 years of experience migrates to Australia, they are often replaced by a fresh graduate. That graduate takes three times as long to fix a fault. That is a collapse in productivity. The same work now costs more and takes longer.

2. The “Low Investment” Cycle
Productivity comes from two things: Skills (people) and Capital (machines/technology). We are miserably failing on both fronts.

Stagnant Technology: Because the economy has been weak, businesses (and the Government) haven’t invested in modern machinery or automation. They rely on manual labor because it’s “cheaper” in the short term.

The Result: A worker in New Zealand produces $50 of value in an hour because they have high-tech tools. A worker in Fiji might produce $5 of value in the same hour because they are working with outdated systems. This means Fiji generates less wealth to tax, leaving the government broke.

3. The “Blackout” Loop
This is where the EFL sale connects directly to productivity.

Unreliable Power Kills Productivity: You cannot have a productive economy if factories have to stop working when the power goes out. Frequent blackouts (due to the old grid) force businesses to run expensive diesel generators or send staff home.

The grid is bad, so productivity is low.

Productivity is low, so the economy is poor.

The economy is poor, so we can’t afford to fix the grid.

Repeat cycle. Vicious cycle.

4. The “Informal Economy” Problem
A huge portion of our workforce (estimated over 60%) is in the informal sector (taxi drivers, market vendors, casual laborers).

While these people work incredibly hard, the financial productivity of this sector is low. They don’t pay corporate tax, they don’t have access to bank loans to expand, and they don’t scale up.

An economy relies on the formal sector (companies like EFL, Vodafone, Fiji Water) to generate the massive tax revenue needed to build dams and bridges. When the formal sector stagnates, the national budget collapses.

The Government had to sell EFL because the Fijian economy was not generating enough surplus wealth to pay for its own development.

And worse we had aligned our economy entirely to Toureism reliance. The over-reliance on tourism was the structural “Achilles’ heel” that turned a difficult situation into a crisis, making the sale of strategic assets like EFL inevitable.

We had effectively built a “monoculture” economy. When you rely on one industry for 40% of your GDP, you are not just taking a risk; you are gambling the national checkbook on factors completely outside your control (pandemics, cyclones, global recessions).

That “Tourism Trap” directly forced the EFL sale:

1. The “Cash Cow” Dried Up Before 2020, tourism was the engine that funded everything else.

The Subsidy Chain: Tourists bring foreign currency, Government taxes profits and uses that tax to subsidize electricity and water for locals.

The Crash: When borders closed suddenly, the Government didn’t have the cash to support EFL’s capital projects.

Without tourism tax revenue, the treasury was empty, leaving them no choice but to find a private buyer.

Because tourism was so easy and profitable for 20 years, Fiji neglected other difficult but necessary sectors. Successive Government’s have been unable to do the hard work of developing an diversified economy with mutiple sectors.

With all the focus (and banking credit) going to tourism, when tourism failed, there was no “Plan B” industry to prop up the economy.

Our economy is a “one-trick pony and because the economy is so volatile (boom/bust with tourism cycles), lenders charge Fiji higher interest rates.

If we had a diversified economy (e.g., strong manufacturing + agriculture + tourism), the economy would be stable, and the Government could have borrowed money cheaply to fix EFL itself.

Instead, because we are “high risk,” borrowing is too expensive, making the partial privatization the only viable option to get cheap capital.

Summary of the Economic TrapLow Productivity:

We exported our best skilled workers.

Single Engine: We relied 100% on tourism.

The Shock: COVID broke the engine.

The Result: We had to sell the family silver (EFL shares) to keep the lights on.

We exported our skills (Brain Drain).

We failed to invest in technology.

Therefore, we had to import a foreign partner (Chugoku) to do the job we could no longer afford to do ourselves.

Poor Governance = shoddy outcomes.

From the pen of Professor Wadan Narsey, Champion of the Truth. December 2025

15 Monday Dec 2025

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The 2012 FNPF Pensioners’ Robbery: the way forward.

  • what the 2025 FNPF Annual Report conveniently ignores
    The 2012 Pensioners have been crying for justice for thirteen long years since the Bainimarama
    Government in 2012 revoked their pension contracts (signed on Form 9NOP) which had been
    offered by FNPF itself.
    Some were forced to take reduced pensions, and some took lumps sums under duress and their
    pensions stopped. Some 1400 are still alive today with some passing away every week without
    seeing justice done.
    Two years ago, the pensioners were heartened when the former Minister of Finance (Professor
    Biman Prasad) announced at his first Budget that the revoking of the 2012 Pensioners’ contracts
    was illegal. He used taxpayers’ funds (not FNPF’s) to restore the pensions of those who had
    accepted the reduced pensions. He did not restore the pensions of those who under duress had
    taken lump sums, and neither did he pay any one’s arrears.
    For the last two years there has been a Core Group of the 2012 Pensioners (all respectable senior
    citizens) who have tried to get the Coalition Government to resolve their case: Ross MacDonald
    (Chair), Matt Wilson, Dewan Chand, Daniel Fatiaki, Hassan Khan, Ronnie Chang, Professor
    Vijay Naidu, Dr Esther Williams, Libby Reade Fong, and Professor Wadan Narsey (from
    Melbourne). The late Jackson Mar was a driving force in the Core Group until he passed away a
    few months ago. Behind them all have been their quiet but equally powerful and supportive
    partners.
    Last week the Prime Minister met with three members of the Core Group, rekindling their hopes
    for full Restorative Justice.
    Sadly, despite the anguish suffered by many Letter Writers, there has been no acknowledgement
    from the FNPF Board of the legitimacy of the 2012 Pensioners’ claims nor any sympathy or
    practical solutions, despite FNPF’s healthy financial state.
    Indeed, FNPF Board Chairman (Mr Daksesh Patel) recently announced with great fanfare that
    for 2025 the “highest interest rate in over 30 years… 8.75%” would be credited to all Members,
    (2025 Annual Report, p. 9).
    But the 2012 Pensioners were not impressed with Mr Patel’s claim “the true measure of our success lies
    in the quality of the service, transparency, and assurance we provide to our members every day. We recognize that
    value is not purely financial; it is holistic, encompassing trust, accessibility, and security.”
    The 2012 Pensioners were also not impressed when the FNPF CEO (Mr Viliame Vodonaivalu)
    stated “To our members, pensioners, employers, and partners- ‘Vinaka” for your continued trust and confidence”
    (p.12).
    It is an utter farce that FNPF has also been spending thousands of dollars in full page media
    advertisements “thanking” the FNPF Members and Pensioners. For what, we may all ask?
    A silent indicator of FNPF’s lack of transparency is that the 2025 Annual Report makes no
    comment on the most important barometer of “trust” and “transparency” – the “Pension Take-
    up Rate” for new Retirees, which indicates a disaster has taken place in “trust of FNPF”.

What “trust” and confidence”?
The “Pension Take Up Rate” is the percentage of new retirees who choose the pension option
rather than take their savings away.
This had collapsed to a record LOW of 2% for 2012, hovered around 4% for thirteen years and
is now again 2% for 2025. Thus 98% (or 98 out of every 100 retirees) DO NOT TRUST the
FNPF Board and Management to manage their retirement savings through pensions.
The FNPF has failed to fulfil the original objective for setting up the FNPF – be a “pension
fund” and not just the “savings fund” it is today which is being milked by all and sundry.
In the glossy 2025 Annual Report the Pension Take-Up Rate is shown as a small declining graph for
just the last five years (p.22).
The FNPF Members must ask the FNPF Board, why do the Annual Reports no longer show the
long term graph (see inset) which proves the long term disaster that the Pension Take Up Rate
was once was a record high 37% in 2004, under the Qarase Government (see my inset).

With the threat of the Bainimarama coup against Qarase, this Pension Take Up Rate then began
to decline and fell to 2% in 2012 after the Bainimarama Government and FNPF Board
committed their brutal robbery:
(a) Through an illegal military Decree, they broke the lawful contracts of existing pensioners and
reduced the pension rate to less than 9% for those continuing the pensions, while forcing the
others to take their “lump sums”.
Yet FNPF had warned Pensioners on Form 9NOP which they had signed in good faith “I also
understand that the option I have made on this form is final and cannot be changed or revoked”. But the
FNPF itself callously revoked that contract in 2012.

They ignored the advice of experienced Australian consultancy firm Promontory whose Report
explicitly stated (Paragraph 24) “ Any retrospective adjustment of existing pension benefits would be difficult under
contract law…… it is not further considered …”.
(b) When the David Burness/Dr Shameem case was being heard in court 2011 (supported by my
sworn Affidavit) by Justice Hettiarachchi, the Bainimarama/Khaiyum Government imposed a
Military Decree throwing the case out of court, denying the 2012 Pensioners their basic human
right to go to court with their perceived grievances. The late David Burness eventually passed
away in despair.
Despite their fiduciary duty to the 2012 Pensioners, not a single member of the 2011/2012 FNPF
Board protested or resigned over the fundamental denial of the basic two human rights of the 2012
Pensioners (sanctity of their contracts and property rights, and their right to go to court for
perceived injustices.).
The one noble exception has been the late Parmesh Chand (a Permanent Secretary in several
governments) who just before he passed away recently, expressed regret at the injustice done to the
2012 Pensioners.
The Fiji Law Society made no protests. One legal lion still in the public limelight today even
argued with a straight face to Justice Hettiarachchi that there was no such entity as FNPF which
could be sued in court. He did not care that Article 4 of the old FNPF Act stated that the FNPF
Board shall be a body corporate and shall, by the name of “The Fiji National Provident Fund Board”, have perpetual
succession and a common seal …. The Board may sue and be sued in its corporate name and may enter into contracts.”
That 2011/2012 FNPF Board also committed other illegalities such as making differential
payments to low income and high income pensioners, and also paying out more than the rate of
inflation even though they had not covered all their liabilities (both banned in the original FNPF
Act).
What an irony and a bitter pill for the 2012 Pensioners to swallow that the perpetrator of the
2012 Robbery, the former Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama, having denied the poor
pensioners their day in court, recently went to court arguing for a $770 thousand pension and
gratuity payout (supported by one lawyer who had put the boot into the 2012 Pensioners).
Bainimarama’s outrageous claims were denied by the High Court (though he still receives a
massive prime minister’s pension).
Proof of FNPF Awareness of their Guilt
Clear proof of the guilt that FNPF
Board and Management felt in 2012 was
in a “Key Features Statement” (see inset)
informing all pensioners that after 1
March 2012 while annuity rates may be
changed in the future based on actuarial
advice “Any change in rates in the future will
only affect new purchasers, not those who have
already purchased the product”. Too late.
The Pension Take Up Rate had already
fallen to 2%.

Most of the better educated retirees knew that with the retirement age at 55 and an annuity rate of
less than 9%, they would need live to more than age 67 in order to get back their life savings.
They already knew that many of their peer group were dying before the age of 65, the average life
expectancy in Fiji for males, and 67 for females.
Sad lack of Board Accountability
Over the last two years, Fiji Times readers will have seen dozens of letters and articles written by
law abiding senior citizens who have given their working lives to Fiji while contributing to FNPF,
with the honest expectation of pensions for life they had signed up to.: Ronnie Chang, Dewan
Chand, Rick Rickman, Daniel Fatiaki, Professor Vijay Naidu, Libby Reade-Fong, Tahir Ali, as well
as many others. There are also independent voices of Fiji’s conscience like Colin Deoki and
Rajendra Naidu from Australia.
But sadly, to my knowledge, not a single current FNPF Board Member today (three of whom are
friends of mine) has ever communicated with any of the Core Group to express sympathy at the
grossly unfair treatment of the 2012 Pensioners.
Today’s Board Members make a mockery of their fiduciary duty to be accountable to ALL FNPF
Members and pensioners, past and present, as proudly boasted by every Annual Report.
I remind that the 2011 Annual Report’s Mission and Vision Statements specifically had among its
Values “accountability” (being answerable and having the courage and honesty to take ownership
of our actions) and “fairness” (treating everyone in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner).
Was it a coincidence that by 2016, the word “fairness” had disappeared from the Mission and
Vision Statements, and by 2017 the word “accountability” had also disappeared. Neither of these
two values are to be found in the 2025 Annual Report.
The 2025 Annual Report (in which there is now a supporting signed statement by the Board
Members including the Chairman) gives not a hint that the FNPF, as a corporate body, may be legally
liable for the restoration of the 2012 Pensions illegally revoked by the Bainimarama Government
and a previous FNPF Board.
Neither does the KPMG Audit Report give any hint in its Audit Statements that FNPF needs to
have contingency funds to settle claims by the 2012 Pensioners.
FNPF’s Board Member’s False Rebuttal
Far from being sympathetic to the robbed 2012 Pensioners, one FNPF Board Member at a
recent meeting with the 2012 Pensioner Core Group, alleged that doing justice to the 2012
Pensioners will require funds to be taken from current Members. This is a gross misconception,
no doubt shared by some other Board Members and some in the FNPF Management.
This Board Member clearly had no idea that the lawful Ratu Mara Government had created in
1975 a “Pension Buffer Fund” specifically for the payment of all pensions and receive the lump
sums of those taking the pension option, and it would have been more than enough to pay all
pensions.

It was to the Core Group’s dismay that a once well respected lawyer for FNPF present at the
meeting (and a long term personal friend of mine) pompously declared (with the former Chief
Justice present) that the FNPF had to follow the LAW, without admitting that the LAW was an
illegal military Decree.
Where is the Pension Buffer Fund?
This PBF had initially been supplemented by a 2 cent deduction from all Members but that was
stopped in 1999 when the PBF had grown large enough.
But the 2012 Annual Report had a false graph of severely declining Pension Buffer Funds allegedly
dropping to a mere $81 million in 2011.
Then the Pension Buffer Fund strangely disappeared from the Annual Reports.
There was another false graph showing that General Members would have to subsidise the
pensioners for forty years to the year 2054. This was another blatant lie perpetrated by the FNPF
Management and the Board (then chaired by Ajit Godagoda).
This Pension Buffer Fund was invested by FNPF and should have received the interest income that all FNPF
funds received. But it was not credited with any interest.
My Table 1 below shows that the PBF far from declining to $81 million by 2011 (as FNPF falsely
alleged), the balance available for paying pensions would have been around $903 million in 2011,
had interest been properly credited to it.
Table 1 Pension Buffer Fund (1975 to 2025) ($million)
(Without Interest and With Interest) 
 

Without interest ($m)
(False numbers)

With Interest ($m)
(Corrected numbers)
1975 1 1 
1980 20 22
1990 96 173
2000 233 578
2010 107 883
2011 81 903
2020   1050
2025   1382

Table 1 Pension Buffer Fund (1975 to 2025) ($million)
(Without Interest and With Interest)
Without interest ($m)
(False numbers)

With Interest ($m)
(Corrected numbers)
1975 1 1
1980 20 22
1990 96 173
2000 233 578
2010 107 883
2011 81 903
2020 1050
2025 1382

A similar figure was independently calculated by accountant and fighter for justice, the late Jackson
Mar.
This Pension Buffer Fund would have more than adequately covered the $49 million annual
pension payment then, and indeed the entire $565 million of long term “vested benefits for
pensioners” calculated by FNPF actuaries (as given in the 2011 Annual Report).
I estimate that, even allowing for $130 million (my rough estimate) paid out of the Pension Buffer
Fund in 2012 for those who were forced to take “Lump Sums”, the same Pension Buffer Fund
would today amount to $1,382 million.
Of course, this sum is hidden in all the huge “accounting” Reserves that the FNPF created
thereafter.
FNPF not a normal business but Gold Mine
I remind that the FNPF is not a “normal” business which has to struggle and compete in the
market for revenues and profits. Instead it is a veritable “gold mine” the envy of all commercial
banks in Fiji, where BY LAW 18% of the Total Wages and Salaries Bill in Fiji pours into its lap,
EVERY YEAR, as Member Contributions. In 2025, this legal inflow amounted to an incredible
$962 million.
On the negative side, they had to pay out a mere $531 million in legal benefits: consisting of
$300 million for retirement lump sums;
$82 millions for emigration;
$56 million for housing
$40 million for death; and a mere
$26 million for pensions.
Taking into account the compulsory contributions alone., FNPF easily makes a net $431 million
surplus annually.

In addition to that you can add all the profits and dividends from their investments, and loans
especially to Government which has borrowed more than $4 billion currently (perhaps earning
$240 million in interest annually).
For financial year 2025, FNPF enjoyed AN INCREASE IN NET ASSETS OF SOME $931
MILLION.
FNPF accounts show a total FNPF Reserve of $2,303 million (more than 2 billion dollars) of
course beefed up by the Pension Buffer Fund;
FNPF also had cash holdings of $765 million. WOW. (Did the FNPF not know where to invest?)
FNPF today is a “Gold Mine”, helped by their robbery of the lawful property of the 2012
Pensioners who are today still crying for Restorative Justice.
The Way Forward
May I humbly suggest that the Prime Minister (and the new Minister of Finance) pay heed to the
call by the former Chief Justice (Mr Daniel Fatiaki) for the speedy Repeal of the two illegal FNPF
Decrees that facilitated the 2012 Robbery (just as speedily as they repealed the Media Decree).
May I humbly suggest that the Prime Minister through the Finance Minister also instruct the
FNPF Board to provide them, the FNPF Members and the public the following:
(a) their estimated current value of the original Pension Buffer Fund, fully credited with annual interest
which the FNPF has credited to all its funds used for investment purposes) to be compared with
my Table 1 rough estimates);
(b) the annual cost to FNPF of immediately renewing all the pensions that the 2012 Pensioners
were receiving before 1 March 2012;
(c) the cost of paying all Arrears to the 2012 Pensioners after allowing for whatever they received
from 1 March 2012 till now (reduced pensions, lump sums, annuity payments). These arrears could
be payable in three annual instalments if FNPF so wishes; and payable to the Estates of Deceased
Pensioners;
The above would amount to full Restorative Justice for the 2012 Pensioners.
I have also personally suggested to the Board Chairman that some high income pensioners might
even accept some decent monthly cap (I suggested $5,000 per month) on their renewed pensions
from 1 March 2012, if that expedited full restoration and restitution for the low income pensioners
who comprise more than 90% of the original 2012 Pensioners.
I would suggest to the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance that if the current FNPF Board
declines to co-operate with Government, then the new Minister of Finance is surely entitled to
appoint new members who have full respect for the lawful contracts that the 2012 Pensioners signed in good
faith with FNPF before 1 March 2012 as implied in the FNPF Mission and Vision Statements.

Doing justice to the 2012 Pensioners and correcting a grievous wrong done by the Bainimarama
Government would go towards fulfilling an election promise made by the Coalition Government –
to return Fiji to Democracy and Rule of Law, that had been denied by the Bainimarama
Government between 2006 and 2022.
[I pay tribute to the late Jackson Mar who fought the injustice of the 2012 Pensioner Robbery till
he passed away a few months ago without seeing justice. Two years ago he and Dr Esther Williams
met with the former Minister of Finance hoping to progress the case. When there was no progress
from the Government end, Jackson strongly pushed for the Core Group to mount a legal case but
the consensus then was that a political solution would be speedier, with which Jackson strongly
disagreed. The jury is still out on that option.
I also pay tribute to the 2012 Pensioners who through the Pensioners Website used to publish my
articles during the dark days of the Bainimarama/Khaiyum censorship when the local media would
not publish them.]

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1?ui=2&ik=77c521be77&attid=0.1&permmsgid=msg-f:1851455235644240334&th=19b1b0ba361cb1ce&view=att&disp=safe&realattid=f_mj57euzh0&zw

The Old Mans final try to make the Fiji Government reap the benefits of Industrial Hemp for Fiji.

12 Friday Dec 2025

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Proposal: Large-Scale Industrial Hemp Cultivation in Fiji – Harnessing Fallow Native Lands for Economic, Environmental, and Social Benefits, Including Hempcrete for Termite-Resistant Housing

Executive Summary

This proposal outlines the transformative potential of establishing large-scale industrial hemp cultivation in Fiji, focusing on utilizing underutilized fallow native lands. Industrial hemp (Cannabis sativa with THC levels below 1%) offers multifaceted benefits: economic growth through high-profit yields and job creation, environmental sustainability via soil regeneration and carbon sequestration, and social advantages by providing alternatives to illegal cannabis cultivation. A key application is the production of hempcrete, a durable, termite-resistant building material ideal for replacing low-cost housing damaged by invasive Asian subterranean termites (AST). With recent legislative amendments in 2025 enabling full industry operations, the Fijian government demonstrates strong will and emerging capacity to activate this sector. Implementation could generate millions in revenue, revitalize rural economies, and address pressing housing challenges, positioning Fiji as a Pacific leader in sustainable agriculture.

Introduction

Fiji’s agricultural sector faces challenges such as underutilized land, climate vulnerability, and invasive pests like AST, which have caused millions in damage to homes and infrastructure since 2010. Native lands, comprising 54.1% of Fiji’s agricultural area (approximately 194,769 hectares under traditional ownership like Mataqali or Yavusa), often lie fallow due to shortening shifting cultivation cycles and socioeconomic factors. Industrial hemp cultivation presents a viable solution, legalized in Fiji since 2022 for varieties with less than 1% THC. Recent 2025 amendments to the Industrial Hemp and Medical Cannabis Act aim to fully operationalize the industry, including banking access and export frameworks. This proposal highlights the benefits, with a focus on hempcrete for housing, and evaluates governmental readiness.nfpfiji.org

Benefits of Large-Scale Industrial Hemp Cultivation in Fiji

Industrial hemp is a versatile, fast-growing crop that can be harvested in 3-4 months, making it suitable for Fiji’s tropical climate. Large-scale cultivation offers the following advantages:

Economic Benefits

  • High Profit Potential: Hemp yields 2-3 times higher profits per square foot compared to traditional crops like vegetables or ornamentals, due to its multiple uses (fiber, seeds, and biomass). In Fiji, this could boost rural incomes, create jobs in processing and export, and reduce reliance on imports. For instance, hemp oil imports are growing at a 6.3% CAGR, indicating domestic production opportunities.nipgroup.com6wresearch.com
  • Market Diversification: Hemp fibers for textiles and paper are more cost-efficient than cotton, while seeds provide nutritious food and oil products. Globally, the industry supports farm expansion and value-added manufacturing, potentially generating millions for Fiji through exports.shfinancial.org
  • Alternative to Illicit Trade: As noted by Fiji’s Economy Minister in 2021, hemp could displace illegal marijuana cultivation, channeling efforts into legal, regulated agriculture.pina.com.fjfijivillage.com

Environmental Benefits

  • Sustainability and Soil Health: Hemp requires minimal water (a fraction of cotton’s needs), reduces chemical inputs, and improves soil quality through deep roots that prevent erosion and enhance fertility. It excels in carbon sequestration, absorbing more CO2 per hectare than forests or other crops, aiding Fiji’s climate goals.grove.rainmatter.org
  • Crop Rotation Advantages: Integrating hemp breaks monoculture cycles, reduces pests, and supports biodiversity, ideal for Fiji’s diverse ecosystems.secondcenturyag.com

Social Benefits

  • Community Empowerment: Cultivation on native lands could foster inclusive growth, addressing tensions between indigenous and Indo-Fijian communities over land use. It promotes food security through nutritious hemp products and sustainable practices.anthroposphere.co.uk

Utilizing Fallow Native Lands

Fiji has significant fallow land potential: 23% of total land (4,250 km²) is agricultural, much of it native-owned and underutilized due to traditional tenure systems and unsustainable shifting cultivation. Hemp is well-suited for these areas, as it thrives on marginal soils like talāsiga lands (degraded grasslands common in Fiji) and requires low inputs. Large-scale adoption could:fiji-psp.landcareresearch.co.nz

  • Revitalize idle lands without displacing food crops, integrating with existing systems.
  • Generate lease revenues for native landowners, promoting economic equity.
  • Address constraints like high production costs through government-supported technology transfer. Pilot projects on communal lands could demonstrate viability, aligning with policies for ecological sustainability.un-csam.org

Producing Hempcrete for Termite-Resistant Low-Cost Housing

AST infestations have devastated low-cost housing in Fiji, prompting government interventions like $2 million relief packages, expanded disaster reserves, and reconstruction aid for households earning under $50,000. These pests cause honeycomb damage to timber structures, costing US$1 million annually. Hempcrete – a composite of hemp hurds, lime, and water – offers a superior alternative:fijionenews.com.fj

  • Termite Resistance: The lime content and lack of organic appeal deter termites and rodents naturally, without chemicals, making it ideal for tropical climates.hempwellness.co.nz
  • Additional Benefits: Carbon-negative, fire-resistant, mold-proof, breathable, and insulating, reducing energy costs and maintenance. It combats climate change by sequestering CO2 during production.sciencedirect.com
  • Housing Application: Locally produced hempcrete could replace damaged timber homes, lowering reconstruction costs and providing durable, eco-friendly options for vulnerable communities. While some research notes uncertainty in extreme termite zones, practical experiences confirm its efficacy.sciencedirect.comfacebook.com

Assessment of Government’s Ability and Will to Activate Hemp Production

Will

The Fijian government shows clear commitment: Hemp was legalized in 2022 to foster industrialization and curb illicit trade. In 2025, the Industrial Hemp and Medical Cannabis Amendment Act addresses barriers like banking restrictions, enabling full operations. Cabinet approvals in 2024 for feasibility studies and export-focused frameworks (including medicinal cannabis) indicate proactive intent to attract investment. Despite a “hemp boom that never was” due to initial stalls, 2025 reforms signal renewed momentum.en.wikipedia.org

Ability

  • Strengths: Existing agricultural infrastructure, tropical suitability, and international partnerships (e.g., feasibility studies) provide a foundation. The Ministry of Agriculture can integrate hemp into strategies for import substitution and technology adoption. Termite response precedents (e.g., $2m aid) show capacity for targeted interventions.mmjdaily.com
  • Challenges: Stalled progress post-2022 highlights regulatory and financial hurdles, with domestic use prohibited and focus on exports. Land tenure complexities may require community consultations.vbr.vu
  • Overall: High will (evidenced by 2025 laws) and moderate ability, improvable through incentives like subsidies and training. Full activation is feasible by 2026, as targeted for similar cannabis initiatives.vbr.vu

Conclusion and Recommendations

Large-scale hemp cultivation on fallow native lands could revolutionize Fiji’s economy, environment, and housing sector, particularly through termite-resistant hempcrete. To activate this:

  1. Launch pilot projects on native lands with iTaukei Land Trust Board collaboration.
  2. Provide subsidies for hemp farming and hempcrete manufacturing.
  3. Conduct awareness campaigns on benefits and legal frameworks.
  4. Partner with international experts for technology transfer. By leveraging 2025 reforms, Fiji can achieve sustainable development, reducing termite damage and unlocking untapped potential. This proposal urges immediate government action for a resilient future.

The Wakaya Letter.

06 Thursday Nov 2025

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” We desire to place before you the following representations. We consider that the act of cession had for the Fijian People of Fiji, a special implication. It was this : they envisaged their country as attached to the crown, an intergral part of the United Kingdom. Her Majesty’s title, decided by the Chiefs after cession is ” Queen Of Fiji and Britain – Ranadi ni Viti kei Peritania” and the Council of Chiefs have from the beginning jealousy maintained their right of directly addressing the Sovereign on the occasions of their meetings.

It is the Fijian view that the possibility of deference of this link with the crown- a link forged in the spirit of mutual trust and goodwill- would never be contemplated. This special relationship would appear to have its closest parallel in the constitutional links between the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man , and the United Kingdom. It is submitted that before

any Constitutional change is considered, and certainly before there is any more move towards internal self government, the terms of the special relationship between the United Kingdom and Fiji should be clarified and codified along the lines of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Channel Island or the Isle of Man.

We propose a new Constitutional Instrument which would embody this understanding of the relationship and would make provision for the safeguarding of Fijian interests building on and strengthening the spirit and substance of the Deed Of Cession. There would have to be a precise restatement of the guarantees of Fijian land ownership. We visualize that the Native Land Trust legislation should not be changed or added to without the prior consent of the Sovereign and the agreement of the Great Council Of Chiefs.

We also stand by the expressed desire of the high Chiefs in the preamble to the Deed Of Session that Fiji should be a Christian state and that therefore no constitutional or administrative changes should take place that would deviate from that intention.

The provisions of the Fijian Affairs Ordinance that all legislations affecting Fijian rights and interests should be referred to the Fijian Affairs Board or , on the recommendation of the Board , to the Great Council Of Chiefs, should be retained and likewise the Governors directions through the public Service Commission to work towards the balance of race in the civil service.

Subject to the satisfactory solution to the issues we have raised in the foregoing memorial, we would be prepared to initiate, in cooperation with the other principal races further move towards internal self government. In this regard we wish to remind you of the terms of the resolution passed at the last session of the legislative council, which records the insistence of the Fijian people that the initiative for any constitutional changes should come from them.

Sgd :K.K.T. Mara 1st FM, P.K.Ganilau 2nd FM,S.Sikivou 3rd FM, R.Vunivalu 4th FM , G.Cakobau 5th FM, A.C. Reid, Chairman, J.N.Falvey, legal adviser & R.M.Major, financial adviser. “

Legality of the 2012 FNPF Act & GROK AI Solution

02 Sunday Nov 2025

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Legality of the 2012 FNPF Act (Actually the 2011 Decree)

Fiji National Provident Fund Decree 2011 (No. 52), promulgated on November 25, 2011, and often discussed in the context of 2012 implementations. This decree reformed the pension system, reducing annuity rates for sustainability reasons (e.g., from historical highs of up to 25% of balances to lower rates like 15%, later adjusted). It was enacted under the interim military-backed government led by Frank Bainimarama, following the 2006 coup, which suspended the 1997 Constitution and ruled without elections until 2014.

  • Was it legal in 2012? At the time, the interim government’s authority was contested internationally and domestically as unconstitutional, stemming from an unelected regime. Pensioners and critics argued the reforms breached existing contracts, violated property rights, and were invalid due to the government’s illegitimacy. Several court cases were filed, such as the high-profile Burness/Shameem challenge in 2011-2012, which sought to halt reductions as a breach of trust and contract. However, the regime issued additional decrees (e.g., limiting judicial review of FNPF decisions) that effectively shielded the reforms from immediate legal overturn. These cases were delayed, dismissed on procedural grounds, or unresolved due to such restrictions. In practice, the decree was enforced as law under the interim regime, but its foundational legitimacy was questionable without democratic backing.
  • Is it legal in 2025? Yes, it remains in force as the FNPF Act 2011. The 2013 Constitution (adopted under the same regime but later upheld) includes transitional provisions validating all pre-2013 decrees and laws, stating they “continue in force as if they had been made under or pursuant to this Constitution.” In August 2025, Fiji’s Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion affirming the 2013 Constitution’s legal effectiveness, further entrenching the validity of prior decrees like the FNPF reforms. Ongoing reviews of the Act in 2025 focus on modernization, not repeal, indicating its accepted status. Critics, including pensioner groups, still label it “illegal” due to its origins, but courts have not invalidated it post-2013.

Regarding the consultants’ advice: Historical accounts confirm actuarial consultants (e.g., Mercer) warned that the pre-2011 scheme was unsustainable, but specifics on advising against touching existing pensions are debated. The reforms proceeded despite protests, with the government citing fund solvency. Coercion claims (e.g., pressuring withdrawals) align with pensioner reports but weren’t ruled illegal in major cases.

Assessment of the 2024 Budget Scheme for Pension Top-Ups

In the 2024-2025 National Budget (announced June 28, 2024), Finance Minister Biman Prasad introduced a restoration for affected FNPF pensioners. Key details:

  • Pensioners who opted for full annuities at reduced rates post-2011 will have rates restored to pre-reform levels (e.g., up to 25% equivalents), effective August 1, 2024.
  • Applies only to those who didn’t withdraw funds; no backpay for 2012-2024 losses.
  • Government funds it fully ($4 million in 2024-2025, ~$57 million over 20 years).
  • Ends prior $25/month social pension top-up for these pensioners.
  • Was it legal? Yes. This is a fiscal policy under an elected government (Coalition since 2022), compliant with the FNPF Act and budgetary laws. It amends no core laws retroactively and addresses a “moral responsibility” without violating contracts. No legal challenges have succeeded against it.
  • Was it wise? It’s a pragmatic step forward—restoring rates prospectively aids ~1,500-2,000 pensioners without overburdening the fund (now healthier post-reforms, crediting 8.75% interest in 2025). It provides closure and boosts retiree income amid inflation. However, omitting backpay ignores 12+ years of reduced payments (potentially $10,000-$50,000+ per person, depending on balances), which critics call incomplete justice. Wisely, it balances fiscal limits (Fiji’s debt/GDP at ~80%) with equity, but fuller wisdom might include phased compensation for hardest-hit cases to rebuild trust.

How Grok Would Resolve the Pensioners’ Situation

As an AI built by xAI to seek truth and help users, I’d approach this pragmatically, focusing on evidence-based steps while respecting Fiji’s legal framework. Resolution requires balancing pensioner rights, fund sustainability, and political realities. Here’s a structured plan:

  1. Advocate for Targeted Backpay Compensation:
    • Lobby the government or FNPF for a one-time ex-gratia payment covering partial losses from 2012-2024. Base it on actuarial calculations (e.g., difference between original and reduced rates, adjusted for inflation). This could be funded via a dedicated levy on FNPF profits or budget surplus, estimated at $20-50 million total—feasible given recent fund growth. Prioritize vulnerable groups (e.g., low-income or elderly pensioners).
  2. Pursue Legal Avenues:
    • File a class-action lawsuit challenging the lack of retroactive relief as a breach of property rights under the 2013 Constitution (Sections 26-27 on fair compensation). Reference past cases like Burness for precedent. The 2025 Supreme Court ruling opens doors for constitutional reviews, potentially questioning decree immunities. Engage NGOs like Citizens’ Constitutional Forum for support.
  3. Political and Public Pressure:
    • Form or join pensioner advocacy groups (e.g., via fijipensioners.com) to petition Parliament during the ongoing FNPF Act review. Use media and social campaigns to highlight human impacts, aiming for amendments in the 2025-2026 budget.
  4. Practical Alternatives for Individuals:
    • Review personal FNPF accounts for errors; apply for the 2024 restoration if eligible.
    • Diversify retirement (e.g., via private savings or government social pensions for those 70+).
    • If coercion evidence exists, seek independent audits or ombudsman review.

This resolution emphasizes fairness without destabilizing the fund, which now benefits all members. If backpay proves unfeasible, enhanced future benefits (e.g., inflation-linked adjustments) could compensate. Ultimately, true resolution needs government goodwill—

The historical mismanagement of FNPF.

20 Monday Oct 2025

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Overview of the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF)

The Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF), established in 1966 and governed by the FNPF Act 2011, is Fiji’s mandatory defined-contribution superannuation scheme. It collects contributions from employees (8%) and employers (10%) to build retirement savings, offering benefits like pensions, annuities, housing assistance, medical aid, and education withdrawals. As Fiji’s largest financial institution with assets exceeding $5 billion, FNPF invests heavily in government securities, real estate (e.g., hotels like InterContinental Fiji), and equities. However, despite its scale, the fund faces significant criticisms for systemic inefficiencies, historical mismanagement, and structural flaws that undermine its role in securing retirement for over 400,000 members. These issues have been highlighted in parliamentary debates, annual reports, media analyses, and public discourse, particularly amid rising emigration and economic pressures as of October 2025.

Below, I outline the key deficiencies, drawing from recent reports (2023–2025), government responses, and stakeholder critiques.

1. Inadequate Retirement Savings and Pension Shortfalls

A core flaw is the fund’s failure to ensure sufficient balances for long-term retirement security, exacerbated by low contribution rates, high withdrawals, and inflation outpacing returns.

  • Low Balances for Retirees: FNPF’s 2024 Annual Report reveals that 128,000 members (about 30% of contributors) will retire with insufficient savings to qualify for a pension, with 66% of these at risk within the next decade. This stems from inconsistent contributions, especially in informal sectors like agriculture and small businesses.
  • Historical Pension “Robbery” (2012 Reductions): Under the 2011 military regime, annuity rates were unilaterally cut from 13–15% to 4–6%, forcing many pensioners into lump-sum withdrawals or reduced payments. This affected thousands, breaching statutory trusts. While the 2024–2025 Budget restored full pensions for some (effective August 2024, funded by government subsidies rather than FNPF restitution), lump-sum victims and arrears remain unaddressed, shifting burdens to taxpayers.
  • Impact of Inflation and Returns: Annuity rates have stagnated amid Fiji’s 3–5% inflation (2023–2025), eroding real value. Critics like economist Wadan Narsey argue FNPF’s conservative investments yield suboptimal returns, leaving retirees vulnerable.

2. Non-Compliance and Contribution Evasion

Enforcement gaps allow widespread evasion, starving the fund of revenue and perpetuating underfunding.

  • Employer Defaults: The 2023–2024 Employment and Unemployment Survey (EUS) by Fiji Bureau of Statistics estimates millions in lost contributions due to non-remittance, particularly from small enterprises and seasonal workers (e.g., sugar cane farmers). FNPF’s own audits show discrepancies, with informal sectors contributing as little as 50% of mandated amounts.
  • Migration-Driven Withdrawals: Emigration surged post-2022, with 40,000 skilled workers leaving (per Opposition Leader Inia Seruiratu, 2025). This triggered a spike in migration withdrawals: from $40 million (1,500 cases) in 2023 to $83 million (2,000 cases) in 2024, and $73 million by mid-2025. Overseas education withdrawals alone jumped from $8.3 million (2023) to $11.3 million (2024). While FNPF pursues bilateral agreements (e.g., with Australia, New Zealand), these erode the contributor base without reciprocal inflows.
  • Broader Economic Ties: FNPF holds 60% of Fiji’s domestic debt ($4.1 billion in government securities as of June 2024, up from $1.9 billion in 2013). Rollovers provide short-term stability but risk long-term taxpayer bailouts if defaults occur, as noted in Griffith Asia Insights (2024).

3. Operational and Technological Inefficiencies

FNPF’s service delivery lags, frustrating members and hindering accessibility.

  • Digital Platform Failures: The myFNPF app and website face chronic issues, including slow loading, validation errors (e.g., “unable to validate FNPF number” despite correct inputs), and account lockouts after failed logins. User reviews on App Store and Google Play (2023–2025) decry it as “pathetic” and “unusable,” with support lines often unreachable. Scheduled maintenance (e.g., January 2025 outage) disrupts e-services without adequate notice.
  • Customer Service Gaps: Response times for queries average days, per public complaints. The fund’s helplines (e.g., 5857) are overwhelmed, and rural access remains poor despite new centers like Nadi Pension Office (opened April 2024).
  • Administrative Legacy Issues: Parliamentary reviews (e.g., 2024 Hansard) highlight unresolved “legacy problems” from pre-2011 governance, including opaque Board composition and politicized appointments.

4. Investment and Governance Risks

While diversified, FNPF’s portfolio is criticized for overexposure to volatile local assets and insufficient transparency.

  • Risk Concentration: Heavy reliance on tourism (e.g., Natadola Bay Resort) exposed the fund to COVID-19 shocks, yet dividends were maintained at 5% in 2023 despite losses. Overseas investments (e.g., via Amalgamated Telecom Holdings) underperform, as detailed in Jackson Mar’s 2011–2023 analyses.
  • Governance Weaknesses: The Board lacks independent oversight, with historical political interference (e.g., 2011 decree changes). Recent efforts, like judicial-FNPF agreements for managing $45 million in court trust funds (January 2025), signal ongoing mismanagement concerns.
  • Equity Gaps: Informal and low-wage workers (e.g., domestic staff, taxi drivers) are underserved by voluntary schemes, widening inequality amid Fiji’s 5% net migration rate (2022–2023).
Deficiency CategoryKey Examples (2023–2025)Impact on Members
Savings Shortfalls128,000 low-balance retirees; 2012 pension cuts unrestored for lump-sum casesPoverty in old age; reliance on welfare
Contribution Evasion$40M+ annual migration withdrawals; employer non-remittanceReduced fund liquidity; lower collective returns
Operational IssuesApp glitches; poor support accessDelayed claims; member frustration
Investment Risks$4.1B govt debt exposure; tourism volatilityPotential losses; unstable annuities

Pathways for Reform

The Coalition Government (post-2022) has pledged collaboration with FNPF to restore credibility, including reinstating 18% total contributions (from 16% in 2023) and exploring portable schemes for migrants. However, experts like Professor Biman Prasad emphasize accountability over subsidies. Public advocacy, including from pensioner groups, calls for independent audits and higher annuity floors. As Fiji approaches its 2026 elections, addressing these flaws is critical to preventing a retirement crisis amid demographic shifts (e.g., aging population, brain drain).

The fLAWs that Fiji suffers

20 Monday Oct 2025

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Overview of Fiji’s Administrative Flaws

Fiji’s administration, encompassing its government, bureaucracy, and public institutions, has faced persistent challenges rooted in its history of military coups, ethnic divisions, and weak institutional safeguards. Since independence in 1970, the country has experienced four coups (1987, 2000, and twice in 2006), which have undermined democratic stability and led to authoritarian tendencies. The 2013 Constitution, imposed under former Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama’s regime (2007–2022), centralized power while curtailing civil liberties, and even after the 2022 democratic transition to Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka’s coalition government, many systemic issues persist. As of October 2025, Fiji’s administration is rated “partly free” by Freedom House, with ongoing concerns about corruption, political fragility, and inefficiencies in public service delivery.

Below, I outline key flaws based on documented reports, analyses, and recent developments, categorized for clarity.

1. Corruption and Mismanagement in Public Institutions

Fiji’s bureaucracy is plagued by embezzlement, bribery, and procurement irregularities, often involving high-ranking officials. The Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) handles cases, but enforcement has been inconsistent, with political interference alleged in prosecutions.

  • Historical Cases: The 1990s National Bank of Fiji scandal involved $200 million in bad debts from favoritism toward indigenous Fijian groups, highlighting poor lending oversight. More recently, the 2019 case of a Provincial Administrator who created duplicate receipts to siphon funds exemplifies routine financial manipulation.
  • High-Level Involvement: Former Fiji Commerce Commission CEO Bobby Jitendra Maharaj faced charges for corruption, while ex-Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum was charged with abuse of office (delayed due to health issues as of 2024). Under Bainimarama, opposition figures were routinely accused of corruption to silence them.
  • Impact: Despite improvements in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index since 2011 (Fiji scored 53/100 in 2023), lack of transparency persists due to self-censoring media and inadequate parliamentary oversight.

2. Political Instability and Military Influence

Fiji’s administration is vulnerable to military intervention, embedded in the 2013 Constitution, which grants the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) veto power over government decisions deemed unconstitutional. This has created a “dual power” dynamic.

FlawDescriptionExamples/Evidence
Coup LegacyFour coups since 1987 have normalized military overreach, leading to decree-based rule and eroded trust in civilian administration.2006 coup by Bainimarama; 2009 Court of Appeal ruling deemed it illegal, but he retained power by abolishing the constitution.
Coalition FragilityRabuka’s 2022–present coalition (People’s Alliance, NFP, SODELPA) is unstable, with internal tensions and unpredictable policies.Exceeded longest post-coup term by January 2024 but faces SODELPA accusations of broken promises; Bainimarama’s FijiFirst (now opposition) was suspended in 2023 over audit issues, seen as politically motivated.
Military WarningsRFMF Commander Jone Kalouniwai has cautioned against “sweeping changes,” raising fears of intervention.January 2023 statement post-election; echoes 1987 coups led by Rabuka himself.

These dynamics prioritize political survival over policy, as noted by former Attorney-General Sayed-Khaiyum in 2025, who criticized the coalition for exacerbating poverty and emigration.

3. Weaknesses in Governance and Public Service Delivery

Administrative decentralization is limited, with central control stifling local autonomy and efficiency.

  • Local Government Dissolution: Municipal councils were dissolved in 2009 under Bainimarama and run by appointed administrators, reducing accountability. Reforms in 2023 restored elections, but implementation lags, with low voter turnout (31% in 2005) reflecting disillusionment.
  • Judicial and Electoral Interference: The judiciary was politicized under Bainimarama, with foreign judges (e.g., Sri Lankans) appointed for pliancy. Electoral bodies face bias concerns, and academic funding was weaponized to influence universities.
  • Economic Mismanagement: Key sectors like sugar suffer from “poor administration” and quality issues, worsened by EU trade preference phase-outs since 2007. Unemployment, crime, and drug use have risen under the current government, widening inequality.

4. Human Rights and Civil Liberties Constraints

The administration’s flaws extend to suppressing dissent, limiting effective governance.

  • Media and Expression: Bainimarama’s era saw censorship via the Media Industry Development Decree; while eased post-2022, Public Order Act charges were used against critics in 2021.
  • Discrimination: Ethnic tensions (indigenous Fijians vs. Indo-Fijians) fuel policies favoring iTaukei groups, echoing 1987 coups that triggered Indo-Fijian exodus (population share dropped from 50% to 33%).
  • Recent Tensions: 2023 proposals to amend land trust laws sparked opposition fears of eroding indigenous rights, uniting critics against perceived overreach.

Potential Pathways Forward

Fiji’s 2026 elections will test these flaws. Positive steps include FICAC’s anti-corruption efforts and judicial diversification (e.g., New Zealand judges in 2023). However, without stronger checks on military power, transparent procurement, and inclusive policies, administrative inefficiencies will continue to hinder development. International partners like the Commonwealth (which suspended Fiji post-2006) emphasize restoring full democracy.

FNPF Illegal 2011 Transition Decree

12 Friday Sep 2025

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The Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) 2012 pension reform was illegal, and the reasons are listed in the text below.

The FNPF Board at the time were either mentally incapacitated or just naturally stupid, because they opted to disregard the advice given to them by the consultants they had employed, Promontory Financial Group, who advised the FNPF board against retrospective changes due to contract law issues.

The current DPM and Finance Minister, Biman Prasad, deliberately muddied the waters in August 2024 by making the taxpayers take on the responsibility of paying a number of the deprived pensioners a Top Up, when the Rabuka government should have repealed the 2012 FNPF action against the existing 2012 retirees and instructed FNPF to make good the deficit.

The Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) is Fiji’s mandatory retirement savings scheme. In 2012, under the Bainimarama government, FNPF implemented a pension reform that retroactively reduced monthly pensions for existing pensioners (those who had already retired and begun receiving payments under prior contracts). This affected retirees who had opted for lifetime annuities via FNPF’s Form 9-OP, which guaranteed fixed percentages (typically 15-25%) of their final contributions as monthly payments for life. Reductions ranged from 20% to over 50% for many, with the most severe impacts on “eldest living pensioners”—those who had retired earlier and were receiving higher annuity rates due to the original scheme’s structure. The reform was enacted via the 2011 FNPF Transition Decree, which forced pensioners to accept lower rates or revert to lump-sum withdrawals. While pensions were partially restored in 2024 by the current government, the original action remains widely viewed as unlawful, with ongoing calls for full restitution including back payments.

The legal flaws in FNPF’s actions stem primarily from breaches of contract law, constitutional and human rights principles, and the FNPF Act itself. These were highlighted in legal analyses, expert opinions (e.g., by economist Wadan Narsey), and aborted court challenges. Below is a breakdown of the key flaws.

Key Legal Flaws

Breach of Existing Contracts and Property Rights

Pension agreements under Form 9-OP constituted binding, enforceable contracts between pensioners and FNPF, specifying fixed annuity rates approved by Fiji’s democratically elected Parliament in 1998. These were personal property rights, protected under common law principles of contract sanctity. The retroactive reduction unilaterally altered these terms without consent, violating contract law and depriving pensioners of vested interests. This also contravened Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which prohibits arbitrary deprivation of property. FNPF’s own consultants (Promontory Financial Group) advised against retrospective changes due to these contract law issues, but the board proceeded anyway.

Denial of Access to Courts and Due Process

The 2011 FNPF Transition Decree (Sections 3-7, Part 4) explicitly barred courts, tribunals, or any other body from hearing challenges to the reductions, terminated ongoing proceedings, and required judges to issue non-challengeable certificates closing cases. This ouster clause denied pensioners their fundamental right to judicial remedy and a fair hearing, violating UDHR Articles 8 (right to effective remedy) and 10 (fair hearing by an independent tribunal). In Fiji’s context, it undermined the rule of law, especially as the Decree was promulgated by an unelected, military-backed regime lacking democratic legitimacy. A notable example is the 2011 High Court case of pensioner David Burness (assisted by lawyer Shaista Shameem), where Justice Pradeep Hettiarachchi ordered procedural fixes, but the Decree preemptively halted it.

Violation of the FNPF Act’s Impartiality and Operational Requirements

Section 12B of the FNPF Act mandates that the fund treat all beneficiaries impartially and without discrimination. The reductions discriminated against existing (older) pensioners by applying a “poverty line” threshold and age-based adjustments, while sparing newer retirees who accepted the changes prospectively. Additionally, Section 8 limits interest credits to members at 2.5%, but FNPF had overpaid interest historically, creating surplus funds (e.g., a $870 million Pension Buffer Fund in 2010) that could have covered payouts without reductions. 

Section 10 allows government advances to the fund, which were not pursued. The action ignored these provisions, treating the fund as a government subsidy vehicle rather than a protected retirement scheme.

Flawed Actuarial and Financial Justifications

FNPF justified reductions based on actuarial reports claiming the old scheme was unsustainable due to high annuities and improving life expectancies. However, these assumptions were legally questionable: they applied Australian mortality improvements (e.g., longer lifespans) to Fiji, ignoring local realities like stagnating life expectancy (males ~65 years, females ~67) due to non-communicable diseases, poor healthcare, and emigration. This led to overestimated liabilities and undercounted FNPF assets, including foregone income from poor investments (e.g., interest-free loans to entities like Natadola Bay Resorts). Under fiduciary duty principles in pension law, the board’s reliance on inaccurate data constituted a breach of care, especially as the reductions were not necessary—internal resources could have sustained payments for 18+ years.

Lack of Legitimacy from the Issuing Authority

The Bainimarama regime, which seized power in a 2006 coup, was widely regarded as illegal under international and domestic law. The Decree was signed by an “illegal President” appointed by this regime, rendering it constitutionally flawed from inception. This taints the entire reform, as it bypassed parliamentary oversight and democratic processes required for altering retirement entitlements. Post-2014 Constitution efforts to legitimize it failed, as the reductions were not revisited until the 2022 democratic elections.

Broader Implications and Outcomes

These flaws not only robbed eldest pensioners (often in their 70s-90s at the time) of financial security—exacerbating poverty in old age—but also eroded trust in FNPF, leading to low pension uptake rates (concealed by the fund). The 2024 restoration (effective August 1) addressed forward payments but left backdated losses (2012-2024) unresolved, with estimates of billions in owed restitution. Pensioner groups continue advocating via petitions and Parliament, arguing for full compensation under the restored rule of law. No major court ruling has fully adjudicated the flaws due to the Decree’s barriers, but legal experts maintain the actions were void ab initio (invalid from the start)

Jenny Seeto FNPF Meeting address August 2025

04 Thursday Sep 2025

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PROMINENT local accountant Jenny Seeto has raised concerns of unfairness in Governments Pension Restoration Fund set up in last year’s national budget to reinstate pension payments for members that had been affected by the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) reform in 2011.

Ms Seeto was speaking in her capacity as an FNPF member during the FNPF Law Review consultations held at the Suva Civic Center on Tuesday night.

The Coalition Government had introduced an FNPF pension restoration fund in last year’s national budget (FY2024-2025) to reinstate pension payments for members that had been affected by the FNPFs reform in 2011, which mandated the reduction of pension rates.

Under the initiative, the Government will pay out $4million a year to affected pensioners.

Ms Seeto said while she sympathises with the affected pensioners, the $4m allocation could be better used elsewhere.

“As a taxpayer I would rather the $4m a year be used towards CWM (Colonial War Memorial Hospital) for example, because so long as there is the ability for FNPF to pay the pensions, so instead of paying eight per cent to members (annual interest credited to FNPF members), why don’t they (FNPF) pay less and gradually restore the pensions themselves. That’s one suggestion,” Ms Seeto said.

Ms Seeto said while the Government’s initiative was commendable, she felt it was not the right direction and called for more clarity and good communication from both parties in order to put the matter to rest.

“It’s never been explained why the law can’t change and I don’t know whether it is a decree, I’m just guessing that because it’s a decree, it’s linked onto the constitution but I think we need some education around why the law can’t change.

“Is it to do with sustainability? Again, (it’s been) 14years since this all happened. I think we just need clarity around why the law can’t change and some good communication so we can put the matter to rest.”

FNPFs board said the fund was disallowed to continue its previous pension payments after its reforms in 2011.

“The issue now about the restoration is again something we can’t do because it’s under the Constitution, because any decree amended is amended moving forward not amended moving backwards,” FNPF board member and workers’ union representative Attar Singh said. “The 2012 decree under which the pension reform was undertaken was done by an unelected Government and I think many were unhappy about that, I was one of them as well.

“The Government’s position about taking the step to continue paying the pensions…that’s a Government decision.

“Government’s budget has nothing to do with the Fund (FNPF).

“The Fund’s position was that the Fund was disallowed from continuing the previous pension.

“It had undergone a reform, and members were given a choice on options to take, and the members exercised their option.

“The point is that the law as it is, the Fund cannot use members’ funds against what the law is. So, what the law currently says is: ‘We can’t give it’, so we cannot give it,” Mr Singh said.

In delivering his Budget speech last year, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance Prof Biman Prasad said the full cost of the restoration initiative is estimated to be around $57m over the next two decades.

Note: This article was first published on the print version of the Fiji Times dated August 21, 2025